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Chapter 1 
 
 
Subsidizing Employment – An Introduction1 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Unemployment is one of the most pressing economic problems of our times. 
Large European countries, in particular, suffer from mass unemployment and have 
not found an appropriate cure yet. Although total unemployment is high, large 
differences exist between different qualification levels. While unemployment of 
college graduates is relatively low, the market for low-skilled labor is in a deep 
crisis. OECD unemployment rates of low-skilled persons are on average more 
than twice as high as those of high-skilled persons. 
On a global level, the literature identifies two reasons for this development. First, 
skill-biased technological progress raises the complementarity between capital 
and high-skilled labor and the substitutability between capital and low-skilled 
labor. Hence, capital accumulation widens the productivity gap between the 
different qualification levels and worsens the relative position of the low-skilled 
(Falk and Koebel 2002). Second, economic integration and international trade 
threaten either the income position or the jobs of the low-skilled in the developed 
world.2 As a consequence, low-skilled individuals have to accept lower wages – 
which drives them into the “working poor“ – or they are forced out of the labor 
market. The latter happens in countries with generous welfare systems that 
provide wage-replacement benefits that implicitly result in too high minimum 
wages: wages at which firms are willing to hire workers become too low to induce 
the low-skilled to work, and wages at which the low-skilled are willing to work 
are not affordable by firms. This wedge is widened by taxes and social security 
contributions.
                                                 
1 Parts of this chapter were written in collaboration with Ronnie Schöb and Joachim Weimann and 
have been published in Kyklos (Knabe, Schöb and Weimann 2006b). 
2 For evidence for the impact of technological progress and international integration on low-skill 
employment and wages, see Acemoglu (2002), Johnson and Stafford (1999), Hijzen et al. (2005), 
and the references cited therein.  
Chapter 1: Subsidizing employment – An introduction 
 2
Wage subsidies may be a possible remedy to this problem. If reservation wages 
exceed the productivity levels of the low-skilled, the government could pay the 
difference to close the gap and thereby restore the low-wage segment. Kaldor 
(1936) was the first to propose a general wage subsidy. The main drawback of 
such a general wage subsidy, however, is its fiscal cost. Wage subsidies have to 
be paid for all employees, although the labor demand stimulus works only at the 
margin. This creates large windfall gains for already existing employment. Firms 
receive the subsidy even if they do not create a single new job.  
An efficient way to reduce the fiscal burden is to restrict the subsidy to the extra 
jobs created by a firm in addition to some reference employment level. Such so-
called marginal employment subsidies could lower marginal labor costs by a 
much larger amount than an equal-cost general subsidy and thus create more 
employment, or, alternatively, create the same marginal stimulus at lower costs. 
Even though the fiscal advantage seems obvious, marginal employment subsidies 
have received rather little attention in the economic literature and do not play a 
major role in the current policy debate. The main goal of this dissertation is thus 
to revive the interest in this type of employment subsidization, but also to 
critically analyze its main drawbacks.  
In this chapter, we set the stage by discussing why subsidizing wages appears to 
be a reasonable policy for revitalizing the low-skilled labor market, especially in 
Continental Europe. We present some stylized facts on the extent and causes of 
low-skill unemployment, review the existing literature, and discuss the 
requirements for an efficient wage subsidy scheme for the low-skilled in 
Continental European type of welfare states. At the end of this chapter, we 
summarize the main results of this dissertation. 
In Chapter 2, we will present a recent proposal for a marginal employment 
subsidy for Germany. The so-called Magdeburg Alternative suggests a permanent 
rebate of the social security contributions of additional employees to their 
employers. This reduces labor costs at the margin without affecting net wages. 
The problem with such a scheme is, however, that firms can replace regular paid 
workers by outsourcing employment to newly established firms. To avoid this 
effect, the Magdeburg Alternative features double marginal subsidization of 
incumbent firms. If an incumbent firm hires a formerly unemployed worker in 
excess of its reference employment level, it receives the subsidy not only for the 
new employee, but also for one incumbent employee. This reduces the incentive 
to crowd out regular employment and results in even larger employment effects. If 
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it functioned perfectly, the Magdeburg Alternative could then eliminate the 
German unemployment problem without imposing an additional fiscal burden. 
According to their critics, however, it is highly unlikely that marginal 
employment subsidies function so perfectly. Instead, marginal subsidization could 
trigger large-scale displacement between firms. Some firms would expand their 
employment levels and receive a subsidy for the additionally created jobs. This 
gives them a cost advantage, which they could use to undercut their competitors. 
Other firms, who do not increase their employment levels fast enough to gain a 
similar cost advantage, have to cut jobs or are completely driven out of the 
market. In the end, marginal employment subsidization might have created a large 
number of new jobs in some firms, but most of these jobs will have displaced jobs 
in other firms. Hence, almost all workers in the economy will have to be 
subsidized, and a marginal subsidy has no advantages over a general subsidy 
anymore. 
Chapters 3 to 5 are devoted to the analysis of between-firm displacement effects 
of marginal employment subsidies. We want to find out whether displacement 
necessarily leads to complete equivalence of marginal and general subsidies, or 
whether marginal employment subsidies can be advantageous in terms of their 
employment and fiscal effects even if one takes between-firm displacement 
effects into account. In Chapters 3 and 4, we develop a partial-equilibrium model 
with perfect competition on the goods market. Unemployment occurs because the 
wage is too high and rigid. In this setup, we show that marginal employment 
subsidies create more employment at lower cost than general subsidies despite 
their displacement effect. The stronger marginal stimulus for employment 
expansion forces firms into fiercer competition, which results in lower prices, 
more output demand, and more employment. 
In Chapter 5, we present a general-equilibrium model with endogenous wage 
setting. Firms interact on imperfectly competitive goods markets, while wages are 
determined by firm-level labor unions. Even in this setup, marginal wage 
subsidies maintain their advantageousness over general subsidies. The reason lies 
in the asymmetry of marginal wage subsidies: while they subsidize the hiring of 
new workers, they do not punish firms that lay off part of their workforce. This 
tames the labor unions. If unions tried to shift the full subsidy into higher wages, 
it would be profitable for the firms to lay off workers. Unions can prevent this 
only by exerting wage restraint, which increases equilibrium employment. 
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This dissertation argues that employment subsidies are a promising instrument for 
restoring the employment prospects of low-skilled workers. It contributes to the 
economic literature by providing a comprehensive theoretical comparison 
between general and marginal employment subsidies. All models presented in this 
dissertation show that marginal subsidies are a better policy measure because they 
can create more employment at less fiscal cost. Even when taking their 
displacement effects into account, the favorability of marginal employment 
subsidies persists. Despite their drawbacks, marginal employment subsidies are 
thus a more efficient policy for employment creation than general wage subsidies. 
2. The three types of welfare states: Some stylized facts 
In this section, we will examine how different types of welfare states cope with 
the difficulty of preserving job opportunities for the low skilled. Figure 1.1 
compares the unemployment rates of low-skilled persons in 23 OECD-countries 
with the general unemployment rate. Two observations are noticeable. First, 
unemployment is generally more prevalent among the low-skilled than among 
higher qualified groups. In most countries, the unemployment rate of the low-
skilled exceeds the general unemployment rate, the exceptions being the Southern 
European countries Greece, Portugal, and Italy, as well as Korea. This highlights 
the fact that the low-skilled form a distinct subgroup of the labor force whose 
unemployment experience differs from that of the rest of the population and 
therefore requires special attention. 
Second, low-skilled unemployment rates vary much more across countries than 
general unemployment rates, even though both are positively related.3 While 
general unemployment rates range from 3.7 percent (Korea) to 9.9 percent 
(Greece), low-skilled unemployment rates lie between 2.9 percent in Korea and 
20.2 percent in Germany. Among the countries with the highest unemployment 
rates of low-skilled persons, we find the large Continental European countries 
France, Spain, Italy, and, with an extraordinarily high rate, Germany. Strikingly, 
the North Americans also score less well than most other countries in the OECD.  
 
                                                 
3 The (unweighted) coefficient of variation is 0.33 for the total unemployment rate and 0.43 for the 
low-skilled unemployment rate. The correlation coefficient is 0.732. 
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Source: OECD (2007c). 
Note: The total unemployment rate refers to the standardized unemployment rates. 
Low-skilled persons are considered to have completed less than an upper secondary 
education. 
Figure 1.1: Low-skill unemployment in the OECD (2005) 
At first sight, it seems impossible to explain the variation in low-skilled 
unemployment by making the standard distinction between flexible, Anglo-
American style labor markets and rigid European labor markets, because both 
types of economies appear on both ends of the spectrum. To shed some light on 
the determinants of low-skill unemployment rates, we distinguish three different 
types of welfare states: the Anglo-Saxon type (e.g. US, UK, Ireland, Australia), 
the Continental type (e.g. Germany, France, Italy) and the Scandinavian type (e.g. 
Norway, Sweden, Denmark). Following Scharpf (2000), Anglo-Saxon welfare 
states are characterized by systems of limited formal welfare that is sufficient to 
prevent poverty, but cannot maintain living standards of higher paid workers. 
They have a political commitment to full employment on a private sector basis, 
provide little employment protection, and exhibit low levels of active labor market 
policies. On the other hand, Scandinavian welfare states provide mainly tax-
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financed earnings-related benefits, show a high level of active labor market 
policies, and a large share of public employment. The Continental European 
welfare states also provide earnings-related benefits which are, however, mainly 
financed by wage-based contributions. Active labor market policies and public 
employment are more important than in the Anglo-Saxon countries, but do not 
reach the levels of the Scandinavian welfare states. Common economic shocks are 
absorbed differently by each type, which might help to explain some of the 
variation in unemployment rates. 
Employment of low-skilled labor is faced with similar obstacles in all OECD 
economies. Economic integration and biased technological progress have caused 
relative demand for low-skilled labor to decline. Since both phenomena mainly 
affect those sectors that produce internationally tradable goods, the released low-
skilled workers could be absorbed by the domestic service sector. Domestic 
services, however, typically provide low-productivity, low-paid jobs. Even if the 
productivity of these jobs was slightly above the level of welfare benefits, which 
define the lowest reservation wage, taxes and social security contributions (SSC) 
have a destructive effect on low-skilled employment. They destroy many 
additional job opportunities in the domestic service sector. There is clear 
empirical evidence in favor of this hypothesis. Figure 1.2 shows how the 
employment share in domestic services relates to the tax and SSC wedge of a low-
paid worker.4 There is a strong negative relation between the two variables 
( 38.02 =R ): the low-wedge countries have employment shares of between 18 and 
26 percent, while most high-wedge countries employ only about 15 to 20 percent 
of their labor force in domestic services. 
If low-skilled workers are driven out of the sectors exposed to international trade 
in all countries, but high-tax countries are not capable of creating new 
employment opportunities in domestic services, one should observe a strong 
positive relation between the wedge on low-paid workers and low-skilled 
unemployment. As Figure 1.3 shows, there is indeed a positive, and very strong, 
relation between the two variables ( 42.02 =R ). While the low-wedge countries 
consistently show low unemployment rates among the low-skilled, there appear to 
be systematic differences among the high-wedge countries attributable to the 
distinction between Scandinavian and Continental European countries. For 
example, Sweden and Germany have about the same wedge (46.6 and 47.3 
                                                 
4 Following Scharpf (2000), we use the employment in ISIC G and H (wholesale and retail trade, 
restaurants, and hotels) as a proxy for domestic low-skill service employment. 
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percent, respectively), but the low-skilled unemployment rate in Sweden is only 
8.5 percent, compared to Germany with an appalling 20.2 percent. Almost all 
Scandinavian countries lie clearly below the line fitted into Figure 1.3, while most 
Continental European countries lie at or above it. 
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Source: OECD (2007a), ILO (2007). 
Note: The wedge for a low-paid worker refers to income tax plus employee and 
employer social security contributions less cash benefits as a percentage of gross 
earnings for a single person without children at 67 percent of average earnings. 
The employment share in domestic services is approximated by ISIC G/H 
(wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants). 
Figure 1.2: The impact of the tax wedge on employment in domestic services 
(2005) 
The two types of high-wedge welfare states seem to deal with low-skilled 
(un)employment in quite different ways. One possible explanation is the extent to 
which the state takes an active role in creating employment opportunities for its 
unemployed. If the high wedge prohibits low-skilled unemployed from being 
absorbed by the private service sector, the state could step in. In fact, public sector 
employment differs immensely between the Continental European and the 
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Scandinavian countries (Figure 1.4). For example, Germany, Italy, and Spain 
employ around 15 percent of their labor force in the public sector, which is in the 
same range as for most low-wedge countries. In contrast, Norway, Denmark, and 
Sweden have public sector employment shares around 35 percent. 
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Source: OECD (2007a, 2007c). 
Note: The wedge for a low-paid worker refers to income tax plus employee and 
employer social security contributions less cash benefits as a percentage of labor 
costs for a single person without children at 67 percent of average earnings. Low-
skilled persons are considered to have completed less than upper secondary 
education. 
Figure 1.3: The impact of the tax wedge on low-skill unemployment (2005) 
 
To test whether public sector employment has explanatory power for the wide 
variation of unemployment rates among the high wedge countries, we conduct a 
simple regression to illuminate the distinct impact of the wedge and public 
employment on the low-skilled unemployment rate. We find the following 
relation: 
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Share Employment Public*230.0Wedge*296.0037.0 
ratent unemployme
skilled-low
)101.0()081.0((0.028)
−+= .5 
Both the wedge and the public employment share have a strong, significant 
impact on the low-skilled unemployment rate. Including public employment in the 
regression increases its explanatory power noticeably ( 50.02 =R ).  
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Source: OECD (2007a), ILO (2007). 
Note: The wedge for a low-paid worker refers to income tax plus employee and 
employer social security contributions less cash benefits as a percentage of labor 
costs for a single person without children at 67 percent of average earnings. Public 
sector employment covers all employment of the general government sector plus 
employment of publicly owned enterprises and companies. 
Figure 1.4: The tax wedge and public sector employment (2005) 
Our quick glance at the data suggests that there are three approaches to dealing 
with low-skilled unemployment. The Anglo-Saxon countries have relatively low 
tax and SSC rates on low-pay workers, which enable them to channel their low-
skilled workforce into private services. Both the Continental European and the 
Scandinavian countries have high tax and SSC rates on low-paid workers, 
                                                 
5 Standard errors are written in parentheses. 
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resulting in a smaller share of low-skilled employment in the domestic private 
service sector. The Scandinavian countries use public sector employment as a 
substitute and thereby keep low-skill unemployment at relatively low levels. The 
Continental European countries, by contrast, combine high tax and SSC rates with 
low public employment, and thus experience high unemployment among their 
low-skilled labor force. 
The data suggest two policy options to fight low-skill unemployment: reducing 
the wedge and/or increasing public employment. The latter option is not advisable 
for Continental European countries.6 First, public budgets are already under 
considerable strain, so that further public spending programs cannot be 
implemented. Second, public employment as a labor market instrument is most 
efficient if it emulates the first-best, private sector employment that would exist in 
a perfectly functioning labor market. This, however, can best be achieved if the 
government sets the right incentives to create employment directly in the private 
sector. Therefore, the best policy advice to give is to fight low-skill 
unemployment by reducing the burden imposed on low-paid workers through 
reductions in taxes and, especially, social security contributions without placing 
additional burden on the public budget. 
3. Which way to go? 
In generous welfare states the labor market for low-skilled workers is typically 
characterized by a two-sided problem. The high level of taxes and social security 
contributions in combination with implicit minimum wages and unionized wage 
negotiations lead to too high wages at the bottom end of the wage scale and 
reduce labor demand substantially. At the same time, the welfare state cushions 
the low-skilled unemployed with benefit payments that are conditioned on not 
being in employment and discourages them from searching for employment with 
high transfer reduction rates. A successful employment policy measure thus has to 
tackle both sides simultaneously to solve the unemployment problem. Lowering 
labor costs without creating incentives for the unemployed to accept job offers 
will fail as will improving incentives to accept jobs when labor costs remain high. 
The question arises how to design wage subsidies. The “prototype” of an 
employee-oriented subsidy is the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the United 
                                                 
6 For example, Sinn (2006b) offers a harsh critique of the Scandinavian model. He labels its 
employment and output effects “Scandinavia’s accounting trick” because public employment 
enters GDP at cost levels, but not by the actual value created. 
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States, which was introduced in 1975 as a modest program to offset social security 
payroll taxes for low income families with children and subsequently became one 
of the largest welfare programs in the US (see IRS 2006). The EITC grants a tax 
credit to low-income earners: instead of paying wage-replacing benefits that are 
decreased if a person starts working, the state pays wage-supplementing benefits 
that increase a person’s income if he decides to leave welfare and accepts a low-
paid job. Such employment-conditional benefits serve two purposes: they lower 
the wedge on low wages, thereby stimulating employment, and at the same time 
serve as a redistributive measure that raises low wages to socially acceptable 
levels. Similar programs have been introduced in European countries as well, 
even though on a much smaller scale than in the United States (see OECD 2003, 
p. 159).7 
How can supplementing workers’ incomes give firms incentives to employ more 
workers? At given wages, (potential) workers are more willing to work, or decide 
to participate in the labor market at all, when they receive an additional subsidy. 
This increases labor supply, which in turn leads to a fall in wages and increased 
labor demand. Although the subsidy is paid to workers initially, it will have 
positive employment effects only if it is shifted to firms in the form of lower 
wages.  
Standard tax incidence analysis indicates that in flexible markets it does not 
matter to which side a subsidy is given. Instead of paying the subsidy to workers, 
who then accept lower wages, the subsidy could be given directly to firms as well. 
Market forces will lead to identical equilibrium outcomes in both cases (see e.g. 
Borjas 2000, p. 170). If market forces are impaired, however, for example by 
minimum wage legislation or union wage setting, tax incidence becomes different. 
First, the timing is different. While subsidies given to employers lower labor cost 
immediately, wage subsidies given to employees only work after they are 
transformed into lower gross wages which can take a considerable amount of 
time.8 Second, the long-run incidence differs in the presence of minimum wages 
                                                 
7 For Germany, the Munich-based Ifo institute proposes a similar scheme called Activating Social 
Welfare (Sinn et al. 2003, 2006) and the European Economic Advisory Group at CESifo is 
propagating the same idea as a “Proposal for Europe” (Corsetti et al. 2002, Ch. 6). For details, see 
Chapter 2. 
8 These timing differences are often disregarded in economists’ policy advice on labor market 
issues. As Blinder (1988, p. 12) puts it: “The difference between the long-run equilibrium results 
that we know and love (and teach to our young) and the short-run disequilibrium results that 
people actually experience are no mere quibbles. They may be fundamental.” Hamermesh (1980), 
using an empirically founded simulation for the United States, shows that the half-life of the 
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and when unions act as insider organizations. Employer and employee taxes do 
not have equivalent effects on negotiated wages and employment if employee 
taxes are subject to exemptions (e.g. Koskela and Schöb 1999) or when 
unemployment benefits are subject to taxation or are indexed to net wages. They 
also differ if gross wages are regulated by minimum wage legislation (Picard and 
Toulemonde 2001) or when trade unions behave as pure insider representatives 
(e.g. Lindbeck and Snower, 1988 and 2001).9 With rigid gross wages only 
employer-oriented wage subsidies will promote employment, while employee-
oriented wage subsidies such as the EITC will only raise the net income of 
incumbent workers and thus only stimulate labor supply. 
Table 1.1 compares those institutional labor market factors that contribute to wage 
rigidity and reduced work incentives between Continental European countries and 
the United States. On the labor demand side, the main factors reducing demand 
for low-skilled workers are high tax wedges on low-wages, high minimum wages, 
strong employment protection legislation, and extensive bargaining coverage. The 
table shows that the Continental European countries are clearly distinct from the 
United States with respect to all these factors. The US has a wedge of 26.3 
percent, while the European countries’ wedges are between 35.5 percent (Spain) 
and 49.2 percent (Belgium). The relative minimum wage is much lower in the US 
than in those Continental European countries that enacted statutory minimum 
wages. The Continental European countries all have strong employment 
protection laws and extensive collective bargaining, whereas they are practically 
non-existent in the US. On the labor supply side, high replacement rates and lax 
work availability conditions weaken the incentives for low-skilled unemployed to 
take up low-paid work. As Table 1.1 shows, the Continental European countries 
provide more generous welfare benefits and are less strict on work availability 
than the US.  
 
                                                                                                                                     
adjustment process after a change in the payroll tax is about five years. We expect the half-life to 
be even longer in unionized labor markets with insider power.  
9 Knoppik and Beissinger (2003) show that German unions pushed through excessive wage 
increases in booms but ensured downward nominal wage rigidity in busts. Furthermore, firms 
normally do not accept jobseekers offers to work for wages less than what the firms’ incumbent 
workers receive because they consider such offers as unfair and they fear adverse effects on 
workers’ morale, see Bewley (1999).  
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 Wedge for 
Low-Paid 
Workera) (in 
%) 
Net 
Minimum 
Wageb) (in % 
of APW) 
Employment 
Protection 
Indexc) (0-6)
Bargaining 
Coveraged) 
(in %) 
Net 
Replacement 
Ratee) (in %) 
Strictness of 
Work 
Availability 
Conditionsf)
Belgium 49.2 56 2.5 >90 66 3.1 
France 41.8 55 2.9 >90 71 2.7 
Germany 47.3 - 2.5 68g) 75 2.6 
Italy 41.7 - 2.4 >80 -h) - 
Spain 35.5 42 3.1 >80 52 - 
United States 26.3 37 0.7 14 29 3.3 
Sources: a) OECD(2007a, 65), b)OECD(2007a, 28), c) OECD(2004, 117), d) 
OECD(2004, 145), e) OECD(2007b), f) Nickell et al. (2005, p. 5) 
Note: a) income tax plus employee and employer social security contributions less 
cash benefits as a percentage of labor costs for a single person without children at 
67 percent of average earnings, 2005. b) after-tax minimum wage relative to the net 
income of a full-time average productive worker (APW), 2006. “-“ denotes the 
absence of a statutory minimum wage. c) summary index comprising regulations on 
regular employment, temporary employment and collective dismissals, 2003. e) 
average of net replacement rates over 60 months of unemployment for four family 
types and two earnings levels (67% and 100% of APW), with social assistance, 
2004. f) index of the strictness of the conditions governing the availability of 
unemployment benefits, mid-1990s. g) In Germany, many firms that are not legally 
covered by collective bargaining nevertheless orientate their wages at collective 
contracts. Taking these firms into account, bargaining coverage amounts to 84 
percent (WSI 2005). h) Unemployment insurance benefits run out after six months. 
A local social assistance scheme (Minimo Vitale) exists, but benefits are available 
in some municipalities only and on a case-by-case basis in the absence of national 
guidelines.  
Table 1.1: Labor Market Institutions 
The comparison in Table 1.1 suggests that labor market institutions both on the 
demand and the supply side differ substantially between Continental Europe and 
the United States. Hence, what may have been a success story in the United States 
might become a failure in Continental European countries without complementary 
policy measures. Deregulation that moves the labor market towards a more 
flexible structure is one option. Such attempts, however, are strongly opposed in 
Continental European countries. Collective bargaining is the established main 
institution where rent-sharing rules are set and distributional conflicts between 
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labor and capital are settled. Thereby, the wage is the main distribution key for the 
domestic product. Restricting or eliminating such a institution will not be possible 
without risking social unrest and increasing conflicts between workers and 
employers (see Schöb 2002). 
There are thus good reasons for employer-oriented wage subsidies in an 
institutional setting with downward rigid wages in the low-wage segment. 
Lowering the social security contributions in the low-skilled sector is a good 
candidate for such a scheme. The welfare system is basically a redistributive 
means to which one should contribute according to one’s ability-to-pay. Unlike 
the tax system, which normally exempts income below the minimum subsistence 
level from taxation, many European social security system consider all persons as 
able-to-pay when they are employed. All workers have to contribute from the very 
first Euro onwards to the social security system. This way of identifying ability-
to-pay implicitly assumes that every worker is productive enough to both 
contribute to the welfare system and still have a net income above the minimum 
level of subsistence. We have seen that this is no longer true for an increasing 
number of low-skilled workers. Their gross reservation wage lies above their 
value-added, and thus their labor is not demanded by firms anymore. Since the 
unemployed are already covered by the social security system, the social security 
contributions are, from an economic point of view, a prohibitive tax on labor. 
Wage subsidies can thus be interpreted as an instrument to eliminate this 
distortion inherent in the low-skilled sector. 
4. Marginal employment subsidies 
Wage subsidies may generally be a possible remedy to narrow the wedge 
described in the last section. Kaldor (1936) was the first to propose a general 
wage subsidy to restore full employment. More recently, support for his idea came 
from Phelps (1997) who proposes a graduated tax subsidy scheme to firms for 
every low-wage worker they employ. 
For governments, general wage subsidies are a very expensive policy instrument. 
Even though new jobs would create some savings because less unemployment and 
welfare benefits have to be paid and additional taxes are collected, all workers 
already in employment would have to be subsidized immediately. This makes a 
general employment subsidy very expensive in the short-run, and even in the 
long-run, it seems dubious whether such a subsidy can be self-financing. 
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To overcome these fiscal drawbacks, marginal employment subsidies (MES) 
propose to restrict the subsidy to the extra jobs created by firms in addition to 
some reference employment level. Compared to general subsidies, however, MES 
have received rather little attention in the economic literature. Among the few 
contributions, the most prominent analysis of MES is presented by Layard and 
Nickell (1980). They implement a MES in both a Keynesian-type and a 
monetarist macroeconomic model. In their model, the reduction in marginal 
production costs mainly benefits the international competitiveness in the export 
sector, which, through its feedback effects on the domestic economy, increases 
overall output and employment. They conclude that a MES can generate more 
jobs than a general subsidy costing the same amount. Since this result holds both 
in the Keynesian and the monetarist version of their model, their analysis 
strengthens the confidence in the general advantageousness of MES. Whitley and 
Wilson (1983) develop a dynamic macrosimulation of the Layard/Nickell-model 
and calibrate it on the British economy. They also find positive employment 
effects, even though the advantage of MES over general subsidies is less 
pronounced than proclaimed by Layard and Nickell (1980). 
The macroeconomic desirability of MES is emphasized by Rehn (1982). He 
proposes MES as a complementary measure to expansionary demand policies to 
avoid the stagflation trap. Expansionary policies, after a short-run positive effect 
on output and employment, typically cause prices to rise, which counteracts the 
expansionary effect. With a MES, the expansion of output and employment could 
instead be connected with falling prices and could therefore reinforce the positive 
employment effects. 
In a conventional neoclassical macroeconomic model, Chiarella and Steinherr 
(1982) allow for marginal subsidies that are paid for an unlimited duration 
although the firms expect the program to be abandoned in the future with some 
positive probability. Their results show that MES can have a significant effect on 
employment both in the closed and the open economy, without worsening the 
government deficit. Oswald (1984) points out the formal similarities between an 
inflation tax (a tax on price increases) and a marginal employment subsidy. By 
making use of a dynamic optimization model of profit maximization, he shows 
that MES, modeled as a continuous function that subsidizes additional 
employment and taxes layoffs, increase a firm’s profit-maximizing employment 
level. Hart (1989) models a firm’s simultaneous decision over its number of 
employees and the hours worked per employee. MES have a positive employment 
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effect because they induce the firm to hire more workers and reduce the hours of 
work. With general subsidies, the substitution effect is reversed if there are quasi-
fixed costs per employee (hiring costs, training, etc.), and the employment effects 
could be negative. 
The latest theoretical work on marginal employment subsidization seems to be 
contained in the influential book on “Unemployment” by Layard et al. (1991). By 
using a general-equilibrium model with imperfect competition on goods and labor 
markets, they show that marginal subsidization can increase aggregate 
employment even if unions succeed in shifting part of the subsidy into higher 
wages. 
There are only a few real-life active labor market policies that have featured MES. 
The first such program was started in Germany in 1932. The government paid a 
tax rebate for a firm’s additional employment, measured by the increase compared 
to a pre-determined reference date. Until December 1932, 62,500 jobs were 
subsidized (see Marcon 1974 and James 1988). In the 1970s, MES-programs were 
implemented in many countries. Examples are the New Jobs Tax Credit in the 
United States (1977/78), the French Prime d’incitation à la création d’emploi 
(1975), the Small Firms Employment Subsidy in Great Britain (1977), and the 
Lohnkostenzuschüsse in Germany (1974/75). Even though some of these 
programs had positive employment effects, their general impact was rather 
limited. The main reasons were the limited duration for which subsidies were 
paid, the small magnitude of the subsidies, little knowledge of employers about 
the programs, bad timing of the reference date, and the possibility to circumvent 
the reference date by outsourcing to newly established firms.10 
5. Displacement between firms: the Achilles’ heel of marginal 
subsidization 
The main argument in favor of a marginal subsidy is that, since a firm's incentive 
to hire an additional worker is affected only by the comparison of his marginal 
value product and his marginal cost, general and marginal employment subsidies 
at the same rate should have the same employment effect. And since MES only 
subsidizes additional employment, this employment effect can be created at much 
lower costs than with a general subsidy. 
                                                 
10 For detailed descriptions of the institutional details and evaluations of the programs, see Perloff 
and Wachter (1979) and Bishop and Haveman (1979) for the US, Layard (1979) for Great Britain, 
Kopits (1978) for France, and Schmidt (1979) for Germany. 
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This very optimistic view of marginal wage subsidies has been challenged. Critics 
argue that one must not transfer the firm-level effects of a marginal subsidy to 
more aggregate levels of the economy. In particular, if the marginal subsidy is 
applied to all firms in the same industry, competition will cause between-firm 
displacement not accounted for in firm-level studies. Although themselves 
proponents of marginal subsidization, Layard and Nickell remark very pointedly: 
 
"A naive microeconomic analysis might conclude that since a profit-maximising 
firm is solely concerned with the marginal wage in determining its output and 
employment levels, a large subsidy on the wages of marginal employees would 
have a dramatic effect on the firm's level of employment at very little cost. This 
argument is, however, grossly misleading at a more aggregate level at least in a 
closed economy. Suppose all firms in a competitive industry in equilibrium are 
offered a marginal wage subsidy and there is a consequent dramatic expansion 
in industry output. This will immediately lead to an equally dramatic fall in the 
price in this industry and since average costs will have fallen but a little, the 
firms will be making losses. The industry will then contract, and in the new 
equilibrium the price of output will be equal to the average cost in the marginal 
firm. Aggregate employment in the industry will have risen only to the extent 
that average cost has fallen as a result of the marginal subsidy; that is, not very 
much." (Layard and Nickell 1980, p. 55; italics in original) 
 
Between-firm displacement is also one of the main obstacles to marginal 
subsidization in the political discussion. When asked about the prospects of MES 
proposals, the then-Economics Minister of the German state of Saxony-Anhalt 
commented:  
 
"The effects of this process are foreseeable: Who quickly doubles his number of 
low-wage workers belongs to the winners, who comes too late will probably go 
bankrupt. After one or two years, the state will have to pay 35 percent of the 
costs of all low-wage workers, without any sizable increase in employment."11 
(Rehberger 2004 -- author's translation)  
 
Sinn (2006a) argues similarily:  
 
“New firms, founded after the base year, would enjoy the full support, whereas 
old firms that have reached maturity would get nothing. Therefore, old firms 
would be driven into bankruptcy and give way to new firms. In view of the 
                                                 
11 The comment refers to the Magdeburg Alternative. This specific proposal for Germany suggests 
to pay a subsidy rate of 35 percent, but to restrict the subsidy to low-wage workers (cf. Chapter 2). 
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foreseeable mass protests of the established firms, I pity the political party that 
promoted such an approach.” 
 
Intra-industry displacement effects are the Achilles’ heel of marginal wage 
subsidies. Even though a thorough analysis of these effects is crucial for definite 
economic policy advice, the literature on this topic is rather sparse. Oswald (1984) 
shows that a marginal wage subsidy, while increasing the employment level in 
each individual firm, affects the number of firms in equilibrium in an ambiguous 
way. The net effect on employment in the entire industry is generally ambiguous. 
The subsidy scheme used in his study, however, combines a marginal wage 
subsidy for employment above the reference employment level with a marginal 
tax on layoffs below this level. Hence, his results do not carry over directly to 
evaluating pure marginal wage subsidy proposals which only subsidize hirings, 
and do not tax layoffs. 
Luskin (1986) analyzes the industry effects of a marginal wage subsidy and 
derives sufficient conditions for the fiscal efficiency (in terms of fiscal 
expenditure per new job) of marginal over general subsidies. His results are 
generally ambiguous but show that marginal subsidies will be fiscally more 
efficient if industry product demand is sufficiently inelastic. This result hinges 
upon the assumption that, with marginal subsidies, new entrants will receive the 
subsidy only if they expand their employment above the same reference level as 
incumbent firms. Hence, minimum average costs with marginal subsidies will 
always exceed those obtained with equal-rate general subsidies. Since minimum 
average costs determine the equilibrium price, an elastic industry product demand 
will cause output and employment to expand much more under general 
subsidization, thereby decreasing the fiscal efficiency of marginal subsidies. In 
our view, the assumption that there could be one reference employment level for 
all firms – incumbents as well as new entrants – is clearly at odds with all actual 
marginal wage subsidy programs. All these programs have individualized 
reference levels for incumbent firms, while firms founded after the reference date 
typically receive the subsidy for all their workers (cf. Schmidt 1979, p. 342). 
 
In this dissertation, we will analyze how damaging between-firm displacement 
effects are for the effectiveness of marginal employment subsidies. We will study 
this question in various frameworks. For example, we will use models with 
perfect competition and with imperfect competition in product markets. Also, we 
will employ fixed-wage models as well as allow for endogenous wage setting. In 
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all models concerned with between-firm displacement, however, we will pay 
close attention to modeling marginal employment subsidies as realistically as 
possible. Hence, we apply firm-specific reference employment levels (thereby 
differing from Luskin 1986), and we will not tax layoffs below the reference level 
(which differs from Oswald 1984). 
6. Summaries of following chapters 
This dissertation is made up of four chapters, each of which is written in the style 
of a self-contained article.  
 
Chapter 2  
The Magdeburg Alternative: A policy proposal for Germany 
 
In this chapter, we first show that the main problem in the German labor market is 
unemployment of the low-skilled. While unemployment among college graduates 
is relatively low, people without a formal education are faced with unemployment 
rates of 22 percent in Western Germany and above 50 percent in Eastern 
Germany. This unemployment problem is caused by distortions on both sides of 
the labor market. On the labor supply side, low-skilled unemployed have few 
incentives to take up work. Even a full-time job would not give them considerably 
more income than the welfare benefits they can receive without working at all. On 
the demand side, high labor costs destroy the job opportunities for those willing to 
work. 
Wage subsidies are a potential remedy to this problem because they close the gap 
between the workers' reservation wages and the firms' willingness to pay. Such 
subsidies could either be given to workers to supplement net wages, or they could 
be paid to firms to lower their labor costs. Employee-oriented wage subsides, as 
exemplified by the American Earned Income Tax Credit and the proposal made 
for Germany by the ifo institute under the title Activating Social Welfare, 
subsidize low wages by giving workers a wage supplement. This will create new 
jobs if workers are then willing to accept lower wages, thereby passing the 
subsidy to their firms. We argue, however, that this transmission mechanism is 
impeded in Germany. Collective wage bargaining and insider power prevent the 
necessary drop in wages. Hence, wage subsidies have to be given to firms directly 
in order to be effective for employment creation. 
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In this chapter, we will discuss a recent policy proposal for Germany that 
takes account of the institutional peculiarities of the German labor market. The so-
called Magdeburg Alternative, developed by Schöb and Weimann (2003, 2005), 
proposes a marginal employment subsidy for low-skilled jobs. This proposal is 
distinct from other wage subsidy schemes by its means to eliminate “revolving-
door” effects and displacement effects. The direct exchange of incumbent workers 
with subsidized workers ("revolving doors") can easily be prevented by linking 
the subsidy to a requirement that the number of employees in a firm should 
increase above some reference level. By using double subsidization, i.e. the 
payment of a subsidy not only for the new employee but also for an incumbent 
employee, the Magdeburg Alternative also makes it unattractive to circumvent 
this additionality requirement by outsourcing employment to new firms. In this 
chapter, we argue that this is the decisive trick of the Magdeburg Alternative. By 
doing so, not only is outsourcing prevented, but also massive incentives for the 
creation of further jobs are generated and the funding of the reform is secured.  
We conduct numerical simulations to estimate the employment and fiscal effects 
of the Magdeburg Alternative. In a medium scenario, the Magdeburg Alternative 
not only creates 1.6 million new jobs, but also helps to consolidate the budget by 
saving between 3 and 6 billion Euro per year. Even under very pessimistic 
assumptions, the expected employment effects of the Magdeburg Alternative 
would still be substantial, and the public budget would be relieved in most cases. 
 
Chapter 3 
Marginal versus general wage subsidies in competitive industry equilibrium 
 
The favorable view of marginal employment subsidies presented in Chapter 2 
relies on the notion that, since a firm's incentive to hire a worker is affected only 
by the comparison of its marginal value product with its marginal cost, general 
and marginal employment subsidies at the same rate should have the same 
employment effect. The argument in favor of a marginal subsidy compared to a 
general subsidy is then obvious: if only additional employment is subsidized, the 
same employment effect could be created at much lower costs. 
This argument neglects the repercussions of displacement between firms. As has 
been pointed out by Layard and Nickell (1980), even though some firms expand 
their production, hire new workers and obtain the subsidy, they do so mainly at 
the expense of other firms which have to reduce employment or are driven out of 
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the market. In an extreme case, all surviving firms would be (almost) completely 
subsidized and marginal and general subsidies would be equivalent. 
In this chapter, we develop a novel approach to modeling the industry-level 
effects of marginal wage subsidies. We construct a model that allows us to 
identify the differential impact of general and double marginal wage subsidies in 
the presence of between-firm displacement. In line with the existing literature 
(Oswald 1984, Luskin 1986), we restrict our analysis to the partial equilibrium 
effects of a permanent marginal subsidy which is targeted at a single competitive 
industry, but relate it to the Magdeburg Alternative by incorporating double 
marginal subsidization. Our aim is to determine the conditions under which a 
double marginal wage subsidy yields better output and employment effects than a 
general subsidy, and to clarify which of the subsidy schemes is fiscally more 
efficient. 
Our results show that a double marginal subsidy generally leads to lower 
equilibrium prices, and hence to a higher equilibrium output level, than an equal-
rate general subsidy. Double marginal subsidies trigger strong displacement 
competition between incumbent firms, because all incumbent firms attempt to 
expand at the expense of other incumbent firms. This competition reduces the 
rents of incumbent firms and drives down prices more strongly than with general 
subsidies. Hence, double marginal subsidies generally result in lower prices as 
well as larger output and employment effects than general subsidies. 
The fiscal effect, measured as the subsidy expenditures per new job, always favors 
the marginal subsidy if its employment effect exceeds that of the general subsidy. 
However, even if their employment effect is smaller, the fiscal effect of marginal 
subsidies can still be favorable since their displacement of non-subsidized workers 
is generally less than complete. 
By making more specific assumptions about the functional form of the production 
technology, we resolve the remaining ambiguities. We show that homogeneity of 
the production function is sufficient to ensure favorable output, employment and 
fiscal effects of double marginal subsidization. Hence, by using a partial-
equilibrium model that focuses on the displacement competition between firms in 
the same industry, we show that double marginal wage subsidies are generally 
preferable to general subsidies despite their between-firm displacement effects. 
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Chapter 4  
Marginal wage subsidies: a rent-extracting instrument for employment 
creation 
 
In this chapter, we resume the discussion of displacement between perfectly 
competitive firms under marginal subsidization. We extend the model developed 
in Chapter 3 in three respects. First, we embed the industry-level analysis into an 
economy-wide model of a small open economy. Second, besides comparing the 
employment and fiscal effects of a double marginal subsidy compared to a general 
subsidy, we examine the distributive effects of the two subsidy schemes. In 
particular, we analyze the differential impact of double marginal and general 
subsidies on incumbent firms' rents, incumbent workers' wages, the public budget, 
and the functional distribution of income. Third, we use this model to conduct a 
numerical simulation of the employment and fiscal effects of double marginal 
subsidies for Germany. This simulation's results, which we compare to previously 
derived results that did not explicitly account for intra-industry displacement (cf. 
Chapter 2), allows us a first estimate of the magnitude of the employment and 
fiscal effects and the size of the rent extraction. 
It is indeed the case that between-firm displacement of considerable magnitude 
takes place in equilibrium under double marginal subsidies. We are, however, able 
to show that negative employment effects of this displacement are not sufficient to 
counterbalance the otherwise positive effects of the subsidy. The essential 
difference between the effects of double marginal and general subsidies is MES’ 
stronger marginal stimulus to employment creation because it leads to a lower 
output price than would occur under general subsidization. This increases output 
demand and promotes employment. Since it creates more employment without 
necessarily subsidizing all employees, double marginal subsidization is always 
cheaper for the government than general subsidization. 
This chapter's analysis clearly reveals why marginal subsidization is fiscally 
advantageous to general subsidization. Its advantage arises because marginal 
subsidization reduces the ability of incumbent firms to capture the rents associated 
with their cost of market entry and thus functions like a tax on pure economic 
rents. The government has to pay less for the subsidy scheme because it can 
indirectly make use of incumbent firms' rents to finance it. 
The numerical illustration of our model yields more cautious results about the 
quantitative effects of recent double marginal subsidy-proposals than those 
predicted by methods that neglect displacement. The employment effects are still 
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substantial, albeit smaller than without displacement. Moreover, we find that 
policymakers are offered a "double dividend" at modest subsidy rates because 
employment gains and fiscal savings can be realized at the same time. At larger 
subsidy rates, however, policymakers face a trade-off between employment 
expansion and fiscal austerity. 
This chapter shows that if politicians want to devise a self-financing subsidy 
scheme, but are precluded from applying taxes on pure economic rents, double 
marginal wage subsidies are a superior policy instrument for employment creation 
to general wage subsidies. 
 
Chapter 5  
Subsidizing extra jobs: boosting employment by taming the unions 
 
In Chapters 3 and 4, we assumed that wages are rigid and do not react to the 
subsidy. This assumption can be justified by a policy provision mentioned in 
Chapter 2: since the subsidy is restricted to the low-wage sector, the government 
can set a wage ceiling, up to which the subsidy is paid, and raise this ceiling 
proportionally with average wages over all skill groups. This hinders the unions in 
their attempt to shift the subsidy into higher gross wages for low-wage workers. 
A general analysis of marginal employment subsidies, however, has to allow for 
endogenously determined wages. In this chapter, we will provide an analysis of 
the incidence of marginal employment subsidies when unions are not directly 
restricted by the government and can freely set any wage they prefer.  
For this purpose, we develop a general-equilibrium model with imperfect labor 
and output markets. We can identify a benchmark scenario in which wage taxes 
and general subsidies do not affect employment at all. We then turn to the formal 
analysis of marginal employment subsidies. The theoretical literature has focused 
on symmetric marginal wage subsidies where firms are rewarded when they 
increase employment but are punished when they reduce their workforce. Real-
life marginal wage subsidy programs, however, are asymmetric. They subsidize 
employment expansions but do not punish shrinking firms. This small difference 
has severe consequences for the incidence of marginal employment subsidies. 
One might expect that the additional punishment of layoffs under symmetric 
subsidization may be good for employment, but the opposite is true. The 
punishment threat of a symmetric marginal employment subsidy makes it more 
costly for firms to lay off workers when trade unions aggressively raise wages. 
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Trade unions can thus shift a large share of the wage subsidy towards higher net 
wages. In our benchmark case, this effect is so strong that symmetric marginal 
subsidies do not affect employment at all. In the asymmetric case without 
punishment, by contrast, the firm may be more willing to shrink and lay off a 
substantial fraction of its workforce when wages become too high. This tames the 
trade unions. Rather than shifting the whole wage subsidy into higher gross 
wages, trade unions can raise the wage at most to the level at which the firm 
becomes indifferent whether to hire more workers or to shrink and lay off 
workers. This wage restraint leads to positive employment effects of asymmetric 
marginal employment subsidies. 
While the introduction of an asymmetric marginal subsidy at small subsidy rates 
always increases employment and welfare, higher subsidy rates might raise 
aggregate employment enough to make the threat of shrinking less frightening for 
the trade union. This may induce some trade unions to let their firm shrink while 
other firms continue to expand. The general equilibrium thus exhibits 
displacement between incumbent firms. Although this displacement may lower 
employment, we show that the government can promote employment further if it 
sets the wage subsidy sufficiently high. However, these additional employment 
gains come at a huge welfare loss. Employment will be concentrated in very few 
firms which sell their goods at low prices while the majority of firms shrink and 
sell their goods at higher prices. This distorts the optimal consumption pattern: the 
variety of goods is diminished substantially. Our numerical simulations illustrate 
that employment and welfare move in the same direction for moderate subsidy 
levels, but that the trade-off becomes severe for larger subsidy rates. 
In how far these results carry over to the long run with free entry crucially 
depends on the way in which new firms are treated (Section 6). When they are 
eligible for the subsidy, their whole workforce has to be subsidized. Any 
incumbent firms could take advantage of this by setting up a new firm to which it 
relocates all its business activities. A marginal employment subsidy would then 
become equivalent to a general wage subsidy in the long run. Alternatively, the 
government could grant the subsidy to incumbent firms only. In this case, the 
marginal employment subsidy will continue to tame the trade unions even in the 
long run. As marginal subsidies normally reduce profits, new firms will not enter 
and our short-run analysis carries over to the long run. Only if the desire for 
variety is very high, profits rise and new firms will enter. This may lead to lower, 
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though still positive employment effects compared to the short run, but the larger 
variety of goods will increase welfare even further. 
 26
Chapter 2 
 
The Magdeburg Alternative:  
A policy proposal for Germany1 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The fight against mass unemployment is, or at least should be, at the top of the 
agenda of economic policymakers in Germany. To find an effective cure for the 
unemployment problem, one first needs the right diagnosis. A specific 
examination of the German unemployment problem shows that, although 
unemployment is very high in general, large differences exist between different 
qualification strata (Figure 2.1). While unemployment of college graduates is 
relatively low, the market for unskilled labor is in a deep crisis. In Western 
Germany, the unemployment rate of people without a completed formal education 
was 21.7 percent in 2004, almost eight times as high as that of college graduates. 
In Eastern Germany, these figure are even worse, indicating that more than half of 
all people without formal qualification are not able to find a job. The productive 
capabilities of these workers are wasted instead of allowing them to contribute to 
the wealth and well-being of society. Large amounts of public transfers have to be 
expended to alleviate the resulting poverty and social exclusion that comes with 
being unemployed. 
The reasons for this social grievance lie on both sides of the labor market. On the 
supply side, low-skilled unemployed have few incentives to take up work. Even a 
full-time job would not give them considerably more income than the welfare 
                                                 
1 Parts of this chapter were written in collaboration with Ronnie Schöb and Joachim Weimann and 
have been published in the CESifo Working Paper Series (Knabe, Schöb and Weimann 2006a). 
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benefits they can receive without working at all. On the demand side, high labor 
costs destroy the jobs opportunities even for those willing to work.  
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Source: Reinberg and Hummel (2005, Appendix) 
Figure 2.1: Skill-specific unemployment rate (1976-2004, former West Germany) 
Demand for low-skilled labor has decreased in all developed countries. On a 
global level, this decrease in labor demand is mainly caused by two phenomena: 
First, skill-biased technological progress makes skilled labor more valuable 
compared to unskilled labor. Second, globalization leads to stronger 
interconnections between industrialized and developing economies which 
threatens the income position of the low-skilled in the developed world.2 
Nevertheless, unemployment is not an inevitable effect of the decrease in demand 
for low-skilled labor. In economies with flexible labor markets, such as the United 
States, the labor market adjusts by increasing wage dispersion. With lower 
relative wages, the employment of low-skilled workers remains profitable for 
                                                 
2 Acemoglu (2002), Johnson and Stafford (1999), and Hijzen et al. (2005) present empirical 
evidence for the impact of globalization and technical progress on the employment opportunities 
of the low-skilled. 
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firms. Of course, the drawback of this reaction is increased inequality – creating a 
stratum of “working poor.”  
The German labor markets lacks this wage flexibility. The German social security 
system provides wage-replacement benefits; they are only paid out to replace 
wages, not to supplement low wages. The resulting very high benefit reduction 
rates make it undesirable for social assistance recipients to seek work. For 
example, if a social assistance recipient earns 1,200 Euro per month, by taking the 
job he can increase his monthly net income by merely 280 Euro. For many, this is 
not sufficient to make it worthwhile to take low-paid jobs. Wages need to be high 
enough to clearly lift people out of the welfare range; otherwise there is no 
incentive to take the job.  This system creates an implicit minimum wage below 
which no worker will be willing to accept a job. Wages of low-skilled workers 
cannot fall below this minimum wage. Since the productivity of many people is 
below this mark, however, they are excluded from the labor market.  
Wage subsidies are a potential remedy to this problem. If gross wages are too 
high, or net wages too low, the government could grant an employment subsidy 
that closes the gap between the workers' reservation wages and the firms' 
willingness to pay. As easy as it sounds, there are certain cliffs to sail around 
when designing a successful wage subsidy program. For example, policymakers 
have to decide whether the wage subsidy should be paid to employees or 
employers. Giving the subsidy to employees would raise their net wage. This 
would lead to increased incentives to take low-paid jobs that they would not have 
taken without the subsidy. Because people will work for lower wages than before, 
firms have an incentives to hire more workers – unemployment decreases. On the 
other hand, employer-oriented subsidies focus on giving the money to firms if 
they hire unemployed people. This makes it profitable for firms to hire workers 
even at wages above the respective workers’ productivity, which would not have 
been done before – unemployment decreases as well. Ultimately, it does not seem 
to matter who receives the subsidy. A flexible labor market will find the right 
price that equilibrates supply and demand. So why is there such a quarrel about 
who should receive the subsidy? Simply put: Germany does not have a flexible 
labor market. The implicit minimum wage and collective wage bargaining inhibit 
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the appropriate movement of wages and a market-based distribution of subsidy 
payments. Under these circumstances, the equivalence of employer- and 
employee-oriented subsidies does not hold anymore. Labor demand can only be 
stimulated if the subsidy is given to employers directly. 
The largest political obstacle to the implementation of a wage subsidy program is 
its fiscal cost. Ideally, a wage subsidy would be self-financing by creating as 
much savings in welfare expenditures as to be expanded for the subsidy. A 
general wage subsidy, however, will never be self-financing when it is 
implemented because it subsidizes all existing jobs before a single new job is 
created. Marginal wage subsidies can alleviate this problem. Such subsidies are 
restricted to the extra jobs a firm creates in addition to its incumbent workforce. 
The marginal stimulus to employment creation stays the same, but the subsidy's 
fiscal costs are tremendously reduced. 
In this chapter, we will discuss a recent policy proposal for Germany. The so-
called Magdeburg Alternative, developed by Schöb and Weimann (2003, 2005), 
proposes a marginal employment subsidy for low-skilled jobs. Under this 
proposal, firms receive a permanent rebate of the social security contributions for 
all workers they hire in excess of their employment level at a pre-determined 
reference date. Firms could try to exploit the subsidy by “outsourcing” all their 
employees: they could set up a new firm and transfer all their workers to this new 
firm. Since all workers are additional in the new firm, they would all be 
subsidized, even though aggregate employment would not have changed. To 
prevent such outsourcing, the Magdeburg Alternative introduces double marginal 
subsidization. If a firm hires an additional worker, it receives a subsidy not only 
for this workers, but also for one of its incumbent workers. This doubles the 
marginal incentive to employment creation, makes outsourcing less attractive, and 
leads to even larger employment effects.  
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we lay out the two-sided character of 
Germany's labor market problem. In Section 3, we discuss the requirements for an 
efficient wage subsidy scheme for the low-skilled. Section 4 briefly reviews 
employee-oriented wage subsidy programs and discusses their limitations in rigid 
labor markets. Against this background, we then present the Magdeburg 
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Alternative and conduct simulations to estimate its employment and fiscal effects. 
Section 6 concludes. 
2. Germany's two-sided labor market problem 
The German labor market for low-skilled workers is characterized by a two-sided 
problem. The high level of taxes and social security contributions in combination 
with implicit minimum wages and unionized wage negotiations have led to too 
high wages at the bottom end of the wage scale and reduced labor demand 
substantially. At the same time, the welfare state has cushioned the low-skilled 
unemployed with benefit payments that are conditioned on not being in 
employment and discouraged them from searching for employment with transfer 
reduction rates of up to 100 percent and beyond. A successful employment policy 
measure thus has to tackle both sides simultaneously to solve the unemployment 
problem. Lowering gross wages without creating incentives for the unemployed to 
accept job offers will fail as will improved incentives to accept jobs when gross 
wages remain high. 
According to current German law, long-term unemployed low-skilled workers 
receive welfare benefits according to some defined socio-cultural minimum level 
of existence. In general, this minimum existence level is not far below the net 
wage achievable from low-paid work (cf. Boss and Elender 2005). If workers 
decided to accept a low-wage job, the high German benefit reduction rates mean 
that the net gain of a full-time job is typically too small to be attractive. If at all, 
the German system favors part-time work. 
This poverty trap in the German system welfare system is illustrated in Figure 2.2. 
A single welfare recipient without children receives a monthly benefit of about 
677 Euro (including a housing allowance). If he takes up regularly paid work, he 
can keep the first additional 100 Euro without deductions. If he earns more than 
that, 80 percent (of gross income between 100 and 800 Euro) or 90 percent (of 
gross income between 800 and 1200 Euro) per additional Euro are deducted from 
benefits. This increases the incentive to accept part-time jobs while the incentive 
to search for a full-time job instead is almost eliminated in the current system. 
Income above 1200 Euro per month is completely deducted from welfare benefits. 
Chapter 2: The Magdeburg Alternative 
 31
As the graph illustrates, the lowest wage brackets promise net incomes that barely 
create sufficient incentives to accept full-time jobs. The poverty trap constitutes 
the first welfare dilemma for the German labor market, because the way the 
welfare system is constructed creates the cases it is supposed to help. 
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Source: WSI (2007) and own calculations. 
Legend: The solid line depicts the net household income of a single welfare 
recipient, depending on his gross labor income. The dots show the lowest union 
wage groups in selected sectors. 
Figure 2.2: The poverty trap 
The demand side of the labor market is impaired with a second welfare dilemma. 
The welfare system is basically a redistributive means to which one should 
contribute according to one’s ability-to-pay. Unlike the tax system, which 
exempts income below the minimum existence level from taxation, the social 
security system considers all persons as able-to-pay when they are employed. All 
workers have to contribute from the very first Euro onwards to the social security 
system. This way of identifying ability-to-pay implicitly assumes that every 
worker is productive enough to both contribute to the welfare system and still 
have a net income above the minimum level of existence. This is no longer true 
for an increasing number of low-skilled workers. Their gross reservation wage lies 
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above their value-added, and thus their labor is not demanded by firms anymore. 
Since the unemployed are already covered by the social security system, the social 
security contributions they pay when taking up a new job do not create any new 
entitlements from the social insurance system. Health insurance coverage remains 
the same and additional entitlements on the pension and unemployment 
insurances are too small to lift individuals above the minimum existence level in 
case of need. From an economic point of view, social security contributions on 
low-paid income are thus equivalent to a labor tax. Since this tax raises gross 
wages above the productivity level of the low-skilled, it actually works like a 
prohibitive tax on labor. Wage subsidies can be interpreted as an instrument to 
eliminate the distortions the government has introduced in the first place. 
3. The optimal design of wage subsidies: institutions matter!  
The question arises how to design wage subsidies. The way in which wage 
subsidies work differs fundamentally between economies with flexible labor 
markets, in which wages are determined by the law of supply and demand, and 
highly regulated labor markets, where wages are bargained over between large 
interest groups. In Germany, collective bargaining is the main institution where 
rent-sharing rules are set and distributional conflicts between labor and capital are 
settled. The so-called ‘Tarifautonomie’ is a constitutional right of employer and 
employee organizations to negotiate labor contracts without undue governmental 
interference. This constitutional status leads to the labor organizations using the 
wage as the main distribution key for the domestic product between labor and 
capital. Restricting or eliminating this institution will not be possible without 
risking social unrest and increasing conflicts between workers and employers (cf. 
Schöb 2002). 
If wages are fixed by collective agreements or by explicit or implicit minimum 
wages, gross wages cannot be altered by a wage subsidy given to workers – at 
least in the short and medium run. And even in the long run, insiders may be able 
to defend their position (see Lindbeck and Snower, 1988 and 2001). Net wages, 
by contrast, cannot be altered by a wage subsidy given to employers. In such an 
institutional setting, a wage subsidy cannot be shifted easily on either market side, 
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so it does matter whether the subsidy is given to employees or employers. As a 
consequence, policymakers need to know whether they have to stimulate labor 
supply or labor demand. If gross wages are too high – for the reasons discussed 
earlier – labor demand should be stimulated by directly subsidizing employers. If, 
in addition, incentives to accept new jobs are lacking, complementary policy 
measures such as an additional wage subsidy to employees are required. 
From a fiscal point of view, any general subsidy – independent of whether it is 
given to employers or employees – will cause a fiscal deficit at the beginning as it 
subsidizes existing jobs right from the implementation while it takes some time 
before a significant number of new jobs lead to a reduction of welfare benefit 
payments. Public acceptability, however, requires that new labor market reforms 
do not impose an additional fiscal burden. This constraint not only applies in the 
long run but must be fulfilled even in the short run. Thus, employment policies 
must be strictly targeted to actions that directly reduce public expenditures. In 
other words, an individual job match between an employer and an employee can 
only enjoy a reduction in taxes and social security contributions if the creation of 
this match directly reduces unemployment and lowers public welfare 
expenditures. This rules out across-the-board tax reductions for low-skilled 
workers, as they are sometimes advocated (cf. German Trade Union Federation 
2003). 
4. The American EITC and its European offsprings 
One way to reconcile social policy that aims at providing a minimum income with 
the economic fact that in many cases low-skilled productivity may not be 
sufficiently high to pay for it is to “make work pay.” Instead of paying wage-
replacing benefits that are decreased if a person starts working, the state could pay 
wage-supplementing benefits that increase a person’s income if he decides to 
leave welfare and accepts a low-paid job. Such employment-conditional benefits 
serve two purposes: they lower the wedge on low wages, thereby stimulating 
employment, and at the same time serve as a redistributive measure that raises low 
wages to socially acceptable levels. 
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The “prototype” of such employee-oriented subsidies is the Earned Income Tax 
Credit (EITC) in the United States, which was introduced in 1975 as a modest 
program to offset social security payroll taxes for low income families with 
children. Subsequent reforms (major expansions in 1986, 1990, and 1993) made it 
one of the largest welfare programs in the US. The EITC grants a tax credit to 
low-income earners that functions like an employee-oriented wage subsidy. For 
low family income, each additional dollar earned is rewarded by a 40 cent tax 
credit (phase-in). Thus, a family can receive a maximum of US$ 4,008 in addition 
to a market income of US$ 10,020. If family income exceeds US$ 13,090, the 
EITC is gradually reduced (phase-out). In this income range, the benefit reduction 
puts a burden of 21 cent on each additional dollar earned by the family.  
Similar programs have been introduced in European countries as well, even 
though on a much smaller scale than in the United States. While the maximum 
amount of the EITC corresponds to 13.4 percent of the full-time median wage in 
the US, Britain pays a maximum of 10.3 percent, the Netherlands 3.4 percent, 
France 3.3 percent, and Belgium 1.3 percent (cf. OECD 2003, p. 159). In 
Germany, the switch from wage-replacing benefits to wage-supplements is also 
being discussed. The most prominent proposal is called Activating Social Welfare 
(Sinn et al. 2002, 2006) developed by the Munich-based Ifo institute. The 
European Economic Advisory Group at CESifo is propagating the same idea as a 
“Proposal for Europe” (Corsetti et al. 2002, Ch. 6). Activating Social Welfare 
comprises three steps necessary for a successful reform. First, welfare benefits for 
recipients who are able to work have to be reduced significantly (up to 53 percent) 
so that staying on welfare without working can only be affordable for persons 
who have other sources of income (e.g. from the shadow economy). Second, a tax 
credit subsidizes low incomes such that even for low-wage work net incomes are 
higher than current welfare benefits. Third, for those on welfare who cannot find a 
job on the labor market even though they are willing to work, the state has to step 
in and provide public employment opportunities.  
The first two steps are the typical ingredients of the “making-work-pay” recipe. 
While the introduction of wage-supplementing elements is rather uncontroversial, 
the substantial reduction of basic welfare levels would be in harsh conflict with 
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the legal minimum income definitions in most European countries. Welfare 
recipients who are willing to work but cannot find a job have the right to their 
socio-cultural minimum of existence. Step three of Activating Social Welfare is 
meant to circumvent this problem. If a person is not able to find a job in the labor 
market, the state will provide jobs in public employment companies. These jobs 
will pay a wage equal to the current level of welfare benefits, so that nobody 
willing to work will have to live below the minimum of existence. If a welfare 
recipient refuses to take a job in a public employment company, he can be 
expected to have better sources of income and can live with reduced benefits.3 
The establishment of public employment thus functions as a self-selection device: 
currently, the alternatives of the welfare system are either working for low wages 
or staying at home with slightly less benefits. With public employment programs, 
the options become either working for low wages or working for welfare benefits. 
Faced with these alternatives, only the truly needy will accept the public 
“workfare” jobs, others will refuse to work (legally) and have to accept drastically 
reduced benefits.4 
To avoid “revolving-door” effects, i.e. that firms simply replace already employed 
workers with subsidy-recipients, all workers, no matter whether previously 
employed or not, have to receive the tax credit. Of course, this will increase the 
fiscal burden of the reform proposal, but corresponds to the more general goal of 
creating a low-wage sector without creating “working poor.” For Sinn et. al. 
(2002, 2006), these windfall gains are not undesirable side effects, but a necessary 
component of a successful reform package. 
In an economy with downward rigid wages above market-clearing levels, 
however, Activating Social Welfare will not create a single new job since it does 
not lead to a fall in labor costs. What may have been a success story in the United 
States might become a failure in Continental European countries without 
complementary policy measures. Deregulation that moves the labor market 
                                                 
3 This procedure is compatible with most currently existing laws. For example, the German social 
code states that the state should create public jobs for those welfare recipients who do not find a 
job and pay them only a small allowance in addition to their benefits (§16(3) SGB II). Refusal to 
accept these jobs is punished with benefits reductions (§31 SGB II). 
4 A more formal, albeit very illustrative, analysis of the effects of work-requirements can be found 
in Besley and Coate (1992). 
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towards a more flexible structure is one option, but is strongly opposed by trade 
unions in Germany. If, due to complementary policies, gross wages fall, their 
members would be the losers of the reform. Only the non-represented outsiders 
would benefit. But even in a more flexible labor market success may be doubtful. 
Sufficient wage pressure from outsiders requires that public employment must be 
provided for all unemployed workers from the very first day Activating Social 
Welfare is introduced. Otherwise, the labor supply effect would be diluted since 
everyone has a constitutional right to receive the legal minimum income. Pure 
employee-oriented subsidies need market forces to shift the subsidies to the 
market side where they are needed. Thus, such a subsidy scheme must be 
embedded in a full-scale de-unionization of the labor market. If the reformers 
miss this ambitious goal because of the resistance of unions and incumbent 
employees, they will fail to create new jobs and leave behind huge fiscal deficits.  
5. Employer-oriented subsidies: The Magdeburg Alternative 
Since the transmission mechanism of employee-oriented subsidies to lower wages 
is impeded by strong labor unions and other rigidities, the alternative is to grant 
subsidies to the employer. This is the key element of a proposal that was launched 
in the German political discussion under the name Magdeburg Alternative (Schöb 
and Weimann 2003, 2005). As pointed out above, a wage subsidy alone may not 
be sufficient to create jobs. The Magdeburg Alternative therefore comprises four 
elements that take account of the two-sided labor market problem, eliminate 
potential displacement effects, and allow for a permanent change from welfare to 
workfare in a way that does not require further fundamental reforms. 
5.1. The four elements of the Magdeburg Alternative 
1. Reimbursing social security contributions for the lowest wage group 
The Magdeburg Alternative reimburses the employers the total amount of social 
security contributions, i.e. employees’ and employers’ contributions, if they hire a 
long-term unemployed welfare recipient. Reimbursement requires that the wage 
for the new job does not exceed the wage in the current lowest union wage bracket 
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for the particular sector. In Germany, this would reduce labor costs by 34% in the 
low-skilled labor market segment.5 Since labor costs are reduced immediately, 
firms benefit as of the first day of the reform, which is different to employee-
oriented subsidies, these having to rely on a functioning transmission mechanism 
translating higher net wages into lower labor costs. The net wage of newly hired 
workers is exactly the same as that of incumbent workers. 
2. Double marginal subsidization: additional reimbursement for existing jobs 
Employer-oriented wage subsidies can be implemented in two ways. They are 
general when they are granted for both incumbent and new workers. This makes 
them very expensive – in the introductory phase in particular since firms receive 
subsidies for incumbent workers even before they start hiring additional workers. 
Alternatively, one can target the subsidy. In this case, the displacement of 
incumbent workers by subsidized workers and outsourcing endanger the success 
of such a scheme and raise the fiscal burden too. Our proposal provides two 
mechanisms to prevent these undesirable side effects. 
To avoid displacement of the incumbent workers within the firm, the subsidy is 
paid only if low-skilled employment in the firm increases compared to the 
employment level at a certain reference date: only the number of workers 
exceeding this level will be subsidized. The reference date has to be in the past so 
that firms cannot adjust the number of workers immediately before it.6 
Even if displacement in the same firm can be prevented by subsidizing new 
employees only, a firm could still outsource its low-skilled employees. In a new 
firm, all low-skilled workers would be subsidized. Outsourcing would yield the 
same effects as displacement within the same firm. But outsourcing is not 
costless. A new firm has to be established, administrative costs increase, 
                                                 
5 In 2007, German social security contributions amount to a total of 40.6 percent, which is split 
between employees (20.75 percent) and employers (19.85 percent). The employer’s part is added 
onto official gross wages. The effective reduction of labor costs is thus 
339.0)1985.01()2075.01(1 =+−− . 
6 Real-life marginal employment subsidy programs frequently feature a reference date. For 
example, the first such program, the German Steuergutscheine für Mehrbeschäftigung (tax rebate 
for additional employment), set the employment on August 15th, 1932, or the average employment 
between June and August 1932, whichever was higher, as the reference employment level (Marcon 
1974, p. 192). 
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production plans have to be reorganized, new employees (former welfare 
recipients) need to receive some training, etc. Although these costs have to be 
compared with the savings of outsourcing, a saving of 35 percent of the labor 
costs will still probably be high enough to encourage large-scale outsourcing. This 
would render the reference date solution ineffective – at additional cost. 
To make outsourcing unattractive, the Magdeburg Alternative subsidizes not only 
new employees but also incumbent employees: for each newly hired low-skilled 
worker one incumbent worker also becomes eligible for the subsidy. This double 
marginal subsidization constitutes an incentive to keep old employees in the firm 
since it changes the marginal calculus of the firm. Obviously, if the hiring of one 
new employee also reduces labor costs for an old employee, the marginal costs of 
labor are even lower than with the single marginal subsidy. Hiring a new 
employee pays twice the subsidy, such that marginal labor costs are reduced by 
nearly 70 percent.  
 
Figure 2.3: Double marginal subsidization 
Figure 2.3 demonstrates the functioning of double marginal subsidization for a 
single competitive firm. The firm’s labor demand curve is given by dL , the status 
quo labor cost is denoted by w. The profit-maximizing labor demand is at 0L . If 
Chapter 2: The Magdeburg Alternative 
 39
the subsidy is restricted to the social security contributions of new employees, the 
marginal wage rate would drop to ws)1( − , where s is the single subsidy rate. The 
profit-maximizing level of employment would be at 1L . Double marginal 
subsidization reduces the marginal wage rate even further to ws)21( − . Of course, 
this further reduction increases labor demand even more to 2L . Hence, the 
subsidization of the old workforce being conditional on the creation of new jobs 
leads to even stronger employment gains. 
The incumbent firms thus face lower marginal labor costs, since a new firm 
receives only the single marginal subsidy for all its employees. The subsidy, 
however, always reduces a new firm’s average labor costs by s percent while the 
average labor costs of the incumbent firm only falls as the firm increases 
employment. Its reduction in average labor costs is only )(2 0LLs − , which is 
smaller than sL  as long as 02LL < . This disadvantage, however, is desired: an 
established firm can only compensate its cost disadvantage compared to new 
firms by expanding its employment. Only if the established firm doubles its 
employment does it obtain the same reduction in average labor costs as a new 
firm. 
3. Improving labor supply incentives 
Germany has a two-sided labor market problem. An employer wage subsidy will 
only cure labor demand but will fail to promote labor supply of those on welfare. 
Complementary measures are necessary. Instead of providing costly subsidies to 
employees, the Magdeburg Alternative proposes to tighten eligibility rules: if 
someone refuses to work, he will lose his welfare benefit payments. In Germany, 
the existing social code (§31 SGB II) allows the employment agency to reduce the 
welfare benefits by 30 percent if a recipient refuses to work. Repeated refusals can 
even lead to full cancellation of benefits: if someone is given the opportunity to 
provide for himself and repeatedly refuses to do so, he cannot rely on society’s 
support. These rules are only applied to those able, but not willing, to work. 
People in need, whether they are unable to work or cannot find a job, will receive 
their socio-cultural minimum income as before. Social security’s important role as 
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the “lowest safety net” stays untouched – only the often-cited “hammock” is torn 
down. Rather than increasing the remuneration for work, the incentives to work 
are raised by lowering the reservation wage via a “tax on voluntary idleness”. 
4. Unlimited duration 
The fundamental problem of the market for low-skilled labor is that the 
productivity of an increasing fraction of the workforce falls below the implicit 
minimum wage defined by the minimum existence level. This level is defined in 
relative terms, i.e. it relates to average incomes. Since the productivity of the low-
skilled does not grow as fast as average productivity, more and more low-skilled 
workers will not be able to earn enough to cover their minimum level of existence 
by their own means. Welfare systems with traditional wage-replacement benefits 
will consequently exclude a growing fraction of the labor force from the labor 
market. 
Wage subsidy schemes – including the Magdeburg Alternative – can move the 
state towards a workfare system where the government only pays the gap between 
low-paid wage income and the socially accepted minimum existence level. Such a 
regime shift, obviously, must be of permanent duration. 
Temporary subsidy schemes have another weakness. When the subsidy is of 
limited duration, a firm will only hire a subsidized person if the worker’s 
productivity is only temporarily below its labor costs, and can be increased by 
(on-the-job) training, etc. As soon as the subsidy runs out, the worker has to be 
able to produce a value-added that at least covers his costs or he will be replaced 
with the next subsidized worker. The resulting “revolving- door” effect is typical 
for limited-duration wage subsidies – it does not increase total employment but 
creates additional cost due to excessive training. Firms will only expand their 
demand for low-skilled employment if they can expect long-term benefits from it, 
which will only happen if firms can rely on permanent labor cost reductions. 
As mentioned before, the ceiling below which wages are subsidized is related to 
existing negotiated wages in the lowest wage bracket. This ensures that incumbent 
low-skilled workers will not lose and this could thus increase political acceptance. 
The ceiling must not, however, be conditioned on negotiated wages in the future. 
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Chances would be high that the subsidy then becomes part of the bargaining mass 
and is redistributed between workers and firms. This would raise wages in the 
lowest wage bracket and reduce the employment effects. The ceiling must 
therefore be determined independently of future wage negotiation outcomes. For 
instance, this could be achieved by raising the ceiling according to average 
productivity. In this case, the ceiling rises proportionately with the socio-cultural 
existence minimum level, which is also linked to average productivity.  
5.2. Employment and fiscal effects 
The Magdeburg Alternative replaces an existing subsidy for non-employment 
with one that subsidizes employment instead. It is thus understood as a workfare 
scheme that allows the state to pay only what the individual cannot provide for 
himself. To show that this can reduce the state’s fiscal burden substantially, we 
proceed in two steps. We first calculate the fiscal savings of getting a welfare 
recipient back to work. Then we estimate how many new jobs will be created and 
present an aggregate cost-benefit analysis that takes account of the additional cost 
due to double subsidization. These calculations are presented for the specific 
institutional details of the German welfare and tax systems. Nevertheless, the 
analysis is sufficiently general to allow its extension to other institutional settings. 
Costs and benefits of getting one welfare recipient back to work 
The Magdeburg Alternative subsidizes new jobs up to a ceiling that correspond to 
the status quo lowest union wage brackets. For our calculation, we assume a 
ceiling equal to a monthly gross wage of 1,200 Euro.7 Since social security 
contributions amount to 40.6 percent of gross income in 2007 (health insurance 
contributions: 14.8 percent; care insurance: 1.7 percent; pension insurance: 19.9 
percent; and unemployment insurance: 4.2 percent), the monthly reimbursement is 
487.20 Euro.8  
                                                 
7 The level of gross wages in the lowest wage group in the different sectors ranges from about 
1,000 Euro to 1,800 Euro (WSI 2007). 
8 Employees without children pay an additional surcharge of 0.25 percent on their care insurance 
premium. Since this surcharge discriminates between different types of employees, we will not 
include it in the reimbursement of SSC to employers. 
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If a welfare recipient takes up a job, the government saves on his welfare benefits. 
For a single person without children, the monthly welfare payment is 347 Euro, 
plus an average housing allowance of 330 Euro. In addition, the government pays 
social insurance contributions for unemployed, i.e. it contributes 127.50 Euro per 
month to a recipient’s health and care insurances and 40 Euro to his pension 
insurance. All transfers are paid by the federal government except 68.8 percent of 
the housing allowance, which is covered by the municipality. 
Previous German workfare experiments have shown that some welfare recipients 
prefer to decline a job offer, even if that means forfeiting future benefits, e.g. 
because they work in the shadow economy or can rely on family support. In the 
German city of Leipzig, a field experiment where all welfare recipients were 
called on to work full-time in a municipal public works company resulted in 
refusal rates of one-third (Feist and Schöb, 1998). Other cities report drop-out 
rates between 24 and 29 percent (German Bundestag, 1998). To present a more 
cautionary estimate, we assume that only every sixth recipient drops out of 
welfare instead of taking the job. Fiscal savings will be correspondingly lower. 
To a minor extent newly employed workers also pay income taxes, which further 
reduce the fiscal burden. Income tax revenues are split between the jurisdictions. 
The federal level and the states receive 42.5 percent each of income tax revenues 
while the municipalities receive 15 percent. The so-called Solidaritätszuschlag, a 
tax surcharge levied on individual income tax liabilities, accrues solely to the 
federal government. 
The reimbursement of social security contributions imposes no net burden on the 
public budget since the fact that an unemployed welfare recipient takes up a job 
does not affect his claims against the social insurance system. Welfare recipients 
are fully insured by the health and care insurances and remain so when they take 
up a new job. Only in case of the pension and unemployment insurances can 
former welfare recipients claim larger pay-outs. The public pensions of low-wage 
workers, however, will generally be too small to cover the minimum existence 
level, so that, again, the residual has to be covered by the welfare system.9 Any 
                                                 
9 In Germany, persons aged 65+ are covered by the Grundsicherung im Alter (basic old-age 
security), which provides a basic pension at the same level as welfare benefits. 
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payment contributed to the pension insurance by a low-wage worker only reduces 
the future liabilities of the welfare system one to one and is thus revenue-neutral. 
The same logic applies to the unemployment insurance. All contributions of a 
low-wage worker reduce the future liabilities of the welfare system in the case of 
future unemployment. Hence, the subsidy paid to a newly employed former 
welfare recipient is completely revenue-neutral.  The expenditures of the federal 
government are equal to the additional income of the public social insurance 
system. 
 
Savings (+)/ 
Costs (-) 
Federal 
Level States 
Health 
Insurance
Pension 
Insurance
Unem-
ployment 
Insurance 
Munici-
palities Total 
Health Ins. Contributions -70.50 --- +70.50 --- --- --- 0.00 
Pension Ins. Contributions -198.80 --- --- +198.80 --- --- 0.00 
Basic Old-Age Security +198.80 --- --- -198.80 --- --- 0.00 
Unempl. Ins. Contribution -50.40 --- --- --- +50.40 --- 0.00 
Grant to Unempl. Ins. +50.40 --- --- --- -50.40 --- 0.00 
Income Tax +20.86 +20.86 --- --- --- +7.36 +49.08 
Welfare Benefits +449.96 --- --- --- --- +168.96 +618.92 
Drop-Outs +89.99 --- --- --- --- +45.41 +135.40 
Monthly savings +490.31 +20.86 +70.50 0.00 0.00 +221.73 +803.40 
Annual savings +5,883.67 +250.32 +846.05 0.00 0.00 +2,660.76 +9,640.80 
Source: Own calculations 
Table 2.1: Costs and benefits if a single welfare recipient is placed in a new job 
Table 2.1 shows the payment flows if a single welfare recipient is placed in a job 
with a monthly gross wage of 1,200 Euro. As we have explained above, the 
reimbursement of social security contributions flows from the federal level to the 
social insurances and thus nets out in the aggregate. Moreover, additional claims 
to pension and unemployment insurances directly reduce future welfare liabilities 
of the federal government. Only the health insurance is a net beneficiary; it enjoys 
higher contributions without having to provide more services. 
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While the reimbursement does not constitute a net drain to the public budget, the 
associated savings are substantial. The largest item is previously paid welfare 
benefits, which save 619 Euro per new job, split into 450 Euro for the federal 
level and 169 Euro for the municipalities.10 Additional savings of 135 Euro result 
from drop-outs. Together with additional monthly tax revenues of 49 Euro, total 
savings amount to 803 Euro per month or 9,641 Euro per year. 
Similar calculations for different household types (married couples, families with 
children etc.) show that the savings of bringing one person into work are generally 
of the same magnitude. The average savings per new job, weighted by the relative 
frequency of different household types, is 9,396 Euro per year. Larger households 
receive higher benefits, so that bringing them back to work reduces the public 
welfare load more than for a single recipient without children. At the same time, 
other tax revenues are smaller and savings from drop-outs are lower because 
welfare can be reduced only for the person who declines to work.  
Aggregate costs and benefits 
Aggregate costs and benefits depend on how many new jobs will be created and 
how high the additional costs that arise are because the double marginal subsidy 
and possible displacement effects make it necessary to subsidize already existing 
jobs. We estimate that about 2.1 million full-time jobs currently exist in the 
German low-wage sector.11 The current number of long-term unemployed welfare 
recipients is 2.8 million.  
As a cautionary guess, we will assume a constant wage elasticity of labor demand 
of 0.5. Additionally, we will examine an optimistic and a pessimistic scenario 
with labor demand elasticities of 0.7 and 0.3, respectively.12 Table 2.2 presents the 
                                                 
10 With a gross wage of 1,200 Euro, even a single welfare recipient is incapable of leaving welfare 
completely. Hence, additional welfare benefits of 58 Euro are paid to top up his net wage. This 
explains why only 619 Euro of 677 Euro welfare benefits are saved. 
11 To calculate this number, we applied the share of employees in the lowest qualification group, 
as obtained from the German wage statistic (Hake and Kaukewitsch 2001), to the current number 
of total employment, and converted part-time jobs into full-time equivalents. The lowest 
qualification group comprises all jobs that, in case of blue-collar workers, require less than three 
months experience or that, for white-collar workers, do not require formal vocational training. 
12 This is in line with the empirical literature on the wage elasticity of labor demand. In his survey, 
Hamermesh (1993) concludes that the most probable interval for the constant-output elasticity is 
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employment and fiscal effects in all three scenarios. The double marginal subsidy 
reduces marginal labor costs by 68 percent. 
 
 Wage elasticity of labor demand 
 0.3 0.5 0.7 
 
Add. displacement 
(in percent) 
Add. displacement 
(in percent) 
Add. displacement 
(in percent) 
 0 50 100 0 50 100 0 50 100 
Employment gain (in ‘000s) 832 832 832 1,566 1,566 1,566 2,058 2,058 2,058 
Fiscal savings from hiring former 
welfare recipients (in mill. € p.a.) 
7,818 7,818 7,818 14,716 14,716 14,716 19,339 19,339 19,339
Costs of stock subsidy (in mill. € p.a.) 4,757 4,757 4,757 8,954 8,954 8,954 11,767 11,767 11,767
Additional displacement (in ‘000s) 0 613 1,226 0 246 492 0 0 0 
Costs of displacement (in mill. € p.a.) 0 3,505 7,010 0 1,407 2,813 0 0 0 
Fiscal effect p.a. (in mill. Euro) 3,061 -444 -3,949 5,762 4,355 2,949 7,572 7,572 7,572 
Fiscal effect per new job (in Euro) 3,678 -534 -4,746 3,679 2,781 1,883 3,679 3,679 3,679 
Source: own calculations. 
Table 2.2: Aggregate employment and fiscal effects 
In the pessimistic scenario (constant elasticity of 0.3), this fall in labor costs leads 
to a 40.4 percent increase in labor demand. With current employment at 2.1 
million persons, this corresponds to 832,096 new jobs. Since each new job saves 
the public budget 9,396 Euro, direct savings are equal to 7.8 billion Euro. From 
this, one has to subtract the expenditures for the double subsidization. If all new 
jobs are subject to double subsidization, the additional reimbursement is 487.20 
Euro per month and job. The annual costs are thus equal to 4.8 billion Euro. We 
also assume that remaining regular jobs are partly replaced by subsidized jobs, 
which raises costs. We present the costs if no, half, or all unsubsidized workers 
are in some way displaced and have to be subsidized, too. If half or all of these 
                                                                                                                                     
between 0.15 and 0.75. The unconditional elasticity, which takes output effects into account, lies 
on average at around unity (Cahuc and Zylberberg 2004, 211). For low-skilled workers, recent 
studies with German data show that their conditional elasticity is 0.5 in the manufacturing sector 
and 2.1 in the service sector (Addison et al. 2007). 
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employees have to be subsidized, the additional costs are 3.5 billion or 7.0 billion 
Euro, respectively. Summing up, the pessimistic scenario results in 832,096 new 
jobs, but might lead to net fiscal costs depending on the magnitude of 
displacement. In the most pessimistic case, the annual fiscal costs per new job are 
4,746 Euro. 
In the medium scenario (elasticity of 0.5), employment increases by 76.1 percent, 
which would create 1.57 million new jobs. Direct savings are 14.7 billion Euro, 
9.0 billion are spent on the stock subsidy, while the costs of additional 
displacement are a maximum of 2.8 billion Euro. Under the various assumptions 
about additional displacement, our proposal would still save the public budget 
between 2.9 and 5.8 billion Euro per year. 
With an elasticity of 0.7, labor demand increases by 120.8 percent. Referring back 
to Figure 2.3, in this situation firms would hit the corner solution where 
employment has doubled. Since the reduction of marginal wages drops from 68 
percent to 34 percent when the number of new employees reaches the number 
already employed, this creates a barrier to further employment. Nevertheless, the 
employment effect in the low-wage sector is immense: employment doubles, 
creating 2.1 million new jobs! The cost savings for public budgets are even larger 
than in the medium scenario: public expenditures fall by almost 7.6 billion Euro 
p.a. 
Even under pessimistic assumptions, the expected employment effects of the 
Magdeburg Alternative would be substantial. In most cases, the public budget 
would also be relieved. Table 2.3 shows how the different levels of government 
participate fiscally. For the medium scenario (elasticity of 0.5 and 50 percent 
additional displacement), all levels of government, i.e. the federal level, the states, 
municipalities, and social insurances, would gain. Municipalities, in particular, 
would gain substantially because they would have to spend 2.6 billion Euro per 
year less on housing. In 2006, the federal employment agency spent, on average, 
4,123 Euro on active labor market policy per unemployed person (Federal 
Employment Agency 2007). Our proposal would make many of these programs 
redundant, so that we could expect additional savings not yet considered in Tables 
2.2 and 2.3.  
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Savings (+)/ 
Costs (-) 
Federal 
Level States 
Munici-
palities 
Social 
Insurances Total 
Savings (according to Table 2.2) +10,531.04 +253.88 +2,605.85 +1,325.15 +14,715.92 
Costs of stock subsidy −8954.03 - - - - - - - - - −8954.03 
Costs of additional displacement −1,406.53 - - - - - - - - - −1,406.53 
Fiscal effect (in mill. Euro p.a.) +170.48 +253.88 +2,605.85 +1,325.15 +4,355.36 
Source: own calculations. 
Note: The results refer to the scenario with a labor demand elasticity of 0.5 and 50 
percent additional displacement. 
Table 2.3: Aggregate cost and benefits at the different levels of government 
6. Conclusion 
The main reasons for low-skilled workers being at a particularly high risk of 
becoming unemployed apply to each and every industrial nation, and the resulting 
high levels of unemployment among low-skilled individuals are a problem for all 
developed countries. Technical progress and the high competitiveness of low-
wage countries come at the cost of the job prospects of low-skilled workers in 
industrialized countries. International comparisons show, however, that OECD 
countries have experienced greatly varying degrees of success in the struggle 
against low-skilled unemployment.   
All the attempts to reduce low-skilled unemployment have one thing in 
common. It is wage subsidies provided by the state, in whatever form, that are 
supposed to close the gap between the low productivity of the low-skilled and the 
minimum existence level. This does not mean, however, that it does not matter 
how this medicine is administered. The flexible labor markets in the USA and the 
UK, for example, enable workfare instruments and employee-oriented subsidies to 
be used to solve the dilemma of too low a labor productivity, as measured by 
some minimum level of existence, by shoring up the market wage with a subsidy 
of net wages. This approach is problematic in the regulated labor markets of 
Continental Europe, however, because rigid wages prevent subsidies from leading 
to a stimulation of demand for low-skilled jobs. At first glance, it would seem that 
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a satisfactory level of success could then only be achieved if the labor market 
were to be deregulated to a great extent. In this article, we have attempted to show 
that this is not necessarily the conclusion that needs to be drawn. On the contrary, 
the Magdeburg Alternative shows that a marginal employment subsidy that 
lowers gross wages can also be applied in the presence of collective wage 
bargaining and the achievement of the unions’ goal of rigid wages.  
The decisive point for a gross wage subsidy is the elimination of “revolving-
door” effects and displacement effects. If it does not succeed in preventing firms 
from exploiting it to replace incumbent workers with subsidized workers, any 
reform linked to the demand side of the labor market is doomed to failure. This 
direct exchange of incumbent workers with subsidized workers can easily be 
prevented by linking the subsidy to a requirement that the number of employees in 
a firm should increase. By using double subsidization, i.e. the payment of a 
subsidy not only for the new employee but also for the incumbent employee, the 
outsourcing of employment is also made unattractive by the Magdeburg 
Alternative. And this is the decisive trick of the Magdeburg Alternative, because 
by doing so not only is outsourcing prevented. Massive incentives for the 
generation of further jobs are also created and the funding of the reform is 
secured. 
In principle, this reform harnesses windfall gains that one would generally 
attempt to avoid: firms are also able to have their incumbent employees 
subsidized, but only if the firms do what is desired, and that is create new jobs. 
The creation of these additional jobs means that the reform can be self-financing 
because any subsidy expenditure is always accompanied by a reduction in welfare 
payments. For this reason, the Magdeburg Alternative not only creates new jobs, 
but also helps to consolidate the budget. 
 
 
Chapter 3
Marginal versus general wage subsidies
in competitive industry equilibrium1
1. Introduction
One of the standard textbook answers to the possible reasons for unemployment is
wage rigidity.2 Wages are set at a level exceeding that at which the labor market
clears. Consequently, labor demand falls short of labor supply and unemployment
occurs. One approach to reduce this type of unemployment is to subsidize wages to
price people back into employment. The wage paid by the employer is moved closer
to its full employment level, while the wage received by the employee remains
unchanged.3
Even though, for a given level of real wages, a general wage subsidy can succeed in
reducing unemployment, it will create large fiscal costs because in order to stimu-
late employment at the margin, the subsidy has to be paid for all employees. Hence,
a general wage subsidy creates large windfall gains for employers that receive the
subsidy for all already employed workers without even creating a single new job.
The large costs of a general wage subsidy constitute an almost insurmountable po-
litical obstacle to its implementation.
Apparently, the problem of subsidizing all workers can be avoided by restricting the
subsidy to additional employment. Only if a firm hires a new employee in excess
of its incumbent workforce at some reference date will it receive a subsidy for this
additional worker. Such a scheme is called amarginal wage subsidy. The arguments
in favor of a marginal subsidy compared to a general subsidy seem obvious: if only
1A modified version of this chapter is forthcoming in Academia Economic Papers (Knabe 2008).
2Empirical investigations into the reasons for downward wage rigidity are provided by Bewley
(1999), Agell and Lundborg (2003), Franz and Pfeiffer (2006), and Agell and Bennmarker (2006).
3Such a wage subsidy was first proposed by Kaldor (1936). Various types of wage subsidies
have recently been suggested by Haveman (1996), Orszag and Snower (2000, 2003), Phelps (1997),
Snower (1994), and Scho¨b and Weimann (2003, 2005).
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additional employment is subsidized, the same employment effect could be created
at much lower costs.4
Critics challenge this view because there seem to be various ways to get around
the “additionality” requirement. For example, an incumbent firm could establish
a second, new firm to which it outsources all its employees. Since the new firm’s
employment level on the reference date would be zero, all workers hired in the
new firm would have to be subsidized, but net employment would not change. To
prevent such outsourcing, one has to set economic incentives that make it more
profitable to expand employment in the already existing firm instead of outsourcing.
Double marginal subsidization provides such an incentive (see Scho¨b andWeimann
2003, 2005; Knabe, Scho¨b and Weimann 2006b). If a firm hires a new worker in
excess of its reference employment level, it receives the subsidy not only for the
new employee, but also for one incumbent employee. This effectively doubles the
marginal labor cost reduction if employment is expanded in the incumbent firm and
provides an effective means of preventing outsourcing compared to regular marginal
subsidies.
Even though double marginal subsidization can prevent displacement of unsubsi-
dized by subsidized workers at the level of an individual firm, one must be careful
when transferring the firm-level effects of a marginal subsidy to more aggregate
levels of the economy. In particular, one should expect that marginal wage subsi-
dies create large between-firm displacement effects. As has been pointed out by
Layard and Nickell (1980), even though some firms expand their production, hire
new workers and obtain the subsidy, they do so mainly at the expense of other firms
which have to reduce employment or are driven out of the market. In an extreme
case, only fully subsidized firms could survive in the market, and double marginal
and general subsidies would be equivalent.
We refer to this process, in which subsidy-induced employment expansions in some
firms cause employment reductions in other firms, as between-firm displacement.
Even though a thorough analysis of these displacement effects is crucial for definite
economic policy advice, the literature on this topic is rather sparse. Oswald (1984)
shows that a marginal wage subsidy, while increasing employment at the firm-level,
affects the number of firms in equilibrium in an ambiguous way. The net effect
on employment at the industry level is generally ambiguous. Luskin (1986) shows
4Marginal wage subsidization has been proposed by Layard and Nickell (1980), Chiarella and
Steinherr (1982), Rehn (1982), and Haveman (1996). A marginal subsidy scheme was recently
proposed for Germany by Scho¨b and Weimann (2003, 2005) and initiated some debate among
economists as well as politicians (see e.g. Bothfeld et al. 2006, German Council of Economic
Experts 2006, Sinn 2006a).
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that marginal subsidies will be fiscally more efficient than general subsidies only if
industry product demand is relatively inelastic. If this condition is not met, how-
ever, the opposite holds and general subsidies are more favourable than marginal
subsidies.
The results of Oswald (1984) and Luskin (1986) have to be taken with caution. Both
models rely heavily on assumptions that do not correspond to effectively imple-
mented or proposed subsidy schemes. For example, the subsidy scheme analyzed
by Oswald (1984) combines a marginal wage subsidy for employment above some
reference employment level with a marginal tax on layoffs below this level. Real-
life marginal wage subsidy scheme, however, have always been asymmetric in the
sense that they subsidize new jobs, but do not punish firms that lay off workers.5
Since this asymmetry affects the extent to which firms are able to lay off workers if
their competitors expand, this assumption is critical for the analysis of between-firm
displacement. Luskin’s (1986) results hinge on the assumption that, with marginal
subsidies, new entrants will receive the subsidy only if they expand their employ-
ment above the same reference level as incumbent firms. This assumption, however,
is at odds with actual marginal wage subsidy programs, all of which have individu-
alized reference levels for incumbent firms, while firms founded after the reference
date typically receive the subsidy for all their workers (cf. Schmidt 1979, p. 342).
Moreover, the policy implications of both studies suffer from the ambiguity of their
results.
In this chapter, we resume the discussion of the industry-level effects of marginal
wage subsidies. In line with the existing literature (Oswald 1984, Luskin 1986),
we restrict our analysis to the partial equilibrium effects of a marginal subsidy tar-
geted at a single competitive industry. While these studies appear to have sacrificed
practical relevance for formal elegance, this chapter’s contribution consists in de-
veloping a model of marginal wage subsidies that pays close attention to the institu-
tional features of real-life marginal subsidy programs. For example, our model has
firm-specific reference employment levels (contrary to Luskin 1986) and restricts
the subsidy to employment expansions without penalizing employment reductions
below the reference employment level (contrary to Oswald 1984). With this novel
way of modelling marginal subsidies, we can overcome the ambiguities of pre-
5In the 1970s, many countries experimented with marginal employment subsidies. Examples are
the New Jobs Tax Credit in the United States (see Perloff and Wachter 1979, Bishop and Haveman
1979), the French Prime d’incitation a` la cre´ation d’emploi (see Kopits 1978), the Small Firms Em-
ployment Subsidy in Great Britain (see Layard 1979), and the Lohnkostenzuschu¨sse in Germany (see
Schmidt 1979). All of these programs were asymmetric, i.e they subsidized employment expansions
but did not tax layoffs.
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vious studies and unambiguously identify the differential impact of general and
marginal wage subsidies in the presence of between-firm displacement. Under rel-
atively weak assumptions, we are able to show that marginal wage subsidies create
more employment at less fiscal costs than general subsidies despite between-firm
displacement at the industry level.
We will proceed as follows. In Section 2, we present a graphical argument to vi-
sualize the effects of double marginal subsidization on a firm’s decisions and on
the industry equilibrium. In Section 3, the model is analyzed formally. Section 4
concludes.
2. A graphical argument
To grasp the different effects of double marginal wage subsidies (DMS) compared
to general wage subsidies (GS), it is helpful to look at a diagram showing marginal
and average cost curves in order to predict the optimizing behavior of firms.
The upper part of Figure 3.1 shows the marginal and average cost curves for a firm
without subsidies (MC, AC), for a newly founded firm receiving a single subsidy
(MCS, ACnew), and for an incumbent firm receiving the double marginal subsidy
as long as employment has not doubled (MCDMS, ACinc.). Prices are denoted by
p, a firm’s output level by y, and the initial price and output levels are p0 and y0,
respectively. To keep the analysis as simple as possible, we assume that labor is
the only factor of production, that the production function exhibits a diminishing
marginal product of labor, and that the wage rate is constant. Hence, the marginal
cost schedule is increasing with the level of output. When entering the market, firms
have to pay start-up costs which are sunk afterwards.6
With DMS, an incumbent firm will not receive the subsidy for output levels below
y0 because it has not created any new jobs. Its marginal cost schedule is given by
MC. If the firm raises its output above y0 and consequently hires more workers, the
additional employment qualifies for the marginal subsidy. With DMS, the firm then
receives twice the subsidy rate s per new employee because for each new employee,
6Without the existence of sunk costs, DMS and GS would be equivalent in the long-run industry
equilibrium. With DMS, the average costs of an incumbent firm could never be less than those of a
newly established firm if it were not for its sunk costs. Hence, incumbent firms would be displaced
by new entrants for which DMS are equivalent to GS.
Sunk costs, however, are ubiquitous for firms. Baumol et al. (1983, p. 494) define sunk costs
as the share of capital investment costs which cannot be recouped by resale of the asset. Examples
for such investments are highly specific physical assets, the gathering of information before a firm
enters a specific industry, costs of organizing the new operation, product-differentiating sales efforts
etc. (Martin 1993, p. 306). Hence, it is plausible to assume that sunk start-up costs play a role in
intra-industry competition.
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Figure 3.1: Firm-level effects and aggregate supply
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one already employed worker is subsidized as well. The effect on marginal costs
is equivalent to a marginal subsidy of 2s; the corresponding marginal cost curve is
given by MCDMS. If the firm doubles its employment, all of its incumbent workers
will be subsidized too. This point corresponds to output level y2 in Figure 3.1.7
At y2, the marginal cost curve jumps up to MCS. None of the incumbent workers
is left unsubsidized, so further employment expansions will only receive the single
subsidy.
A new firm entering the market has no employment on the key date, and so all its
employees receive the single subsidy. Its marginal cost curve is thus given by the
entire MCS–curve. However, a newly entering firm has to bear start-up costs, and so
its average cost curve is given by ACnew. The lowest price at which new firms start
entering the market, both under GS and DMS, is denoted by p¯ ≡ miny ACnew(y).
With the knowledge of its marginal and average cost curves, we can derive an in-
cumbent firm’s supply function. For very low output prices, the firm’s supply func-
tion is given by the marginal cost curve MC, i.e. it will shrink compared to its initial
production level y0. For higher prices, there will be a critical price at which the firm
makes the same profit either by shrinking to some production level less than y0 or by
expanding production to a level above y0 and receiving the subsidy. In Figure 3.1,
this critical price is denoted by p˜, and the two production levels yielding equal prof-
its are y)) and y), respectively.8 For prices above p˜, the firm’s supply curve is given
by the double subsidy marginal cost curve MCDMS as long as employment has
not doubled. Since employment exceeding twice the initial level receives only the
single subsidy, the firm will always supply y2 for all prices between MCDMS(y2)
and MCS(y2). For all prices above this interval, the firm’s supply curve is given by
MCS.
With the knowledge of marginal and average cost curves, we can derive the indus-
try’s aggregate supply function shown in the lower part of Figure 3.1 (solid line),
where n0 denotes the number of firms in initial equilibrium and Y stands for the in-
dustry’s output level. For visual clarity, we have assigned numbers to the different
sections of the supply curve:9
Section 1: The output price is less than the critical price p˜. All incumbent firms
7Note that with diminishing marginal product of labor, y2 < 2y0.
8By expanding from y)) to y), a firm makes inframarginal losses on all units between y)) and y0,
but inframarginal profits on all units between y0 and y) (shown by the shaded areas in Figure 3.1). At
p˜, the gains and losses exactly balance, so that the same level of profit arises at both output levels.
9It should be mentioned that the exact shape of the industry supply curve depends on the precise
functional form of the production technology as well as on the level of the subsidy. Unless other-
wise indicated, we will, without affecting our results qualitatively, consider only the case where all
sections depicted in Figure 3.1 exist.
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reduce their production level. No subsidy is paid out.
Section 2: The output price is exactly p˜. Some incumbent firms will expand to
y), others will contract to y)). The number of firms contracting and expand-
ing depends on the quantity of industry output demanded. Hence, some of
the incumbent firms will expand at the cost of other incumbent firms. The
additional employment in expanding firms has to be subsidized.
Section 3: All incumbent firms expand their employment. Most, but not all, work-
ers are subsidized.
Section 4: All incumbent firms double their employment. All workers are subsi-
dized.
Section 5: The output price is p¯. All incumbent firms double their employment
and produce y2. The industry product demand not supplied by the incumbent
firms is then served by new entrants, each of which produces an output level
of MC−1S ( p¯). All workers are subsidized.
The lower part of Figure 3.1 can then also be used to compare the equilibria ob-
tained with DMS when displacement is taken into account and when it is neglected.
If there were no displacement between firms, all firms would supply along their
marginal cost curve with double subsidies, MCDMS. The industry supply curve
would then be given by the dashed-dotted line in the lower part of Figure 3.1, and
the resulting market equilibrium would occur in point A. As we have argued above,
however, point A cannot be an equilibrium because the output price would be so
low that all firms would want to reduce their output levels below y0. When some
firms reduce their output, aggregate supply falls and the market price rises until it
reaches the price level p˜ at which firms are indifferent between shrinking and ex-
panding. Taking these displacement effects into account shifts the equilibrium with
DMS from point A to point B, which impairs the predicted equilibrium output and
employment effects of DMS.
With GS, the derivation of the industry’s supply curve is straightforward (dashed
line in the lower part of Figure 3.1). An incumbent firm is completely subsidized at
the single rate, and so its supply curve is given by MCS. For new firms, there is no
difference between DMS and GS - in either case, all their employees are subsidized
at the single rate. Hence, new firms will enter the market if the output price is at
least p¯. The resulting equilibrium is indicated by point C.
Figure 3.1 compares the industry supply curves both underDMS andGS. For output
levels below Y˜ , the industry supply curve withGS is below the industry supply curve
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with DMS. The DMS-curve is above the GS-curve for output levels between Y˜ and
n0y2. Both curves coincide for output levels above n0y2 where new firms enter the
market. A sufficient condition for a favorable output effect of DMS compared to
GS is that the industry supply curve with GS is above the DMS-curve at the point
where the demand curve D (p) intersects the DMS-curve, or, in other words, that
Y˜ < D ( p˜) where Y˜ = n0MC−1S ( p˜).10 For an arbitrary non-increasing demand
function, DMS will always result in a larger equilibrium output than GS if Y˜ <
n0y0. Since, as we will show in the next section, DMS require at least as many,
and generally more, workers to produce a given output compared to GS, a higher
output effect is also sufficient for a larger employment effect. Comparing the fiscal
effects of both subsidies, it is clear that a favorable employment effect of DMS is
also sufficient to ensure lower fiscal costs per newly created job. On the one hand,
more new jobs mean more savings in welfare expenditures, while on the other hand
DMS create less costs because they will never subsidize more already existing jobs
than GS.
The effects are less clear-cut if Y˜ > D ( p˜). The output effect will be favorable to
GS, but the employment and fiscal effects of DMS might nevertheless still be more
desirable. We will discuss this point in the next section in more detail.
3. A formal analysis
Suppose that each firm has a production technology y = f (l), with f ) > 0, f )) <
0,where y is a firm’s output and l its labor input. This production technology results
in a variable cost function C(y) with C ) > 0 and C )) > 0. Let marginal costs be
denoted by MC(y) ≡ C )(y). The wage rate is denoted byw, the single subsidy rate
by s, and start-up costs by F. Total market demand is a non-increasing function of
the price level denoted by D(p) with D) ≤ 0.
We first show that DMS are more likely to prevent firms from outsourcing their
entire workforce than regular (single) marginal wage subsidies. DMS subsidize al-
ready employed workers’ wages if new employees are hired. Let the share of an
already employed worker’s wage that is subsidized per new employee be denoted
by X.11 For example, if the full wage bill of an already employed worker is subsi-
dized (the DMS case), then X = 1. If per new employee only half of an incumbent
worker’s wage is subsidized, X = 1/2. The profit function for the relevant price
10In Figure 3.1, Y˜ < D ( p˜) means that point C has to be to the left of – or exactly at the same
point as – point B.
11The possibility of a variable policy parameter X was mentioned by Scho¨b and Weimann (2003).
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intervals can then be written as
π (p, s, X) =



pMC−1 (p/σ)−wl0
−σw
d
f −1
b
MC−1 (p/σ)
c
− l0
e if p˜ ≤ p ≤ σMC(y2)
py2 − (1+ σ)wl0 if σMC(y2) < p ≤ p¯
,
(3.1)
where y0 is the firm’s employment level at the reference date, y2 is the output level at
which the firm has doubled its initial employment level, i.e. y2 ≡ f (2l0) with l0 ≡
f −1(y0), and σ ≡ 1− (1+ X) s. p˜ is the price level at which the firm is indifferent
between expanding or contracting, implicitly determined by the condition
π ( p˜, s, X) = π ( p˜, 0, X) , (3.2)
where the right-hand side is the profit if a firm shrinks and does not receive any
subsidies. p¯ is the price level at which new firms enter the market:
p¯ = min
y
v
F + (1− s)C (y)
y
w
. (3.3)
If a firm decides to outsource all of its employees to a new firm, it will receive the
single subsidy for all of them. Profits are then given by the profit function (3.1)
with X = 0 plus an additional subsidy of swl0 for its incumbent workforce. We
assume that outsourcing is costly (legal costs of establishing a new firm, etc.). If
outsourcing costs are given by Cout , the profits of an outsourcing firm are
π (p, s, 0)+ swl0 − Cout . (3.4)
By comparing the profits with and without outsourcing, one can determine a critical
level Cˆout at which it is desirable for a firm to maintain production in the old firm
instead of outsourcing it to a new firm.
Cˆout = π (p, s, 0)+ swl0 − π (p, s, X) . (3.5)
Only if outsourcing costs exceed this critical level can marginal wage subsidies be
an effective policy instrument compared to general wage subsidies.
Regular (single) marginal wage subsidies do not provide subsidies for already em-
ployed workers. This is captured by setting X = 0 in (3.5). The critical level of
outsourcing costs is then given by
Cˆout = swl0, (3.6)
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i.e. outsourcing will be desirable as long as outsourcing costs are less than the gain
from receiving a subsidy for the entire existing workforce.
DMS propose to subsidize the existing workforce if new workers are hired. This
will reduce the critical level of outsourcing costs:
∂Cˆout
∂X = −
∂π (p, s, X)
∂X < 0. (3.7)
Subsidizing part of the existing workforce does not affect the profit from outsourc-
ing, but it increases the profit from expanding employment in the existing firm.
Hence, DMS provide a mechanism that can prevent displacement via outsourcing.
In the remainder of this chapter, we will assume that the value of X = 1 proposed
by Scho¨b and Weimann (2005) is sufficiently high to avoid outsourcing.
Analogously to the graphical analysis in the previous section and assuming that all
sections shown in Figure 3.1 exist, the industry supply function with DMS is given
by
YMS(p) =



0 if 0 ≤ p ≤ MC (0)
n0MC−1 (p) if MC (0) < p < p˜
n0MC−1 ( p˜) ,
n0MC−1
r
p˜
1−2s
s

if p = p˜
n0MC−1
r
p
1−2s
s
if p˜ < p ≤ (1− 2s)MC (y2)
n0y2 if (1− 2s)MC (y2) < p < p¯
[n0y2,∞[ if p = p¯
, (3.8)
and the industry supply function with GS is given by
YGS(p) =



0 if 0 ≤ p ≤ (1− s)MC (0)
n0MC−1
r
p
1−s
s
if (1− s)MC (0) < p < p¯K
n0MC−1
r
p¯
1−s
s
,∞
K
if p = p¯
. (3.9)
We now turn to the analysis of the output, employment, and fiscal effects of the two
types of subsidies. For this, we will make use of the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1 Comparing two industry equilibria, in each of which the same level of
output is produced, but which differ in the number and/or size of individual firms,
the level of employment is always smaller in the equilibrium in which, with the same
or larger number of firms, all firms have the same output level.
Proof. See Appendix.
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Lemma 3.1 shows that for a given level of output, employment is larger underDMS
due to a technical inefficiency in the production sector. If all firms have the same
strictly concave production function, different firm sizes mean that the marginal
productivity of labor is not equalized between firms. Moreover, reducing the num-
ber of firms means that each firm has to increase its level of production. This lowers
the marginal productivity of labor to inefficiently low levels. Hence, a small number
of large, differently sized firms require more labor inputs to produce a given output
than a large number of small, equally sized firms.
As in the previous section, we define a critical level of industry output Y˜ by the
point at which the industry supply curves with DMS and GS intersect:
Y˜ ≡ n0MC−1 ( p˜/ (1− s)) . (3.10)
With the help of Lemma 3.1, we can now easily identify all the cases where DMS
have favorable output and employment effects compared to GS.
Proposition 3.1 For a specific demand function D(p) with D) ≤ 0, the output and
employment effects will be at least as large with DMS as with GS if the demand
function intersects the industry supply function under DMS to the right of the crit-
ical level Y˜ , i.e. D ( p˜) ≥ Y˜ . For any such demand function, this will be the case if
the initial industry output exceeds Y˜ , i.e. n0y0 ≥ Y˜ .
Proof. See Appendix.
Referring to Figure 3.1, Proposition 3.1 states that whenever the demand curve in-
tersects the industry supply curves in a range where theDMS-curve lies on or below
the GS-curve, output with DMS will be larger than (Sections 2, 3 and 4) or as large
as (Section 5) with GS. The reason that DMS may result in higher equilibrium out-
put lies in their rent reduction effect. Under both subsidy schemes, incumbent firms
are to some degree protected from the competition of new entrants by the sunk char-
acter of start-up costs, and hence obtain rents. UnderGS, for p < p¯ demand is large
enough to support all incumbent firms, each of which expands its production and
receives the subsidy for all its employees. Under DMS, the double marginal sub-
sidy provides a larger incentive for each firm to expand production than the single
subsidy. If total market demand is not large enough to support all incumbent firms’
desired output expansion, incumbent firms will compete for the expansion, so that
some firms increase their output at the expense of other firms. The subsidy thus
triggers competition between incumbent firms that, in industry equilibrium, results
in lower prices, lower rents, and larger output under DMS than under GS.
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Proposition 3.1 also postulates that the higher output effect of DMS is always as-
sociated with a higher employment effect as well. The reason lies in the technical
inefficiency described by Lemma 3.1. With GS, any given output level is produced
by equally sized firms, while with DMS either some firms expand while others con-
tract or all incumbent firms become larger than they would be under GS. Thus, the
favorable output effect of DMS also causes a favorable employment effect.
The second part of Proposition 3.1 states that for certain supply functions, there
will be favorable output and employment effects for any demand function. The
condition n0y0 ≥ Y˜ can be used to identify these supply functions. For example,
all homogenous one-factor production functions fulfill this condition.
Corollary 3.1 For all homogenous one-factor production functions with a degree
of homogeneity between 0 and 1, the output and employment effects of DMS are
(weakly) larger than with GS.
Proof. See Appendix.
If D ( p˜) < Y˜ , however, the output effect will be larger with GS. Nevertheless, the
distorted production structure with DMS can still lead to a larger employment ef-
fect because the technical inefficiency may require more labor to produce a smaller
amount of output. If the employment gain due to the technical inefficiency effect of
DMS (cf. Lemma 3.1) dominates the employment gain of the output effect of GS,
employment still rises more under DMS than under GS. The necessary conditions
for a favorable employment effect of DMS are therefore weaker than those derived
in Proposition 3.1.
Formally, the necessary condition for a favorable employment effect ofDMS in case
of D ( p˜) < Y˜ is
(1− γ ) f −1
b
MC−1 ( p˜)
c
+ γ f −1
r
MC−1
r
p˜
1−2s
ss
> f −1
r
MC−1
r
pGS
1−s
ss. (3.11)
In (3.11), the share of expanding firms γ ∈ [0, 1] and the equilibrium price level
with GS, pGS, are implicitly determined by
(1− γ ) n0MC−1 ( p˜)+ γ n0MC−1
t
p˜
1− 2s
u
= D ( p˜) , (3.12)
n0MC−1
t
pGS
1− s
u
= D (pGS) , (3.13)
60
Chapter 3: Marginal vs general subsidies in competitive industry equilibrium
respectively. The RHS of (3.11) is the employment necessary to produce the output
demanded at pGS when all firms act identically. The first term on the LHS of (3.11)
is the level of employment in contracting firms, weighted by their share, while the
second term on the LHS is the weighted employment level of expanding firms. The
weight γ is determined by condition (3.12), which equates the combined output of
contracting and expanding firms with the industry demand at p˜. As we will show
below, the LHS of (3.11) can exceed its RHS even if the underlying employment
effect favors GS due to the concavity of the production function.
It is also possible to determine a sufficient condition for the favorability of DMS
with respect to its employment effects for all feasible non-increasing demand func-
tions. If n0y0 < Y˜ , the largest possible difference between the equilibrium output
levels with DMS and GS for a non-increasing demand function is that industry out-
put with DMS stays at n0y0, while output with GS goes to Y˜ .12 Analogously to
(3.11), DMS will yield a larger employment effect than GS if
(1− γ ) f −1
b
MC−1 ( p˜)
c
+ γ f −1
r
MC−1
r
p˜
1−2s
ss
> f −1
r
MC−1
r
p˜
1−s
ss, (3.14)
where γ is implicitly determined by
(1− γ )MC−1 ( p˜)+ γMC−1
t
p˜
1− 2s
u
= y0. (3.15)
The following proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 3.2 For some specific demand function D (p) with D) ≤ 0, the em-
ployment effects will be larger with DMS than with GS if either a) the output effect
of DMS is larger than that of GS, or b) the output effect of GS is larger than that
of DMS, but the technical inefficiency effect dominates the output effect (Condition
3.11).
For any such demand function, this will be the case if the technical inefficiency ef-
fect of DMS at the initial output level dominates the output effect of GS at price p˜
(Condition 3.14).
Proposition 3.2 covers a wider set of demand functions for which the employment
effects are favorable to DMS than Proposition 3.1.
12This will occur if D)(p) = 0∀ p ≥ p˜ and D)(p)→∞∀ p < p˜.
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Corollary 3.2 The set of demand functions D(p) with D)(p) ≤ 0, for which em-
ployment effects are favorable to DMS, is always at least as large as, and generally
larger than, the set of demand functions for which the output effect is also favorable
to DMS, described in Proposition 3.1.
Proof. See Appendix.
Corollary 3.2 shows that favorable employment effects is a weaker requirement on
DMS than favorable output effects. Hence, when introducing DMS, it is even more
likely that favorable employment effects arise than that favorable output effects arise
as compared to GS.
The last point to analyze is the fiscal efficiency of both subsidy schemes. Our mea-
sure of fiscal efficiency is the subsidy expenditure per net job created (as in Luskin
1986). The smaller this number, the more likely it is that the government can ac-
tually save money through less unemployment benefits expenditures, higher tax
revenues from the additional employment, etc.
Under DMS, subsidy expenditures per net job created are given by
φswLDMS
LDMS − L0
, (3.16)
where LDMS is total equilibrium employment and L0 ≡ n0l0 is total initial em-
ployment. φ denotes the share of subsidized workers in total employment. If
p ∈
d
p˜, (1− 2s)MC (y2)
d
(Sections 2 and 3 in Figure 3.1), incumbent firms
have not doubled their employment and some, but not all, workers are subsidized:
φ ∈ ]0, 1[ . If p ≥ (1− 2s)MC (y2) (Sections 4 and 5 in Figure 3.1), incumbent
firms have doubled their employment so that all their workers are subsidized. Since
new entrants are always fully subsidized, we have φ = 1.
Under GS, subsidy expenditures per net job created are given by
swLGS
LGS − L0
, (3.17)
where LGS is total equilibrium employment.
By comparing (3.16) and (3.17), one can determine the fiscally more efficient sub-
sidy scheme.
Proposition 3.3 The fiscal efficiency of DMS is at least as large as the fiscal effi-
ciency of GS if
φ LDMS
LGS
≤
LDMS − L0
LGS − L0
. (3.18)
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Proposition 3.3 immediately allows us to determine the set of demand functions for
which fiscal effects are favorable to DMS.
Corollary 3.3 The set of demand functions D(p) with D)(p) ≤ 0, for which fiscal
efficiency is at least as large with DMS as with GS, is always at least as large as,
and generally larger than, the set for which employment effects are favorable to
DMS.
The proof of Corollary 3.3 is straightforward. Even if all workers had to be subsi-
dized under DMS (φ = 1), a favorable employment effect is sufficient for favorable
fiscal efficiency because the costs of subsidizing already existing jobs are spread
out among more new jobs, thereby reducing the fiscal burden per new job created.
Moreover, smaller employment effects of DMS can also be fiscally more efficient
if not all firms have doubled their employment and thus not all workers have to be
subsidized in industry equilibrium.
As follows from Corollary 3.3, GS can only be fiscally more efficient than DMS
if D ( p˜) < Y˜ and the industry demand function is sufficiently inelastic around
the initial equilibrium. This result contradicts Luskin’s (1986) finding that only a
sufficiently inelastic demand function can ensure better fiscal effects of marginal
subsidies.
To sum up, under certain conditions, such as homogenous production functions or
sufficiently elastic industry product demand, DMS cause larger output and employ-
ment effects thanGS and are fiscally more efficient. Under weaker conditions,DMS
can have favorable employment effects and be fiscally more efficient even if their
output effect is smaller than that under GS. And, finally, DMS might be fiscally
more efficient even if both output and employment effects are smaller than under
GS.
4. Conclusion
In this chapter, we have analyzed whether a marginal wage subsidy can serve as
a policy measure to reduce unemployment despite intra-industry displacement. In
particular, we have compared a double marginal wage subsidy scheme with a stan-
dard general wage subsidy. Our aim was to determine the conditions under which
a double marginal wage subsidy yields better output and employment effects than
a general subsidy, and to clarify which of the subsidy schemes is fiscally more effi-
cient.
Our results show that a double marginal subsidy generally leads to lower equi-
librium prices, and hence to a higher equilibrium output level, than an equal-rate
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general subsidy. The reason for this result is that double marginal subsidies give
a larger marginal stimulus for output expansion than equal-rate general subsidies.
The resulting increase in industry-level supply drives down the market price more
strongly than with general subsidies, which raises output and employment at the
industry level. If double marginal subsidies depress prices below a critical level,
however, between-firm displacement occurs. Only some incumbent firms can ex-
pand their production, while all other incumbents are forced to reduce their size
substantially. This displacement raises the fiscal costs of marginal subsidies and
reduces their output and employment effects. Nevertheless, we were able to derive
conditions under which between-firm displacement is not sufficient to counteract
the positive effects of double marginal subsidies completely. Our results show that
double marginal subsidies might result in lower prices as well as larger output and
employment than general subsidies despite their displacement effects.
Furthermore, the employment effect of a double marginal wage subsidy generally
exceeds that of the general subsidy even if both yield the same output effect. This re-
sults from a technical inefficiency induced by double marginal subsidization. With
decreasing returns to scale at the firm level, an efficient production structure re-
quires all firms to have the same size. Double marginal subsidies, however, cause
some firms to expand and others to contract, which distorts the production structure
and increases the amount of labor necessary to produce the same level of output.
This technical inefficiency yields favorable employment effects, such that even in
those cases where the output effect favors general subsidies, employment can still
be larger with marginal wage subsidies.
The fiscal effect, measured as the subsidy expenditures per new job, always favors
the marginal subsidy if its employment effect exceeds that of the general subsidy.
However, even if their employment effect is smaller, the fiscal effect of marginal
subsidies can still be favorable since their displacement of non-subsidized workers
is generally less than complete.
If we make more specific assumptions about the functional form of the produc-
tion technology, we can resolve the remaining ambiguities. As we have shown,
homogeneity of the production function is sufficient to ensure favorable output,
employment and fiscal effects of double marginal subsidization. Hence, by using
a partial-equilibrium model that focuses on the displacement competition between
firms in the same industry, we have shown that double marginal wage subsidies
might be preferable to general subsidies despite their between-firm displacement
effects.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3.1. Suppose that in one sector, output is produced by n1 firms,
each of which has a production level of y. In the other sector, there are n2 firms,
of which γ n2 firms each produce y) and (1− γ ) n2 firms each produce y)). If total
output is the same in both sectors, we have
n1y = n2
b
γ y) + (1− γ ) y))
c
. (3.A.1)
Employment in the first sector is given by n1 f −1 (y) , which by inserting (3.A.1)
becomes
n1 f −1
t
n2
n1
b
γ y) + (1− γ ) y))
cu
, (3.A.2)
while employment in the second sector is given by
n2
r
γ f −1
b
y)
c
+ (1− γ ) f −1
b
y))
cs
. (3.A.3)
From the definition of the production function ( f ) > 0, f )) < 0), we know that
the inverse production function f −1 (y) is strictly convex. Thus, from Jensen’s
inequality we have
f −1
b
γ y) + (1− γ ) y))
c
< γ f −1
b
y)
c
+ (1− γ ) f −1
b
y))
c
if y) /= y)), (3.A.4)
and from the definition of a convex function we have
f −1
t
n2
n1
b
γ y) + (1− γ ) y))
cu
≤
n2
n1
f −1
bb
γ y) + (1− γ ) y))
cc
if n2 ≤ n1.
(3.A.5)
Combining (3.A.4) and (3.A.5) yields
n1 f −1
t
n2
n1
b
γ y) + (1− γ ) y))
cu
< n2
r
γ f −1
b
y)
c
+ (1− γ ) f −1
b
y))
cs
(3.A.6)
if y) /= y)) and n2 ≤ n1, which proves the lemma.
Proof of Proposition 3.1.
Let pDMS and pGS be defined by D(pi ) = Yi (pi ) with i ∈ {DMS,GS}. From the
supply functions (3.8) and (3.9), it follows that
p > p˜⇒ YGS (p) ≤ YDMS (p) . (3.A.7)
If D ( p˜) > Y˜ = YGS ( p˜) , then pGS > p˜. Under this condition, (3.A.7) implies that
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D (pGS) ≤ YDMS (pGS) and thus pDMS ≤ pGS. Hence,
D ( p˜) > n0MC−1
t
p˜
1− s
u
⇒ D (pDMS) ≥ D (pGS) . (3.A.8)
If D ( p˜) = YGS ( p˜) = n0MC−1 ( p˜/ (1− s)) , then pGS = pDMS = p˜ and
D (pDMS) = D (pGS) , which combined with (3.A.8) yields
D ( p˜) ≥ n0MC−1
t
p˜
1− s
u
⇒ D (pDMS) ≥ D (pGS) . (3.A.9)
This proves that the output effect favors DMS under the first condition of the propo-
sition.
We now have to show that employment is larger under DMS than under GS. If
pGS ∈ [ p˜, p¯[, and hence pDMS ∈ [ p˜, p¯[, the number of firms is equal to n0 un-
der both subsidy schemes. Under GS, each firm produces MC−1 (pGS/ (1− s)) ,
while under DMS some firms produce MC−1 (pDMS/ (1− 2s)) and others pro-
duce MC−1 (pDMS) . Lemma 3.1 shows that for D (pDMS) = D (pGS) and this
production structure, employment is larger under DMS. This holds, a fortiori, for
D (pDMS) > D (pGS) .
If pGS = p¯, all firms produce the same quantity MC−1 ( p¯/ (1− s)) under GS, and
the number of firms is given by D( p¯)/MC−1 ( p¯/ (1− s)) ≥ n0. Under DMS, ei-
ther pDMS < p¯, in which case the number of firms is equal to n0, or pDMS = p¯, in
which case the number of firms is equal to n0+[D( p¯)− n0y2] /MC−1 ( p¯/ (1− s))-
≤ D( p¯)/MC−1 ( p¯/ (1− s)) since, by assumption, argminy ACnew (y) ≤ y2.
Hence, under GS the number of firms is never smaller than under DMS and firms
are always of equal size. In this case, Lemma 3.1 shows that the employment effects
always favor DMS.
We are left to show the second part of the proposition. The initial equilibrium is
defined by D (p0) = n0y0. With p˜ < p0 and D) (p) ≤ 0, there does not exist a
demand function D (p) for which D ( p˜) < n0y0. This concludes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 3.1.
The condition n0y0 ≥ Y˜ can be written as
(1− s)MC (y0) ≥ p˜, (3.A.10)
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where p˜ is implicitly defined in (3.2) by
p˜MC−1 ( p˜)−w f −1
b
MC−1 ( p˜)
c
− p˜MC−1 ( p˜/ (1− 2s))
+wl0 + (1− 2s)w
d
f −1
b
MC−1 ( p˜/ (1− 2s))
c
− l0
e
= 0.
(3.A.11)
With y = f (l) , the marginal and inverse marginal cost functions are given by
MC (y) = w
f )
b
f −1 (y)
c, (3.A.12)
MC−1 (p) = f
r
f )−1 (w/p)
s
. (3.A.13)
Inserting into (3.A.11) gives
p˜ f
b
f )−1 (w/ p˜)
c
−w f )−1 (w/ p˜)− p˜ f
b
f )−1 ((1− 2s)w/ p˜)
c
+wl0 + (1− 2s)w
d
f )−1 ((1− 2s)w/ p˜)− l0
e
= 0.
(3.A.14)
If f (l) is homogenous of degree h, this is rewritten as
K
1− (1− 2s) hh−1
L K
p˜ f
r
f )−1 (w/ p˜)
s
−w f )−1 (w/ p˜)
L
+ 2swl0 = 0. (3.A.15)
If Condition (3.A.10) is true, we must have
K
1− (1− 2s) hh−1
L

(1− s)MC (y0) f
r
f )−1
r
w
(1−s)MC(y0)
ss
−w f )−1
r
w
(1−s)MC(y0)
s

+ 2swl0 ≤ 0,
(3.A.16)
because a price higher than p˜ must yield a larger profit for an expanding firm than
for a contracting firm. Since (1− s)MC (y0) = (1− s)w/ f ) (l0) , this condition
becomes
1− (1− 2s) hh−1
(1− s) 1h−1
v
f (l0)
l0 f ) (l0)
− 1
w
+ 2s ≤ 0, (3.A.17)
which, by applying Euler’s theorem, can be rewritten as
1− (1− 2s) hh−1
(1− s) 1h−1
v
1
h
− 1
w
+ 2s ≤ 0. (3.A.18)
This condition holds for all values h ∈]0, 1[ and s ∈ [0, 1/2[. This proves the claim.
Proof of Corollary 3.2. Proposition 3.1 shows that all such demand functions for
which the condition D ( p˜) ≥ Y˜ holds have employment effects that favor DMS. To
67
Chapter 3: Marginal vs general subsidies in competitive industry equilibrium
prove the corollary, we have to find at least one demand function that violates the
condition and still has larger employment effects with DMS.
Suppose that D ( p˜) < Y˜ , so that the equilibrium price under GS, pGS, is deter-
mined by D (pGS) = n0MC−1 (pGS/ (1− s)), and pGS < p˜. Let D)(p) = 0∀p ∈d
pGS, p˜
e
. Then D(pGS) = D ( p˜) , and due to the strict convexity of the inverse
production function
(1− γ ) f −1
b
MC−1 ( p˜)
c
+γ f −1
r
MC−1
r
p˜
1−2s
ss > f −1 (D ( p˜) /n0) = f −1 (D (pGS) /n0) ,
(3.A.19)
where γ is defined by (3.12). Thus, if there exist demand functions that violate
D ( p˜) ≥ n0MC−1 ( p˜/ (1− s)) , there are always some demand functions that cre-
ate a larger equilibrium employment effect with DMS than with GS.
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Marginal wage subsidies:
a rent-extracting instrument for employment
creation1
1. Introduction
Many countries experience involuntary unemployment because wages are set at
too high levels. Minimum wage regulations, the influence of insider-oriented trade
unions and also social norms within firms cause downward wage rigidity and pre-
vent wages from falling to their full employment level.2 To fight this type of un-
employment, wage subsidies have been promoted by economists for more than half
a century as a promising remedy.3 A general subsidy, which a firm receives for all
its workers, reduces its labor costs and makes it profitable for the firm to hire more
workers.
A main objection to general wage subsidization is its large fiscal cost. If all workers,
including those already in employment, have to be subsidized, the government has
to raise large amounts of public funds to finance the subsidy. This constitutes a seri-
ous obstacle to the implementation of wage subsidy programs, either because there
is political resistance to increased taxation or because of concerns about the excess
burden of taxation. Thus, a promising introduction of a wage subsidy scheme has to
ensure that it is self-financing to fulfill this “political implementability constraint”.
To overcome this problem, policy proposals known as marginal wage subsidies
(MS) recommend to restrict the subsidy to a firm’s additional employment, mea-
sured with respect to a firm’s employment level at some reference date. This would
1A modified version of this chapter has been circulated in the FEMM Working Paper Series
(Knabe 2006b).
2Empirical investigations into the reasons for downward wage rigidity are provided by Bewley
(1999), Agell and Lundborg (2003), Franz and Pfeiffer (2006), and Agell and Bennmarker (2006).
3Kaldor (1936) was the first to propose an employer-oriented wage subsidy. More recently,
various types of wage subsidies were suggested by Snower (1994), Haveman (1996), Phelps (1997),
Orzag and Snower (2000, 2003) and Scho¨b and Weimann (2003).
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reduce fiscal costs while maintaining the same marginal stimulus to employment
creation as a general subsidy (GS).4
Various criticisms have been brought forward against marginal wage subsidies, too.
There appears to be an obvious way how firms could circumvent the marginal char-
acter ofMS: firms could lay off all their incumbent workers, establish a new firm in
which they hire an equal number of workers, and delegate the tasks formerly per-
formed by their incumbent workers to these new firms. In the new firms, all workers
would be eligible for marginal subsidies.5 Such outsourcing can be avoided with
double marginal subsidies (DMS), where for each new employee also one incum-
bent employee is subsidized (see Scho¨b and Weimann 2003, 2005; Knabe, Scho¨b
and Weimann 2006b). This strengthens the incentives for incumbent firms to in-
crease employment within the firm rather than outsource existing jobs in order to
obtain the subsidy.
Another disadvantage of marginal subsidies is that they cannot prevent competitive,
between-firm displacement. Layard and Nickell (1980) argue that if all firms in
a competitive industry are offered a marginal wage subsidy, they will all want to
expand their production. This will cause the price in this industry to fall. Since av-
erage costs will have fallen only little, the firms will be making losses, so that some
firms will leave the industry. In the resulting equilibrium, most of the employment
expansion in remaining firms will have taken place at the expense of employment in
exiting firms. Since more workers have to be subsidized in equilibrium, the claimed
favorability of (double) marginal subsidies compared to general subsidies vanishes.
This chapter focuses on this intra-industry competition in the presence of marginal
subsidies and develops a model that allows us to identify the differential impacts of
general and double marginal wage subsidies.6 We will show that, despite the exis-
tence of between-firm displacement, the employment effects with DMS are always
larger than with GS. The reason is that the fiercer competition triggered by DMS
4Marginal wage subsidization has been proposed by Chiarella and Steinherr (1982), Haveman
(1996), Layard and Nickell (1980), and Rehn (1982). Recently, a marginal subsidy scheme was
proposed for Germany by Scho¨b and Weimann (2003, 2005) and initiated some debate among
economists as well as politicians (see e.g. Bothfeld et al. 2006, German Council of Economic
Experts 2006, Sinn 2006a).
5Empirical evidence that firms take advantage of marginal subsidy schemes by outsourcing is
mentioned by Schmidt (1979).
6We apply Occam’s razor to construct our model as simple as possible to focus on the differential
impact of double marginal and general subsidies. In particular, we abstract from different skill
groups of labor, capital-labor substitutability, or endogenous wage setting. Even though these would
surely be important factors for a complete policy evaluation of marginal and general subsidies, they
have similar effects for both subsidy schemes, so that their inclusion would make the model less
tractable without affecting its qualitative results.
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between incumbent firms reduces their rents, leads to lower prices and thus to more
employment. The indirect extraction of firms’ rents allows the government to pay
less for financing the subsidy scheme, so that DMS are also fiscally advantageous.
Intuitively, an ideal self-financing employment policy would be to restore full em-
ployment by paying a general wage subsidy, which is financed by a non-distortive
tax on incumbent firms’ rents. If it is not possible to impose such a tax, a dou-
ble marginal subsidy closely mimics such a wage subsidy-cum-profit tax scheme,
and thus allows the government to implement a self-financing subsidy program. A
numerical illustration of the employment and fiscal effects of DMS for Germany,
which we compare to previously derived results that did not explicitly account for
intra-industry displacement (Scho¨b and Weimann 2003, 2005; Knabe, Scho¨b, and
Weimann 2006a), allows us a first estimate of the magnitude of the employment and
fiscal effects and the size of the rent extraction.
We will proceed as follows. In the next section, we develop the theoretical model.
In Section 3, we analyze and compare the differential impact of DMS and GS on
employment, fiscal, and distributive variables. Section 4 contains the numerical
illustration. Section 5 concludes.
2. The model
Suppose the economy consists of a large number of competitive firms that produce
a homogeneous, tradable good. We assume for simplicity that all of the good is
exported and that the proceeds from exporting are used to import a bundle of con-
sumption goods, the world market price of which is fixed and normalized to one.7
World demand for the output good is given by the isoelastic demand function
D (p) = Ap−ε, (4.1)
where p is the output price in terms of the imported consumption good, ε > 0 is
the price elasticity of demand, and A is a scaling parameter.
We assume that labor is the only (variable) factor of production. We thus neglect
firm-level substitution effects between capital and labor. Even though these effects
are surely very important, the debate on the efficacy of DMS and GS has been con-
cerned only with the intra-industry effects of such subsidies in a competitive envi-
ronment (see Layard and Nickell 1980, Bothfeld et al. 2006, Sinn et al. 2006a). By
restricting our attention to a one-factor production technology, we can focus specif-
7These assumptions allow us to ignore income effects on demand and to focus on the production
of the economy’s output good. A similar setup can be found in Ethier (1985).
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ically on the differential effects of DMS and GS on between-firm competition and
industry structure.
A firm’s production function is given by
y ≡ f (l) = lα, (4.2)
where y is a firm’s output level, l denotes its labor input, and α ∈ ]0, 1[ . Before
starting production, firms face start-up costs F. These costs are sunk after entry.8
Households, the number of which is normalized to one, supply one unit of labor and
receive wage income w if employed or unemployment benefits b if unemployed.
Moreover, they receive firms’ profits π and finance government expenditures – for
unemployment benefits and employment subsidies – via a tax τ . The government is
required to balance its budget.
Unemployment arises because the wage rate w (in terms of the consumption good)
is fixed above its full-employment level.
2.1. Initial equilibrium
The initial equilibrium is characterized by the zero-profit condition for newly enter-
ing firms. The output price in the initial equilibrium has to be equal to the firms’
minimum average cost. From the production function (4.2), a firm’s variable cost
function is given by C (y) = wy1/α, so that the price in the initial equilibrium is
p0 = miny
v
F + C (y)
y
w
=
F
(1− α) y0
, (4.3)
where each firm produces
y0 =
t α
1− α
F
w
uα
. (4.4)
The demand function (4.1) then determines the total output of the economy. The
number of firms n is such that this total output will be supplied by individual firms,
8Examples for sunk start-up costs are investments in highly specific physical assets, the gathering
of information before a firm enters a specific industry, costs of organizing the new operation, product-
differentiating sales efforts etc. (Martin 1993, p. 306). In the context of our model, one could also
think of F being a shadow, rather than direct, cost arising from legal and administrative barriers to
entry (Blanchard and Giavazzi 2003).
Empirical evidence suggests that sunk costs are an important determinant of firm and industry
behavior. For example, Roberts and Tybout (1997) observed that firms are more likely to remain
in the export market (having paid the associated sunk costs) than to exit the market if they face
unfavorable, but temporary shocks. Lambson and Jensen (1995, 1998) found that firm value is
more variable in industries exhibiting higher sunk costs. Bresnahan and Reiss (1994) found that the
minimum price that triggers entry by rural dentists is strictly higher than the maximum price that
induces exit.
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each of which produces y0. Hence,
n0 =
D (p0)
y0
. (4.5)
Total employment is then given by L0 = n0y1/α0 .9
We have to determine the initial income distribution to examine the redistributive
consequences of employment subsidization policies. Government expenditures in
the initial equilibrium are τ0 = (1− L0) b, operating firms obtain positive rents
which exactly cover their start-up costs F , and aggregate net labor income is given
bywL0+b (1− L0)−τ0. The labor share in the functional distribution of income is
given by the ratio of aggregate net labor income to total output,wL0/ [p0D (p0)] =
α.
2.2. Equilibrium with general subsidies
If GS are introduced, all firms – incumbents as well as new entrants – receive the
subsidy s for all their employees. Hence, their variable cost function becomes
C (y) = (1− s)wy1/α. Because the start-up costs of incumbent firms are sunk,
only newly entering firms take them into account in their entry decision. Only if the
output price is high enough to ensure that rents cover the start-up costs, new firms
will enter. The minimum price at which new firms are induced to enter is given by
p¯ = min
y
v
F + (1− s)C (y)
y
w
=
F
(1− α) y¯ , (4.6)
where each firm produces
y¯ =
t α
1− α
F
(1− s)w
uα
. (4.7)
The aggregate supply curve thus consists of two parts. For all prices less than p¯,
new firms will stay out of the market and incumbent firms supply a quantity at which
price equals marginal variable costs. For all prices at and above p¯, any aggregate
output quantity can be supplied by incumbent and newly entering firms. Hence,
9This is the standard procedure to determine the long-run competitive equilibrium with free entry
(see Mas-Colell et al. 1995, Section 10F).
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aggregate supply with GS is given by
YGS (p) =



n0
r
αp
(1−s)w
sα/(1−α)
if p < p¯
v
n0
r
αp
(1−s)w
sα/(1−α)
,∞
v
if p ≥ p¯
. (4.8)
The upper part of Figure 4.1 illustrates the effects of GS at the level of an individ-
ual firm. MC and AC are the unsubsidized marginal and average cost curves, so
that (y0, p0) is a firm’s initial equilibrium. With GS, marginal costs are reduced to
MCS. Since their start-up costs are sunk, incumbent firms choose to supply along
the MCS−curve at any output price. A new firm’s average cost curve is given by
ACnew. For all prices below p¯ (the minimum average cost of a new firm), incumbent
firms choose to supply along the MCS−curve. At p¯, new firms enter the market and
aggregate supply becomes perfectly price-elastic.
The aggregate effect of GS in shown in the bottom part of Figure 4.1. The dashed
line indicates the aggregate supply curve YGS (p) . The new equilibrium price with
GS is then determined by YGS (pGS) = D (pGS) .
2.3. Equilibrium with double marginal subsidies
The upper part of Figure 4.1 shows the marginal cost curve for an incumbent firm
if DMS are introduced: below y0, its marginal costs are given by the MC−curve.
If output exceeds y0, the additional employment receives the double subsidy, so
that marginal costs drop to MCDMS.10 Only if output is expanded beyond y2 =
f
b
2 f −1 (y0)
c
, i.e. beyond the level at which a firm’s employment doubles com-
pared to its initial level, additional employment receives only the single subsidy and
marginal costs rise to MCS.
There will be a price level p˜ at which an incumbent firm makes the same profit by
either contracting or expanding.11 In Figure 4.1, this price level can be read off
where the inframarginal losses on all output units between y)) and y0 are the same
as the inframarginal profits for all units between y0 and y) (the two hatched areas
10Note that we restrict s to the interval [0, 1/2[.We thus rule out the case where the single subsidy
exceeds 50 percent because the marginal labor cost under DMS would then become negative.
11Expanding firms obtain marginal profits for those output units in the interval
d
y0, y)
e
, but face
intra-marginal losses from those output units in the interval
d
y)), y0
e
. At p˜, the two effects exactly
balance.
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Figure 4.1: Firm-level and aggregate effects of GS and DMS
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are of equal size). Formally, p˜ is implicitly defined by12
p˜
tα p˜
w
uα/(1−α)
−w
tα p˜
w
u1/(1−α)
(4.9)
=



p˜
r
α p˜
(1−2s)w
sα/(1−α)
− (1− 2s)w
r
α p˜
(1−2s)w
s1/(1−α)
− 2swy1/α0
if p˜ < (1− 2s)C ) (y2)
p˜y2 − (1− s)wy1/α2 if p˜ ≥ (1− 2s)C ) (y2)
,
where the LHS and the RHS of (4.9) are the profit of a contracting and an expanding
firm, respectively.
The aggregate supply function with DMS, depicted by the solid line in the bot-
tom part of Figure 4.1, thus consists of five sections.13 If the market price is
very low (p < p˜), all incumbent firms contract because it is not profitable to
expand production despite the subsidy (Section 1). If p = p˜ (Section 2), some
incumbent firms expand and others contract, but all firms make the same profit. If
p˜ < p < (1− 2s)C ) (y2), all incumbent firms increase their employment (Sec-
tion 3). As long as the price is less than (1− 2s)C ) (y2) – the marginal production
cost at twice the initial employment level –, it is not profit-maximizing for the firm
to double employment. If (1− 2s)C ) (y2) ≤ p < p¯, all incumbent firms exactly
double their employment (Section 4). Further employment expansion would only
be profitable if the output price exceeded (1− s)C ) (y2) , because only the single
subsidy rate would be paid at the margin. Finally, if p = p¯, all incumbent firms
double their employment and new, completely subsidized firms enter the market
(Section 5). With these considerations, one obtains a piecewise-defined aggregate
supply function YDMS (p) (see Appendix A). With DMS, the new equilibrium price
is then determined by YDMS (pDMS) = D (pDMS) .
3. Comparing general and double marginal subsidies
Equilibria with GS and DMS are quite different. In this section, we will compare
the output, employment, and aggregate income effects of DMS compared to GS and
12The price level p˜ has to be defined piece-wise, since it could either be where expanding firms
increase their employment to less than twice the initial level ( p˜ < (1− 2s)C ) (y2)), or where they
double their initial employment ( p˜ ≥ (1− 2s)C ) (y2)).
13Depending on the chosen functional specification, some of these sections might not exist, see
Appendix A. Without loss of generality for our formal analysis, we will restrict our attention to the
most general case in which all five sections feasible with our functional specification exist. In the
numerical simulations in Section 4, we will include all different variants.
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the initial equilibrium, and examine the impact on incumbents’ rents, government
deficit, and the functional distribution of income.
Let us start with the output effect.
Proposition 4.1 (Output) Aggregate output with DMS is at least as large as that
with GS, if both are provided at an equal rate. For both types of subsidy, the aggre-
gate output level exceeds that in the initial equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The main force driving the differential effects of DMS and GS is the displacement
competition between incumbent firms triggered by DMS. The large reduction in
marginal costs under DMS makes all firms want to expand production compared
to the initial, unsubsidized equilibrium. This drives down the market price. Since
incumbent workers are not subsidized, average costs fall less than marginal cost.
Firms will make losses, so some firms will significantly decrease their production
level to reduce average (variable) costs. The sunkness of start-up costs, however,
prevents incumbent firms from exiting the market completely despite the losses they
make compared to the initial equilibrium. The displacement competition thus drives
down output prices significantly and raises demand and aggregate output.
Under GS, no such displacement competition occurs. Since all firms are subsidized
independently of whether they expand production or reduce it, firms cannot prof-
itably underbid their competitors by expanding production. Since the subsidy is
only paid at the single rate, firms’ desire to expand production is smaller than under
DMS, prices do not fall as much, and hence demand and aggregate output do not
increase as much as under DMS.
If demand is sufficiently elastic, so that the output price reaches p¯, new firms enter
the market. In this case, both DMS and GS yield the same total output.
Let us turn to the employment effects.
Proposition 4.2 (Employment) Aggregate employment with DMS is always larger
than that with GS, if both are provided at an equal rate. For both types of subsidy,
the aggregate employment level exceeds that in the initial equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix B.
DMS induce a technical inefficiency in the industry structure. Since they reward
only the expansion of firms, even if it takes place at the expense of other firms,
they result in larger firms than GS. Since marginal productivity is smaller in larger
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firms, this means that average labor productivity is smaller underDMS, so that more
labor is needed to produce the same amount of output. This technical inefficiency,
combined with the generally favorable output effects of DMS, implies that DMS
also cause larger employment effects than GS.
Our measure of aggregate domestic income I comprises aggregate net labor in-
comes and rents minus start-up costs. Since taxes and the payment of unemploy-
ment benefits and subsidies net out in aggregate incomes, the sum of aggregate firm
rents and aggregate labor incomes is the same as aggregate firm revenues. Aggre-
gate domestic income thus reduces to aggregate firm revenues minus start-up costs.
In our model, the relationship between aggregate domestic income in the two subsi-
dized equilibria, IDMS and IGS respectively, and the initial income level I0 depends
on the elasticity of world output demand.
Proposition 4.3 (Aggregate domestic income) If world output demand is



elastic (ε > 1)
unit elastic (ε = 1)
inelastic (ε < 1)



, the income relation is



IDMS > IGS > I0
IDMS = IGS = I0
IDMS < IGS < I0



.
Proof. See Appendix B.
By paying a subsidy, the government acts like a monopolistic intermediary because
it directly influences the equilibrium output price. If demand is unit elastic (ε =
1), any change in the output price causes a proportional negative change in output
demand, so that aggregate firm revenues stay constant. As is shown in the proof,
the increased output of incumbent firms exactly suffices to satisfy the increased
demand, so that no new firms enter and no additional start-up costs have to be
expended. Hence, aggregate domestic income is not affected by the subsidy. If
demand is elastic (ε > 1), an output price change leads to an overproportional
negative change in demand, so that a price reduction will increase aggregate firm
revenues. Since DMS cause competition between incumbent firms to drive down
prices more and/or create larger firms (and thus leaves less room for new entrants
which would cause additional start-up costs), aggregate domestic income will be
larger with DMS than with GS. Vice versa, an inelastic demand (ε < 1) would
call for higher prices and less output to maximize aggregate domestic income. In
such a situation, a social planer is faced with a trade-off between employment and
aggregate income effects.14
14In other words, even though pDMS = pGS = p¯ (Section 5 in Figure 4.1) implies that the
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We now turn to the distributive effects of DMS and GS. Our first result shows that
incumbent firms lose under DMS.
Proposition 4.4 (Incumbent firms’ rents) The rent obtained by incumbent firms
under DMS is always less than under GS or in the initial equilibrium. Incumbents’
rents under GS are at most as large as those in the initial equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix B.
This again is a consequence of the displacement competition between incumbent
firms when DMS are introduced. Firms have an incentive to expand production
by using the subsidy to undercut their unsubsidized competitors. Since all firms
attempt to do that, they compete prices down more than they would under GS, and
thereby reduce their rents.15 Under GS, incumbent firms’ rents are unaffected and
suffice to cover start-up costs if pGS = p¯, while these firms also suffer from rent
reduction if pGS < p¯.
Since political acceptability of a subsidy program depends on its fiscal effects, it is
worthwhile to examine the effect of DMS and GS on government expenditures.
Proposition 4.5 (Government expenditures) DMS will always result in smaller
government expenditures than GS if sw < b.
Proof. Proposition 4.2 shows that employment under DMS always exceeds that
under GS. If sw < b, any additional employee reduces government expenditures.
Moreover, while GS always subsidize the entire workforce, the share of subsidized
employees under DMS can never exceed unity.
If sw exceeded b, or in other words, if the single subsidy rate exceeded unemploy-
ment benefits’ replacement ratio, each additionally employed worker would cost
the government more than it saves. Since DMS always cause a larger employment
effect than GS, this would raise government expenditures more under DMS than
under GS if a sufficiently large number of incumbent employees has to be (double-
)subsidized. It is, however, very plausible to assume that sw < b. As mentioned
output effect is the same for GS and DMS whether demand is elastic or inelastic, aggregate domestic
income differs between the two cases. If demand is elastic and pDMS = pGS = p¯, GS will cause
more new firms to enter than DMS. Hence, more entry costs have to be paid that reduce incomes.
With inelastic demand, it always holds that pGS < p¯ (see the proof of Proposition 4.3), so the case
pDMS = pGS = p¯ cannot occur. Graphically, the demand curve at ε = 1 always intersects the
supply curve with GS exactly in the kink where the supply curve becomes horizontal.
15In the initial equilibrium, firms earned zero profits, but received positive rents due to the sunk
entry costs. In the new equilibrium, incument firms make negative profits. They are, however, able
to cover their variable costs and thus still earn positive rents, so that they stay in the market.
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before, DMS restrict s to be less than 50 percent, because otherwise the double sub-
sidy would result in negative marginal labor costs, while benefit replacement rates
in OECD countries are typically far above 50 percent, especially in Europe (see
Carone et al. 2004, Table 8).
The net income of incumbent workers and those persons who remain unemployed
will be larger underDMS than underGS. This follows directly from Proposition 4.5.
Since government expenditures are lower under DMS than under GS if sw < b,
those persons whose employment status has not changed also have to contribute
less under DMS than under GS.16
The above analysis suggests that there is a similarity between DMS and a general
subsidy scheme combined with a tax on the rents of incumbent firms. DMS can
provide a stronger employment stimulus at lower fiscal costs than GS because they
extract incumbent firms’ rents and use them for financing the subsidy scheme. If
instead GS were introduced at a larger rate, the same employment effect could be
created, while the subsidy’s fiscal burden could be kept down by imposing a profit
tax on the rents of incumbent firms. Such profit taxes, however, have received
little support in the public finance literature because there are immense problems of
operationalizing the notion of economic profit (see Rosen 2002, 270) and because
constitutional restrictions, which intend to protect property ownership, implicitly
define an upper limit on feasible tax rates (Fuest and Huber 1997). DMS, on the
other hand, achieve the extraction of incumbents’ rents “through the back-door”
without encountering the problems of pure profit taxation. Therefore, DMS allow
the financing of the subsidy scheme in a non-distortive way (apart from the technical
inefficiency discussed above).
The final distributive measure in our analysis is the labor share in the functional
distribution of income.
Proposition 4.6 (Labor share) DMS cause the labor share to rise compared to the
initial equilibrium, whileGS have no effect on the functional distribution of income.
Proof. See Appendix B.
One of the well-known properties of the group of Cobb-Douglas-type production
16The exact distibutional consequences depend on the specific type of taxation. If, for example,
taxation is lump-sum, employment rises, and total government expenditures do not change compared
to their initial level, the lump-sum tax per person does not change, so that the income of incumbent
workers and the remaining unemployed is not affected. If, however, taxation is proportional, em-
ployment rises, and government expenditures do not change, the newly employed pay higher taxes,
so that the tax rates for incumbent workers and the remaining unemployed can be reduced, thereby
making them better off.
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functions, to which (4.2) belongs, is the constancy of the functional distribution of
income if all factors of production receive a competitive compensation (see Mankiw
2003, 71). In our case, however, firm incomes are not competitive compensations,
but rents arising from the sunkness of start-up costs. The firms’ share in total
income can thus only stay constant as long as their ability to secure these rents
is unaffected. Since GS treat all firms identically, the subsidies do not affect the
rent-capturing ability of incumbent firms and the labor share stays constant. With
DMS, on the other hand, competition between incumbent firms reduces their rent-
capturing abilities and thus leads to an increased labor share. Hence, in addition to
their employment-promoting effect, DMS also serve as a redistribution device.
The DMS–scheme is sometimes criticized for raising barriers to entry and thus hin-
dering technological progress because it gives a greater marginal cost advantage to
incumbents than to entrants. This criticism seems to be misplaced. Even though
the marginal cost reduction is larger for incumbents, their average cost reduction
is smaller than that of new entrants because not all employees will be subsidized.
Hence, incumbents will always make less profits than new entrants which gives the
entrants a competitive advantage. In other words, the status quo was characterized
by barriers to entry because incumbent firms were protected by the sunkness of their
entry costs. DMS are a mechanism which causes incumbents to compete away their
entry-cost rents, and thus even reduces barriers to entry.
To sum up, DMS cause larger output and employment effects and are less expensive
for the government than GS. We have shown that this advantageousness of DMS
persists even if we account for displacement competition between firms. DMS re-
duce the fiscal costs of the subsidy scheme by indirectly making use of incumbent
firms’ rents to finance the employment expansion.
4. Numerical illustration
In this section, we present a numerical illustration of our model to illustrate the
general magnitude of the differential effects of DMS and GS on employment and
distributional variables and apply it to check the robustness of previous estimations
of the effects of DMS-proposals for Germany.
The simple view of marginal employment subsidies relies on the principle that
firms produce where prices equal marginal cost. A straightforward extension of
this ”marginalist” principle is that a double marginal subsidy has the same employ-
ment effect as a general subsidy at the double rate, because both types of subsidies
reduce marginal costs by the same amount. This approach would be valid if indi-
vidual firms operated on separate markets or if they were collective price-takers, for
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example because the world-market price could not be affected by domestic firms. In
both cases, there could be no inter-firm displacement effects, and only the marginal
cost reduction would be relevant for a firm’s production decision. Since DMS offer
the double reduction in marginal costs, this ”marginalist” view predicts that DMS
provide large employment gains and fiscal relief.
Critics of DMS claim that the alleged favorable effects of marginal subsidization
are only due to the failure of the ”marginalist” view to take inter-firm displacement
effects into account (Bothfeld et al. 2006, Sinn 2006a). They argue that inter-firm
displacement will force all firms with some unsubsidized employment out of the
market, so that only completely subsidized firms remain. Hence, the critics predict
full displacement, in which case DMS would effectively be equivalent to GS. In this
chapter, we have developed a model that shows that both approaches – predicting
full displacement or no displacement at all – are too simplistic. DMS will indeed
trigger strong inter-firm displacement, but this does not make them equivalent to
GS.
We will now quantitatively compare the differential effects of GS and DMS. For
the double marginal subsidy, we apply both the ”marginalist” approach and the
model developed in this chapter. Henceforth, we will refer to the two approaches
as DMS without displacement and DMS with displacement, respectively. We revert
to the same base parameters as the most recent calculations on the German DMS-
proposal Magdeburg Alternative developed by Scho¨b and Weimann (2005).17 The
Magdeburg Alternative is specifically targeted to low-skilled, low-wage jobs. The
size of the target group, i.e. the number of low-skilled unemployed persons in
Germany, is estimated to be 2.8 million, while 2.1 million low-skilled persons are
employed. Bringing one additional low-skilled unemployed back into work saves
the public budget 15,192 Euro p.a. (gross savings without subsidy costs), while
annual gross labor costs (including employer’s social security contributions) are
17,258 Euro.18 To reproduce these parameters in our model, we set b/w = 0.88.
17Scho¨b and Weimann (2003, 2005) apply the ”marginalist” approach to determine the effects of
theMagdeburg Alternative. They recognize that displacement might occur, but model it without any
repercussion on aggregate employment (cf. Chapter 2 of this dissertation).
18By bringing one low-skilled unemployed back into work at a monthly wage of 1,200 Euro, the
government saves on average 637 Euro in welfare benefits. Moreover, the average amount of taxes
and social security contributions paid is 515 Euro, while no new claims to the social insurances arise
(welfare recipients were covered by health and basic pension insurances already). In addition, past
experiences show that some welfare recipients prefer to decline a job offer and forfeit future benefits
(Feist and Scho¨b 1998). This saves, on average, another 114 Euro per new job. Thus, the total
amount saved is 1,266 Euro per month, or 15,192 Euro per annum. Annual labor costs of 17,258
Euro are obtained by adding employer’s social security contributions (19.85 percent) to the monthly
wage of 1,200 Euro.
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Figure 4.2: Comparison between DMS with and without displacement and general
subsidies
Scho¨b andWeimann (2005) assume a wage elasticity of labor demand of 0.5, which
corresponds to a price elasticity of output demand of ε = 0.4. The other parameters
are set at α = 0.67, F = 1, and A = 0.438.
The numerical results of the comparison betweenGS and the twoDMS-models with
and without displacement are presented in Figure 4.2. When neglecting displace-
ment, double marginal subsidies have tremendous employment gains and signifi-
cantly reduce government expenditures. For a 35 percent subsidy rate examined
by Scho¨b and Weimann (2005), employment would rise by 1.7 million persons.
Government expenditures would fall by 5.5 billion Euro.19
While the employment effect obtained by neglecting displacement depends only the
reduction in marginal costs, theDMS–model developed in this chapter demonstrates
that the employment reaction to a double marginal subsidy depends on the interplay
of marginal costs, average costs, and between-firm competition. Figure 4.2 shows
that double marginal subsidies have a strong employment effect even if between-
firm displacement is taken into account. The numerical illustration suggests, how-
ever, that it is not as strong as that predicted when neglecting any displacement.20
19It is noticable that the DMS-method without displacement predicts a constant unemployment
rate and sharply rising government expenditures for s ≥ 0.375. For these subsidy rates, all firms
would double their employment and experience a sharp increase in their marginal cost (because
further employment expansions receive only the single subsidy). Hence, increases in the subsidy
rate do not create more employment, but only raise the necessary expenditures.
20As can be seen in Figure 4.2, the employment-enhancing effect of larger subsidy rates under
DMS with displacement becomes weaker for s ≥ 0.2. The reason is that, for subsidy rates below 20
percent, an increase in s causes expanding firms to become larger, while for s exceeding 20 percent,
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In particular, employment expands by only 1.03 million jobs.21 Also with respect to
the government budget, the numerical results are less favorable to double marginal
subsidization than those predicted without displacement. At a subsidy rate of 35
percent, theDMS–method with displacement predicts that government expenditures
rise by 2.5 billion Euro per annum.
Figure 4.2 shows that policymakers are offered a “free-lunch” at small subsidy rates,
where employment gains can be achieved with fiscal savings, while they face a
trade-off between employment expansion and fiscal consolidation for larger sub-
sidy rates. For example, a subsidy rate of 13 percent would maximize fiscal savings.
Government expenditures could be reduced by 1.35 billion Euro, and 280,000 new
jobs could be created. At a subsidy rate of 25 percent, DMS would be revenue-
neutral, but bring about 720,000 new jobs. With subsidy rates above 25 percent, the
employment effects are even larger, but come at the cost of rising public expendi-
tures.22
Compared to GS, double marginal wage subsidies score better under both methods.
For any rate of subsidy, general subsidies lead to smaller employment effects at
larger fiscal costs than double marginal subsidies. According to our numerical re-
sults, GS at a subsidy rate of 35 percent cause employment to rise by half a million
new jobs and the government budget to rise by 8 billion Euro per annum, indepen-
dently of the method used.23
To sum up, double marginal wage subsidies create more employment at smaller fis-
cal costs than general subsidies. Our results suggest, however, that the quantitative
effects are smaller than those suggested if between-firm displacement is neglected.
The choice of the subsidy rate confronts policymakers with a trade-off. At small
subsidy rates, they can enjoy a ”double dividend” of both employment gains and
they will already have doubled their employment and will not expand further. Hence, the marginal
price and employment effects of higher subsidy rates are smaller if s ≥ 0.2.
21This number shows the net employment effect. It is comprised of 1.5 million additional jobs in
expanding firms and an employment reduction of 470,000 jobs in shrinking firms.
22For comparison, the DMS-method without displacement at a subsidy rate of 13 percent predicts
341,000 new jobs and fiscal savings of 3.71 billion Euro, while at a rate of 25 percent, the respective
predictions are 870,000 new jobs and savings of 5.77 billion Euro.
For a more complete evaluation of the fiscal effects of the different subsidy schemes, one also
has to take into account savings in other active labor market programs, the draining of the shadow
economy, the reversal of international outsourcing movements, and institutional peculiarities, such
as the conversion of unsubsidized part-time jobs for secondary earners to subsidized full-time jobs
for welfare recipients in Germany. These effects will, however, only affect the magnitude of the
fiscal effects, without changing the ordering of the differential effects between GS and the DMS-
approaches.
23At the abovementioned subsidy rate of 13 percent, GS would create only 150,000 new jobs at
2.76 billion Euro additional costs. At a subsidy rate of 25 percent, 330,000 new jobs at 5.54 billion
Euro costs could be created by GS.
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fiscal savings. Contrary to GS, the fiscal effect is non-monotonous in the subsidy
rate, so that if policymakers want to achieve larger employment gains, these can
only be achieved at fiscal costs.
5. Conclusion
Marginal wage subsidies are claimed to generate larger employment effects at smaller
fiscal costs than general wage subsidies, but their effectiveness suffers from inter-
firm displacement effects. Incumbent firms might expand due to the marginal sub-
sidy, but mainly by capturing the market share of competing firms, which conse-
quently have to cut employment. The stronger the displacement effect, the lower
becomes the net employment gain and the higher becomes the fiscal cost per newly
created job.
Our model confirms part of this story but also shows that the overall assessment
has to be substantially modified. Indeed, it is the case that inter-firm displacement
of considerable magnitude takes place in equilibrium under double marginal sub-
sidies. Nevertheless, the larger marginal stimulus to output expansion leads to a
lower output price than would occur under general subsidization, which in turn
causes a larger output demand and employment gain. Since it creates more employ-
ment without necessarily subsidizing all employees, double marginal subsidization
is always cheaper for the government than general subsidization.
Its fiscal advantage arises because double marginal subsidization reduces the ability
of incumbent firms to capture the rents associated with their cost of market entry
and thus functions like a tax on pure economic profits. The government has to pay
less for the subsidy scheme because it can indirectly make use of incumbent firms’
rents to finance it.
Double marginal subsidies lower barriers to entry in existing industries because,
even though incumbent firms receive a larger subsidy at the margin under double
marginal subsidization than under general subsidies, the reduction of their rents
in equilibrium reduces the protection they enjoy against new entrants from their
established market position. In entirely new sectors, all firms will be treated equally
under double marginal and general subsidization, so that double marginal subsidies
have no disadvantage in this case either.
The numerical illustration of our model yields more cautious results about the quan-
titative effects of recent double marginal subsidy-proposals than those predicted by
previously used methods that neglect between-firm displacement. The employment
effects are still substantial, albeit smaller than former simulations suggested. More-
over, we find that policymakers are offered a ”double dividend” at modest subsidy
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rates because employment gains and fiscal savings can be realized at the same time.
At larger subsidy rates, however, policymakers face a trade-off between employ-
ment expansion and fiscal austerity.
To conclude, our model shows that marginal wage subsidies, when designed as
double marginal subsidies, create more employment at less fiscal cost than gen-
eral wage subsidy programs. The driving force behind this result is that double
marginal subsidization extracts incumbent firms’ rents through intense price com-
petition, and indirectly puts them to use for employment creation. In this respect,
double marginal subsidies closely mimic a policy which finances a general wage
subsidy by a non-distortive profit tax on incumbent firms. Thus, if politicians want
to devise a self-financing subsidy scheme, but are precluded from applying taxes on
pure economic rents, double marginal wage subsidies are a superior policy instru-
ment for employment creation to general wage subsidies.
Appendix A
In Sections 2 and 3, we restricted our attention to the case where the aggregate
supply function with DMS consists of five parts. Formally, the five-part aggregate
supply function with DMS can be written as
YDMS (p) =



n0
bαp
w
cα/(1−α) if p < p˜

n0
bαp
w
cα/(1−α) ,
n0
r
αp
(1−2s)w
sα/(1−α)

 if p = p˜
n0
r
αp
(1−2s)w
sα/(1−α)
if p˜ < p < (1− 2s)C ) (y2)
n0y2 if (1− 2s)C ) (y2) ≤ p < p¯
[n0y2,∞[ if p ≥ p¯
.
(4.A.1)
Here, we will show under which conditions this is correct and which other cases
might occur.
Generally, the aggregate supply function could consist of up to six different sec-
tions. The first section is where the market price is so low that all incumbent firms
want to reduce production. In the second section, the output price is where firms
are indifferent between expanding or contracting, so that a horizontal supply curve
results. The third and fourth sections describe the case where all incumbent firm
expand production, but do not (Section 3) or do (Section 4) double their employ-
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ment. A fifth section could arise if incumbent firms find it profitable to expand their
employment to more than twice its initial level, while new entrants do not find it
profitable to enter the market. The sixth section arises where the output price is at
the minimum average costs of new entrants. New firms enter the market, and the
supply curve becomes perfectly price-elastic.
Depending on the form of the production function, not all of these section necessar-
ily occur. With the functional specification laid out in Section 2, we can rule out the
existence of some of these sections and show that other sections exist independently
of the chosen parameter values.
Section 1 always exists because MC (0) = 0. Hence, at no positive output price
will incumbent firms find it optimal to leave the market completely.
Section 2 will exist for any admissible parameter values, because, as can easily be
seen by contradiction, p˜ < p¯ always holds. If p˜ ≥ p¯ and p¯ < (1− 2s)C ) (y2) , it
must hold that


p¯
r
α p¯
w
sα/(1−α)
−w
r
α p¯
w
s1/(1−α)

 ≥

 p¯
r
α p¯
(1−2s)w
sα/(1−α)
− (1− 2s)w
r
α p¯
(1−2s)w
s1/(1−α)
−2swy1/α0

 ,
(4.A.2)
which, after inserting (4.6), becomes
(1− α) (1− s)α

1−
t
1
1− 2s
uα/(1−α)
+ 2αs ≥ 0. (4.A.3)
This condition is never fulfilled for α ∈]0, 1[ and s ∈ [0, 1/2[. If p˜ ≥ p¯ and
p¯ ≥ (1− 2s)C ) (y2) , the same logic leads to the condition
(1− α) (1− s)α/(1−α) − 2α (1− s)α + 2α (1− s) ≥ 0. (4.A.4)
Moreover, p¯ ≥ (1− 2s)C ) (y2) requires that
21−α −
(1− s)α
1− 2s
≤ 0. (4.A.5)
Conditions (4.A.4) and (4.A.5) cannot be fulfilled at the same time for α ∈]0, 1[
and s ∈ [0, 1/2[. Therefore, we always have p˜ < p¯, and Section 2 always exists.
The third section exists if p˜ < (1− 2s)C ) (y2) , while the fourth section exists if
p¯ > (1− 2s)C ) (y2) .Whether these conditions are fulfilled depends on the param-
eter values chosen. It is possible that one of the two sections does not exist. Both
sections, however, cannot be non-existing at the same time because p˜ < p¯.
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The fifth section (where incumbent firms more than double their employment, but
new firms do not enter) cannot exist with our functional specification. This section
would only exist if p¯ > (1− s)C ) (y2) , which holds if [2 (1− s)]1−α − 1 < 0.
This condition is never fulfilled for α ∈]0, 1[ and s ∈ [0, 1/2[.
Since the sixth section always exists, our functional specification restricts the mul-
titude of aggregate supply curves to three different cases. If p˜ < (1− 2s)C ) (y2)
< p¯, all sections, except the fifth, exist. If p˜ < p¯ ≤ (1− 2s)C ) (y2) , the fourth
and fifth sections do not exists, and if (1− 2s)C ) (y2) ≤ p˜ < p¯, the third and fifth
sections do not exist.
Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Since the production function (4.2) is homogenous of
degree α, we have
(1− s)C ) (y0) ≥ p˜. (4.A.6)
This can easily be seen by inserting this inequality into (4.9), which, if the condition
holds, yields
1− (1− 2s)α/(α−1)
(1− s)1/(α−1)
t
1
α − 1
u
+ 2s ≤ 0. (4.A.7)
Since this holds for all values of α ∈]0, 1[ and s ∈ [0, 1/2[, condition (4.A.6) must
hold.
From (4.A.6), it follows that Y−1DMS (n0y0) ≤ Y−1GS (n0y0) , and Y−1DMS (Y ) ≤ Y−1GS (Y )
< p0 ∀ Y ≥ n0y0. Since D) (p) < 0, this implies that p0 > pGS ≥ pDMS and
D (p0) < D (pGS) ≤ D (pDMS) .
Proof of Proposition 4.2. It always requires more workers to produce a given
output withDMS than withGS because the firms’ production function (4.2) exhibits
decreasing marginal productivity of labor, and the number of firms is smaller with
DMS than with GS, and/or firms are of unequal sizes with DMS while they are of
equal size withGS. (A general proof of this result is provided by Knabe (2006a), cf.
Chapter 3 of this dissertation). Since Proposition 4.1 states that output with DMS is
at least as large as with GS, the employment effect of DMS always has to be larger
than that of GS.
Proof of Proposition 4.3. First note that the critical demand elasticity which sep-
arates the two parts of the GS–supply curve is exactly ε = 1. This critical elas-
ticity is determined by the condition A p¯−ε = n0 y¯. From (4.6), (4.7), and (4.4),
we have p¯ = (1− s)α p0 and y¯ = (1− s)−α y0, so that the condition becomes
88
Chapter 4: A rent-extracting instrument for employment creation
(1− s)−αε = (1− s)−α , which is only fulfilled for ε = 1.
From Proposition 4.1, we know that pDMS ≤ pGS < p0∀ε > 0. In case of elastic
demand (ε > 1), pDMS ≤ pGS implies that revenues with DMS are at least as large
as with GS. Moreover, we know that for ε > 1, more new firms will enter under
GS than under DMS. Hence, nDMS < nGS, which causes larger start-up costs with
GS. Therefore, IDMS > IGS. Comparing GS to the initial equilibrium, we have
IGS = p¯D ( p¯)− n¯F and I0 = p0D (p0)− n0F, which results in sgn (IGS − I0) =
sgn
b
(1− s)α(1−ε) − 1
c
> 0∀ε > 1. Hence, I0 < IGS < IDMS.
For ε = 1, firm revenues and the number of firms are the same under DMS, GS, and
initially. Hence, I0 = IGS = IDMS.
In case of inelastic demand (ε < 1), we have a strict inequality pDMS < pGS < p0,
which implies that firm revenues are smallest with DMS and second smallest with
GS. Since the number of firms is always n0, we have I0 > IGS > IDMS.
Proof of Proposition 4.4. Let RDMS (p), RGS (p) , and R0 be the rents of an in-
cumbent firm under DMS, GS, and in the initial equilibrium, respectively. Since
RGS ( p¯) = F and R0 = F by the zero-profit condition for new entrants, and
∂RGS (p) /∂p > 0, we have RGS (p) ≤ R0∀p ≤ p¯.
Since pDMS ≤ pGS and ∂RGS (p) /∂p > 0, it is sufficient to show that RGS (p) >
RDMS (p) for any given p ∈
d
p˜, p¯
e
to prove the proposition. We check whether
this condition holds for the three relevant price intervals separately.
For p = p˜, RDMS (p) = RGS (p)|s=0 . Since ∂RGS/∂s > 0 and s > 0, we have
RGS (p) > RDMS (p).
For p ∈
e
p˜, (1− 2s)C ) (y2)
d
, an incumbent’s rent under DMS can be written as
RDMS (p) = p
K
yDMS − (1− s)wy1/αDMS
L
− sw
K
2y1/α0 − y
1/α
DMS
L
(4.A.8)
= RGS (p)|y=yDMS − sw
K
2y1/α0 − y
1/α
DMS
L
,
where yDMS = [αp/ ((1− 2s)w)]α/(1−α) . It follows that RDMS (p)
< RGS (p)|y=yDMS . Moreover, RGS (p) ≥ RGS (p)|y=yDMS , since the rent would
not be maximized otherwise. Hence, RGS (p) > RDMS (p) .
In the interval p ∈
d
(1− 2s)C ) (y2) , p¯
e
, RDMS (p) = RGS (p)|y=y2 . Since y2 >
[α/ ((1− s)w)]α/(1−α) in the relevant price interval, we have RGS (p)
> RGS (p)|y=y2 .
Therefore, RGS (p) > RDMS (p)∀p ∈
d
p˜, p¯
e
.
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Proof of Proposition 4.6. The labor share in the initial equilibrium is α. Under
GS, each firm produces yGS = [αpGS/ ((1− s)w)]α/(1−α) . The number of firms
is then given by nGS = D (pGS) /yGS. Making use of these expressions, the labor
share under GS becomes
(1− s)wLGS
pGSD (pGS)
=
(1− s)wnGSy1/αGS
Ap1−εGS
= α. (4.A.9)
Let φ be the share of subsidized workers under DMS, and LDMS (p) and LGS (p)
be the total employment under DMS and GS if p is the equilibrium price. From
Proposition 4.2, (4.A.9), and φ ≤ 1, it follows that
(1− φs)wLDMS (pDMS)
pDMSD (pDMS)
> (1− s)wLGS (pDMS)
pDMSD (pDMS)
= α. (4.A.10)
This shows that DMS always results in a larger labor share than GS.
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Chapter 5 
 
 
Subsidizing extra jobs: 
promoting employment by taming the unions1 
 
1. Introduction 
When wages are above market-clearing levels and cause unemployment, wage 
subsidies could alleviate unemployment by narrowing the gap between the labor 
cost borne by firms and the minimum compensation demanded by workers. 
Comprehensive wage subsidy schemes, however, are associated with two major 
drawbacks. First, subsidizing wages creates large windfall gains for all workers 
already in employment. This makes wage subsidization very expensive to the 
government. Second, if the subsidy can be redistributed through the wage 
bargaining process, the effectiveness of wage subsidies in promoting employment 
is endangered. The literature on tax incidence in economies with imperfect labor 
markets has demonstrated that under certain institutional arrangements wage 
subsidies may actually be shifted completely into higher net wages. In this special 
case, labor costs stay constant and unemployment does not fall (see Layard 
Nickell and Jackman 1991).2 
The fiscal cost of wage subsidization can be significantly reduced by restricting 
the subsidy to extra jobs created in addition to a firm’s incumbent workforce.
                                                 
1 This chapter was written in collaboration with Ronnie Schöb. 
2 Nevertheless, recent theoretical and empirical work shows that wage subsidies generally have a 
positive effect on employment (see e.g. Daveri and Tabellini 2000, Nickell and Layard 1999). 
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Layard and Nickell (1980) were the first who showed that this type of marginal 
employment subsidies can generate more jobs than general subsidies costing the 
same amount.3 Indeed, the theoretical findings are all together very much in favor 
of a marginal rather than general wage subsidy scheme and several field 
experiments with such subsidy schemes confirmed the theoretical findings.4 
Surprisingly, academic research lost interest in marginal employment subsidies in 
the meantime. The positive summarizing evaluation of marginal employment 
subsidies in the otherwise so influential book by Layard, Nickell and Jackman 
(1991) should have stimulated further research. Instead, it appears to have become 
the closing words on this issue – so far. 
This chapter aims at reviving the interest in the analysis of marginal employment 
subsidies. We develop a general equilibrium model with imperfect labor and 
output markets (Section 2) for which we can identify a benchmark scenario in 
which wage taxes and general subsidies do not affect employment at all (Section 
3). We then turn to the formal analysis of marginal employment subsidies 
(Section 4). The theoretical literature has focused on symmetric marginal wage 
subsidies where firms are rewarded when they increase employment but are 
punished when they reduce their workforce. Real-life marginal wage subsidy 
programs, however, are asymmetric. They subsidize employment expansions but 
do not punish shrinking firms. This small difference has severe consequences for 
the incidence of marginal employment subsidies. One might expect that the 
additional punishment of layoffs under symmetric subsidization may be good for 
employment, but the opposite is true. The punishment threat of a symmetric 
marginal employment subsidy makes it more costly for firms to lay off workers 
when trade unions aggressively raise wages. Trade unions can thus shift a large 
share of the wage subsidy towards higher net wages. In our benchmark case, this 
                                                 
3 This result was qualitatively confirmed in different theoretical frameworks by Chiarella and 
Steinherr (1982), Whitley and Wilson (1983), Oswald (1984), Hart (1989), and Layard, Nickell 
and Jackman (1991). 
4 In the 1970s, many countries experimented with marginal employment subsidies. Examples are 
the New Jobs Tax Credit in the United States (see Perloff and Wachter 1979, Bishop and 
Haveman 1979), the French Prime d’incitation à la création d’emploi (see Kopits 1978), the 
Small Firms Employment Subsidy in Great Britain (see Layard 1979), and the 
Lohnkostenzuschüsse in Germany (see Schmidt 1979). 
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effect is so strong that symmetric marginal subsidies do not affect employment at 
all. In the asymmetric case without punishment, by contrast, firms may be more 
willing to shrink and lay off a substantial fraction of its workforce when wages 
become too high. This tames the trade unions. Rather than shifting the whole 
wage subsidy into higher gross wages, trade unions can raise the wage at most to 
the level at which the firm becomes indifferent whether to hire more workers or to 
shrink and lay off workers. This wage restraint leads to positive employment 
effects of asymmetric marginal employment subsidies. 
When the subsidy raises aggregate employment, the threat of shrinking becomes 
less frightening for the trade union. High subsidy rates may induce some trade 
unions to let their firm shrink while other firms continue to expand. The general 
equilibrium thus exhibits displacement between incumbent firms. Although this 
displacement may lower employment, we show that the government can promote 
employment further if it sets the wage subsidy sufficiently high. However, these 
additional employment gains come at a huge welfare loss. Employment will be 
concentrated in very few firms which sell their goods at low prices while the 
majority of firms shrink and sell their goods at higher prices. This distorts the 
optimal consumption pattern: the variety of goods is diminished substantially. Our 
numerical simulations (Section 5) illustrate that employment and welfare move in 
the same direction for moderate subsidy levels, but that the trade-off becomes 
severe for larger subsidy rates. 
In how far these results carry over to the long run with free entry crucially 
depends on the way in which new firms are treated (Section 6). When they are 
eligible for the subsidy, their whole workforce has to be subsidized. Any 
incumbent firm could take advantage of this by setting up a new firm to which it 
relocates all its business activities. A marginal employment subsidy would then 
become equivalent to a general wage subsidy in the long run. Alternatively, the 
government could grant the subsidy to incumbent firms only. In this case, the 
marginal employment subsidy will continue to tame the trade unions even in the 
long run. As marginal subsidies normally reduce profits, new firms will not enter 
and our short-run analysis carries over to the long run. Only if the desire for 
Chapter 5: Promoting employment by taming the unions 
  94
variety is very high, profits rise and new firms will enter. This may lead to lower, 
though still positive employment effects compared to the short run, but the larger 
variety of goods will increase welfare even further.  
2. The model 
We apply a general equilibrium model as laid out by Layard, Nickell and Jackman 
(1991). Rents are created by firms who can set prices above marginal costs in 
monopolistically competitive goods markets. These rents are distributed between 
firm owners and workers through collective wage setting by firm-level labor 
unions. Unemployment arises because it reduces union’s wage pressure to the 
level where rent claims by firms and unions are compatible with each other.5 
Worker households 
The economy consists of many identical worker-consumer-households, the 
number of which we normalize to one. Each household j provides one unit of 
labor and derives its utility from consuming a variety of m goods. Following Dixit 
and Stiglitz (1977) and Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), we formulate the utility 
function as 
 
)1(
1
)1()1/(1
0
−σσ
=
σ−σσ− 


= ∑m
i
ijj CmV , (5.1) 
where σ is elasticity of substitution between the various product varieties and Cij 
is the amount of variety i consumed by household j. 0m  is the initial number of 
goods available and serves as a normalization parameter. The household's budget 
constraint reads 
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5 Simplified versions of these type of models are presented in e.g. Heijdra and van der Ploeg 
(2002) and Sørensen and Whitta-Jacobsen (2005). 
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where jW  is the nominal wage rate of household j, jΠ  is the profit share of 
household j, B  is the nominal unemployment benefit payment, t is the wage tax, 
and Pi is the price of variety i.  
Summing up over all households yields 
 PCCP
j
m
i
iji ≡∑∑
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, (5.3) 
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being the quantity and price indices (see Dixit and Stiglitz 1977 for details).6 
Aggregate demand for good i is then given by: 
 
σ−



=
P
P
m
CC ii . (5.5) 
Firms 
Each firm produces one good for which it is a monopolist. We assume a constant-
returns-to-scale technology with labor being the only input factor, i.e. ii Ny = , 
],...,1[ mi ∈  where Ni is the amount of labor employed by firm i, and yi is its 
output level. The firm can set the good’s price iP  but takes the gross wage 
)1( sWi −  as given, where s is an ad-valorem wage subsidy. Firm i’s profit is 
iiii NsWP ))1(( −−=Π .
7 Using iii NyC == , the profit-maximizing price set by 
firm i is 
 ifi WsP )1)(1( −µ+=  (5.6) 
                                                 
6 In the case with identical prices for all goods, the quantity index reduces to C = mCi and the price 
index to P = Pi. 
7 For expositional convenience, we use the term “profit” for the short-run profit that equals the 
producer rent, i.e. we do not subtract start-up costs.  
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with 1)1( −−σ=µ f  denoting the (constant) markup the firm sets over marginal 
cost. Conditions (5.5) and (5.6) give us the labor demand functions  
 i
P
Ws
m
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P
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m
CCsN ifiii ∀


 −µ+
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
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σ−σ− )1)(1(
,...)( . (5.7) 
Firms have to pay start-up costs F when they enter the market. These costs are 
sunk after the firm has entered. 
Welfare 
The term ( )σ−110m  in the utility function (5.1) normalizes the maximum potential 
welfare for the initial number of 0m  to one.
8 Maximum welfare is achieved when 
households consume all 0mm =  goods in equal amounts. In this case, we have 
1== imCC . Intuitively, the concavity of (5.1) reflects the desire for variety: a 
household who is indifferent between two consumption bundles (1,0) and (0,1) 
always prefers the mixed bundle (0.5, 0.5) (see Dixit and Stiglitz 1977, p. 297). 
Welfare losses may occur when labor is idle due to (involuntary) unemployment 
or when goods are consumed in different quantities. Both types of welfare losses 
may occur in our model both in the short run and in the long run. In addition, 
long-run welfare may rise when additional varieties become available. 
Wage Determination 
Each firm’s workforce is organized in a firm-level labor union that can 
unilaterally determine the firm-specific wage rate. We apply a union objective 
function Ω of the Stone-Geary type: 
 [ ] ioii NWWtW φ−−=Ω )1()( . (5.8) 
The union benefits from firm-level employment Ni and the difference between the 
net wage earned by each worker employed by firm i and the outside option oW . 
                                                 
8 This can be seen from maximizing C subject to the economy’s resource constraint of one unit of 
labor. 
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The weight ] [σ∈φ ,0  indicates the relative importance of wage gains compared to 
employment.9 
The outside option oW  is determined by the expected net wage available to a 
worker who loses his current job. A laid-off worker will either find employment 
in a different firm, where he can expect to earn the economy-wide average wage 
W, or he will be unemployed and receive unemployment benefits B. The 
probability of finding a job is given by the aggregate employment rate y. Hence, 
the workers’ outside option is 
 )1()1( yBWtyW o −+−= . (5.9) 
Maximizing the trade unions’ objective function (5.8) with respect to Wi yields 
 
)1(
)1(
t
WW
o
ui
−
µ+=  with 
φ−σ
φ
=µu . (5.10) 
To maximize its utility, a union will set a markup µu on the (gross equivalent) of 
the expected outside wage. Note that both firm-level unions and individual firms 
take the prices and wages set by other firm-union-pairs as given. 
General equilibrium 
In general equilibrium, the rents claimed by monopolistically competitive firms 
and by labor unions have to be compatible with each other. If unions tried to reach 
a real wage above (below) the level compatible with firms’ price setting, 
inflationary (deflationary) pressures would arise. Hence, the general equilibrium 
occurs where price stability – or, for that matter, non-accelerating inflation – is 
secured. 
                                                 
9 The parameter φ is useful for numerically simulating the model because it secures “reasonable” 
unemployment levels in general equilibrium. The specification (5.8) encompasses the common 
utilitarian trade union model with risk-neutral workers as a special case for φ=1 (see Farber 1986, 
1061). 
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We apply the symmetry condition for both the labor market and the goods 
markets: WWi =  and PPi = . Then, the firm’s pricing rule (5.6) becomes the 
aggregate price-setting (PS) equation 
 
)1)(1(
1
sP
W
f −µ+
= . (5.PS) 
Firms add a constant markup onto any nominal wage the trade unions set: firms 
will always adjust their goods’ prices such that the equilibrium real wage remains 
constant. 
To determine the wage-setting condition, we consider unemployment benefits that 
are proportional to the average net wage rate, i.e. WtbB )1( −= . The aggregate 
wage setting (WS) equation then follows from (5.9), (5.10), and the symmetry 
condition, 
[ ] .
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=⇔−+µ+=  (5.WS) 
The WS-condition shows that, with a constant net replacement ratio, labor taxes 
and subsidies do not have any general equilibrium employment effects (cf. 
Layard, Nickell and Jackman 1991). A lower unemployment rate would raise the 
unions’ outside option and lead to higher wage claims, which would lead to 
continuous increases in the outside option and wages. Since the reverse holds for 
higher unemployment rates, there is a unique unemployment level compatible 
with price stability. 
The conditions (5.PS) and (5.WS) thus specify both the equilibrium 
unemployment rate and the real wage. In our benchmark case, equilibrium 
employment is determined in the labor market while the distribution of income, 
given by the real wage, is determined in the goods markets. The wage tax, which 
is implicitly determined by the balanced government budget ByWsty )1()( −=− , 
influences neither employment nor the level of gross wages because it affects the 
unions’ outside option proportionally to net wages. 
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In what follows, we start with the analysis of the short run where the number of 
firms is fixed at 0mm = . The long run with free entry of new firms will be 
postponed until section 6.  
3. The irrelevance of general employment subsidies 
A general employment subsidy (GS) lowers a firm’s labor costs and thereby 
allows the firm to charge a lower price for its product (see equation (5.6)). Since 
all subsidized firms reduce their prices, the resulting deflationary effect increases 
aggregate demand C and employment in all firms. Rising aggregate employment 
lifts the unions’ outside option oW , which triggers upward wage pressure. This 
counteracts the deflationary effect of the wage subsidy until price stability is 
restored. For the special case of a constant net replacement ratio, the whole 
subsidy is shifted towards higher gross wages (as can be seen from totally 
differentiating the PS-condition). According to the WS-condition, equilibrium 
employment does not change either. Since net-of-subsidy labor costs also remain 
constant, neither firms’ profits nor aggregate workers’ income change. Hence, in 
our general-equilibrium framework GS has neither allocative nor distributive 
effects as it leaves both employment and net wages unchanged. This result will 
serve as a benchmark and should thus be summarized as 
Proposition 5.1: For a constant net replacement ratio, a general employment 
subsidy has no effect on either employment or the distribution of income. 
This neutrality result confirms a more general insight from the tax incidence 
literature that (linear) tax instruments will affect employment only when the tax 
burden can be shifted away from labor income to other income sources.10 This is 
ruled out here. Indeed, our result would also hold if unemployment benefits were 
tax-exempt, in which case a subsidy is just a swap between higher employment 
subsidies and higher wage taxes. Our assumption of a constant net replacement 
ratio is thus more restrictive than necessary but will be very helpful to analyze the 
potential employment effects of marginal employment subsidies in isolation. 
                                                 
10 Pflüger (1997) discusses several tax reforms in a similar framework and finds employment 
effects only when the government can actually shift the tax burden to other income sources. 
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4. Marginal employment subsidies 
4.1. Symmetric marginal employment subsidies 
In the theoretical literature, a specific type of marginal employment subsidies, 
which we will call “symmetric marginal employment subsidies” (SMS), has been 
discussed as an alternative policy instrument to general wages subsidies (see 
Layard and Nickell 1980, Oswald 1984, Layard, Nickell and Jackman 1991). The 
idea is to subsidize extra jobs, but at the same time tax employment reductions. 
Formally, such a SMS is equivalent to a general subsidy combined with a tax on a 
firm’s initial workforce. This becomes apparent from a single firm i’s profit 
function with a SMS (see Layard et al. 1991, p. 491): 
 ( ) 00 )1()()( iiiiiiiiiiii NsWNWsPNNsWNWP −−−=−+−=Π , (5.11) 
where Ni0 is the firm’s initial employment level. The first way of writing the profit 
function shows that the subsidized wage applies to all workers hired in excess of 
Ni0, while the second expression reveals that SMS is effectively a general subsidy 
on all workers combined with a lump-sum tax. Such a lump-sum tax does not 
affect the profit-maximizing behavior of a single firm so that the firms’ price 
setting will be the same as under GS. Likewise, firm-level union wage setting will 
be unaffected by SMS. Thus, SMS and GS have the same effect on gross wages 
and no effect on employment.  
The only difference lies in the lump-sum tax component which reduces the net 
fiscal expenditures for the SMS program. In general, the balanced-budget tax rate 
t will be: 
 
)1(
)()1()()1()1(
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yby
yysybtyysWyWtbtWy
−+
−+−
=⇔−+−−= , (5.12) 
with 0* =y  for GS and 00
*
imNyy ==  for SMS. As can be seen from 
0/ * <dydt , the wage tax t is lower and the net wage is higher with SMS. Net 
profits are lowered by the lump-sum tax the firm has to pay. This leads to 
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Proposition 5.2: For a constant net replacement ratio, a symmetric marginal 
employment subsidy has no effect on employment, but redistributes income from 
profit to labor income. 
While the result of Proposition 5.1 stems from our assumption of a constant net 
replacement ratio, the strong result of Proposition 5.2 also hinges on the 
assumption of a monopoly trade union. Indeed, our results are in contrast to 
Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) who find a positive employment effect of 
SMS in a Nash-bargaining framework. With Nash bargaining, the union is unable 
to raise the wage up to a level where employment is the same as without the 
subsidy. At this level, the total rent to be distributed would be the same as without 
the subsidy, but the union would receive a larger share at the cost of firm’s profits. 
This worsens the union’s bargaining position, because it would have more to lose 
if the firm threatened to stop negotiating, and wages have to fall. Distributional 
effects do not matter in the monopoly trade union framework though. The 
monopoly union sets the wage rate irrespectively of the (non-negative) profit level 
of the firm. Additional benefits for the firm thus do not enter its arbitrage 
calculus.11 
Our restrictive assumptions that lead to Propositions 5.1 and 5.2 thus ensure that 
our benchmark scenario is most adverse to favorable employment effects arising 
from wage subsidies. If any type of wage subsidy has a positive employment 
effect under these assumptions, it will have a positive employment effect under 
assumptions more favorable to wage subsidies, a fortiori. 
4.2. Asymmetric marginal employment subsidies 
Real-life marginal wage subsidy programs are asymmetric in the sense that they 
subsidize extra jobs but do not punish shrinking firms. Examples are the New 
Jobs Tax Credit in the United States, the French Prime d’incitation à la création 
d’emploi, the Small Firms Employment Subsidy in Great Britain, and the 
Lohnkostenzuschüsse in Germany, all of which applied asymmetric marginal 
                                                 
11 This result is an application of a general result, according to which comparative statics results 
for the monopoly union model and the Nash-bargaining model are different when changes affect 
the firm’s revenue function (see Holmlund 1989).  
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subsidies (AMS).12 To account for this asymmetry, firm i’s profit function has to 
be rewritten as 
 )0,max()( 0iiiiiii NNsWNWP −+−=Π . (5.13) 
Under AMS, a firm can pursue two different strategies. One strategy is to expand 
employment above its initial level, receive the subsidy for the extra jobs, and sell 
large amounts of output  at low prices (“expansion”). The other strategy is to keep 
employment at or below its initial level, forgo the subsidy, and sell lower levels of 
output at higher prices than its competitors (“shrinking”). Depending on the wage 
set by the firm-level union, a firm chooses whichever strategy yields the larger 
profit. In the expansion strategy, the firm has to raise its employment beyond 0iN . 
Its marginal cost is then iWs)1( − , and it maximizes its profit by setting 
ifi WsP )1)(1( −µ+= . If the firm decides to shrink, charging a markup on its 
marginal cost will yield a price ifi WP )1( µ+= . A firm will prefer expanding to 
shrinking if, for a given wage Wi,  
 −+ π≡µ≥−−µ≡π iiifiiifi NW
m
y
sWsNWs )0()()1( 0 . (5.14) 
The left-hand side of (5.14) is a firm’s profit from the expansion strategy, +π i , 
which consists of the profit the firm would make if the subsidy s was paid for all 
employees )(sNi  (cf. equation (5.7)) minus the subsidy-exemption for all 
incumbent workers. The right-hand side denotes the firm’s profit in the shrinking 
strategy, −π i . 
Figure 5.1 illustrates how the firm’s output decision depends on the wage rate set 
by its union. Without subsidies, the firm faces a wage rate 0iW . It maximizes its 
profit by selling 0iy  units of output. When the marginal subsidy is introduced, and 
wages do not change, the firm’s marginal cost schedule is at 0iW  for output levels 
below 0iy , but at 0)1( iWs−  for output levels above this reference level. The firm 
maximizes its profit by selling the increased output +0iy  at a lower price. If the 
                                                 
12 See Perloff and Wachter (1979) and Bishop and Haveman (1979) for the US, Layard (1979) for 
Great Britain, Kopits (1978) for France, and Schmidt (1979) for Germany. 
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firm’s union raises its wage to e.g. iW
~ , the marginal cost schedule shifts upwards, 
but retains its downward jump at 0iy  to iWs
~)1( −  (dashed line). There are two 
local profit-maxima where marginal revenue MR equals marginal cost: the firm 
could either expand to +iy , or it could shrink to 
−
iy . The firm chooses the output 
level that yields the higher profit. By switching from −iy  to 
+
iy , the firm would 
make infra-marginal losses on all units between −iy  and 0iy , but would make 
profits on all units between 0iy  and 
+
iy . In Figure 5.1, the infra-marginal losses 
and profits are represented by the two shaded triangles. We have drawn iW
~  as the 
“indifference wage” at which the two areas have the same size. At iW
~ , the firm is 
indifferent between shrinking and expanding, i.e. )~()~( iiii WW
−+ π=π . For lower 
wage levels, the firm would strictly prefer to expand. If the firm-level union raises 
the wage above this threshold, however, the firm would prefer to shrink.  
 
yiyi− yi0
Wi0
(1 )−s Wi0
~(1 )−s Wi
Wi
~
yi+ yi0+
P ,Wi i
 
Figure 5.1: The firm’s output decision for given demand 
This discontinuity in the firm’s output supply behavior constitutes the main 
difference between AMS and SMS. It provides firms with a credible threat that 
they shrink and cut jobs if unions set too high wages. This constrains unions in 
their ability to shift the subsidy into higher gross wages. If the loss in employment 
weighs larger than the benefit from higher wages, a union prefers to set the wage 
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just equal to the indifference wage iW
~  to extract the maximum rent from a still 
expanding firm. 
To identify potential general equilibria with AMS, we first look at cases where all 
unions are unconstrained in their wage-setting and set wages according to their 
first-order condition (5.10) as the full markup on their (common) outside option. 
One can show that if all firms decide to shrink, any single firm would have an 
incentive to deviate and expand. Conversely, if all firms expand, any single firm 
would have an incentive to shrink. Hence, we can rule out equilibria in which 
trade unions set the firm-level wage according to the first-order condition (5.10). 
This should be summarized in a  
Lemma 5.1: There is no Nash equilibrium with AMS in which all unions set their 
wage as the full markup on their outside option. 
Proof: See appendix. 
In any general equilibrium with AMS, at least some unions have to be constrained 
in their wage-setting by the indifference wage iW
~ . At the indifference wage iW
~ , a 
firm never shrinks in equilibrium because its union would always reduce its wage 
marginally to induce the firm to expand. This leaves us with only two potential 
equilibria: 
•  Case A: all unions set the indifference wage iW
~ , and all firms choose to 
expand, 
• Case B: some unions set the indifference wage iW
~  so that their firms 
expand, while other unions choose a higher wage and let their firms 
shrink. 
4.2.1. Case A: all unions prefer expansion, and all firms expand 
If all firms try to expand, they will all set their price as a markup over subsidized 
marginal cost. The PS-condition remains unaffected. Individual unions, however, 
prefer to deviate from their first-order condition (markup wage-setting) because 
unconstrained wage-setting would cause their firms to shrink. Unions will set the 
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highest possible wage iW
~  that just ensures that firms expand (cf. Figure 5.1). If all 
unions behave this way, the new wage-setting equation is given by WW ~= , 
where W~  is determined by condition (5.14), holding with equality, 
 )~()~( WW ii
−+ π=π . (5.15) 
Inserting (5.PS) into (5.15), and using yC =  since all firms set the same prices, 
gives the equilibrium employment rate: 
 [ ]σ−−−µ= )1()1(
0
ss
syy
f
. (5.16) 
Inspection of (5.16) shows that 0yy >  and 0/ >dsdy  for all ] [1,0∈s , which 
leads us to  
Proposition 5.3: An asymmetric marginal employment subsidy has a positive 
employment effect if all unions prefer that their firms expand. 
Proof: See appendix. 
AMS restrict the unions’ ability to shift the whole subsidy into higher gross wages 
because their firms would then prefer to shrink. As long as unions value the 
potential loss of jobs more than the potential wage gains from shrinking, they will 
be better off with the indifference wage iW
~ . Part of AMS – contrary to SMS – 
then leads to a reduction in prices, and the resulting deflationary pressure raises 
output and employment. 
4.2.2. Case B: some firms expand and other firms shrink 
Equation (5.16) shows that if s becomes sufficiently large, aggregate employment 
exceeds one. At full employment, however, each firm-level union has an incentive 
to raise the wage and let its firm shrink because any worker whom the firm lays 
off could easily find a job at the same wage rate elsewhere but those who remain 
would be strictly better off. Therefore, Case A cannot be a feasible equilibrium for 
all values of s. 
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As long as there is some unemployment, any individual union has to compare its 
utility from expansion (at a wage iW
~ ) with the utility from shrinking (at a wage 
i
o
u WW
~)1( >µ+ ). Figure 5.2 illustrates the two different strategies. 
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Figure 5.2: The union’s indifference between shrinking and expanding 
As described above, the asymmetry of the AMS schedule causes a jump in a 
firm’s labor demand function at the wage iW
~ . When the union sets the wage to 
iW
~ , the firm expands employment to +iy . If the union sets the wage according to 
(5.10), the firm reduces the employment level to −iyˆ . The union compares the 
rents gained by its members over their outside option under both strategies. For 
the low-wage strategy, the rent is given by the areas A + C. For the high-wage 
strategy, the rent is given by the two rectangles B + C. If the value of the outside 
option is relatively small, i.e. oo WW ˆ< , the union will prefer the low-wage 
strategy, and vice versa for attractive outside options oo WW ˆ> . At oWˆ , the union 
is indifferent between both strategies. Figure 5.2 depicts this critical level of the 
outside option where A and B are of the same size. 
Increasing the subsidy causes expanding firms to become larger and employ more 
workers. This raises the outside option above oWˆ , such that some unions would 
find it beneficial to raise their wages above W~  and let their firms shrink. This is 
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the displacement effect of AMS. Some firms expand employment, while other 
firms shrink and lay off a substantial part of their workforce. Since shrinking 
firms set higher prices, this displacement causes inflationary pressures that 
counteract the subsidy’s deflationary effect. The aggregate employment effect 
becomes generally ambiguous and depends on whether the inflationary effect 
from rising prices in shrinking firms is large enough to outweigh the deflationary 
effect from the subsidy. 
We now turn to the formal analysis of Case B. In any equilibrium with 
displacement, some firm-union-pairs expand while some other (of otherwise 
identical) firm-union-pairs shrink. This requires that all unions are indifferent 
between the two strategies, which will be the case if the following condition 
holds: 
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are the employment levels in expanding firms and in shrinking firms, respectively. 
The left-hand side of equation (5.17) is a union’s utility )~( iWΩ=Ω
+  from setting 
the indifference wage iW
~  as determined by (5.15) that induces the firm just to 
expand. The right-hand side is the union’s utility ( )1)1()1( −− −µ+Ω=Ω tW ou  
from setting the full markup according to (5.10), in which case the firm will 
shrink.  
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The m incumbent firms are divided in +m  expanding and +− −= mmm  shrinking 
firms. In equilibrium with iWWi ∀=
~~ , the economy-wide average wage W  is 
then determined by weighting firms’ wages with their employment share: 
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The aggregate employment level is obtained by 
 −−++ += ii ymymy . (5.19) 
The outside option is then given by 
 [ ]( )WtybyW o −−+= 1)1( . (5.20) 
The last remaining piece necessary to determine the general equilibrium is the 
average price level that can be determined by inserting markup prices into 
equation (5.4) and dividing by P: 
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The six equations (5.15) and (5.17)-(5.21) determine the equilibrium values of y , 
C , PW , +m , PW~  and PW o . This system of equations does not have a 
closed-form solution, but it is possible to analyze the employment effects when 
the subsidy rate is raised to very high levels. 
Proposition 5.4: If an asymmetric marginal employment subsidy approaches 100 
percent, the economy reaches full employment whereas welfare falls to zero. 
Proof: See appendix. 
Increasing the subsidy rate induces some firm-union pairs to shrink. These firms 
set higher prices, which cause inflationary pressures counteracting the subsidy’s 
deflationary effect. If the subsidy rate is raised to sufficiently high levels, 
however, Proposition 5.4 shows that the subsidy’s deflationary effect dominates 
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its inflationary counter-effect. The power of AMS to impose a wage cap on unions 
is thus sufficiently strong to allow the economy to run almost at full employment 
without triggering inflation. 
Full employment, however, comes at huge welfare costs. While in Case A, 
welfare and employment go hand in hand (they are actually equivalent due to the 
symmetric structure of the model), this is no longer true when firms split up into 
small, high-price firms and large, low-price firms. At a given level of aggregate 
employment, this reduces welfare compared to a situation in which all firms 
behave identically. A higher subsidy rate will induce more firm-union pairs to 
shrink, while the remaining firm-union pairs become larger. Consumers are left 
with less variety in their shopping baskets. For the limiting case 1→s , 
Proposition 5.4 indicates that the number of expanding firms approaches zero, 
while the few expanding firms employ almost the complete aggregate workforce 
),0( yymm i →→
+++ . Despite larger output levels of the remaining good(s), 
variety-loving consumers are clearly worse off by this extreme reduction in the 
available range of (affordable) products. Hence, an AMS sacrifices the 
consumers’ desire for variety for gains in aggregate employment. 
Proposition 5.4 indicates the existence of Case B. The question remains whether 
Case A always exists so that introducing AMS at a very small rate would always 
increase both employment and welfare. If there had not been any employment 
gains compared to the situation without subsidies, the outside option would not 
have improved and there would not be any incentive to shrink. Therefore, starting 
at 0=s  and marginally increasing the subsidy rate will always lead to a Case A – 
equilibrium before switching to Case B. Proposition 5.5 summarizes. 
Proposition 5.5: The marginal introduction of an asymmetric marginal 
employment subsidy always raises both employment and welfare. 
Proof: See appendix. 
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5. Numerical simulation 
Since no closed-form solution of the equilibrium in Case B can be obtained – 
except for the limiting case of 1→s  – we apply a numerical simulation to 
analyze the effects of AMS for “intermediate” subsidy rates. How strongly 
welfare is linked to aggregate employment in Case B depends on the consumers’ 
taste for variety, which is represented by the elasticity of substitution σ. To 
account for its influence, we consider four different scenarios: 
• a high desire for variety, which implies a low substitutability ( 5.1=σ ); 
• two intermediate scenarios with 2=σ  and 3=σ ; 
• a low desire for variety, which is represented by a high substitutability 
( 10=σ ). 
In all scenarios, we set the net replacement rate to 5.0=b  (which is in line with 
stylized facts for the OECD; see Carone et al. 2004, Table 8). The union’s weight 
on wages φ is adjusted to ensure an unemployment rate of ten percent in the initial 
situation without subsidies.13 
Figure 5.3 plots the employment, welfare, and distributional effects of AMS for 
all four scenarios. There is always a range of moderate subsidy rates for which 
Case A exists. As was to be expected, higher values of φ reduce the maximum 
attainable employment level in Case A. In the first scenario with 075.0=φ , for 
example, unions value employment much more than wages, such that an AMS 
with 13.0=s  can increase aggregate employment up to 99.7 percent before 
unions start to raise wages and let their firms shrink. In the fourth scenario, on the 
other hand, unions value wages much more ( 5.0=φ ). The transition from Case A 
to Case B occurs at a subsidy rate of 02.0=s  and an aggregate employment rate 
of 95.3 percent. The critical subsidy rate, above which Case B sets in, falls as σ 
rises. Individual firm-union-pairs react more strongly to a given subsidy rate if 
they face more elastic product demand. This produces stronger employment 
effects, and the switch to Case B occurs at lower subsidy rates. 
                                                 
13 Empirical estimates of φ are typically in the range of 0.2 to 0.4, but can reach values as high as 
0.88 for some unions (see Cahuc and Zylberberg 2004, 379, for an overview). 
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Figure 5.3: Numerical simulations 
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Our simulations suggest that the employment and welfare effects in Case B are 
not monotonous. Aggregate employment can fall immediately after switching to 
Case B. This non-monotonous employment effect has its roots in the non-
monotonous composition of the workforce. At the transition between Cases A and 
B, the share of workers employed in expanding firms yym i /
++  has to be equal to 
one. When the first firm decides to shrink, this share has to fall. Workers in 
shrinking firms earn a higher wage than workers in expanding firms, so average 
wages increase and wage pressure rises. This inflationary effect counteracts the 
subsidy’s deflationary effect and causes employment to fall. Although the overall 
effect is ambiguous for some interval in Case B, we know from Proposition 5.4 
that yym i /
++  converges to one for 1→s . Hence, the employment share of 
expanding firms has to increase eventually, which lowers the average wage, 
reduces inflationary wage pressure, and increases employment.  
In comparison, the four scenarios show that the negative effect on employment 
lessens as σ rises. A higher price elasticity of product demand means that 
shrinking firms become smaller. This lowers the share of workers employed in 
shrinking firms and thereby reduces their impact on aggregate wage pressure. In 
the fourth scenario with 10=σ , the upward wage pressure is too weak to 
overcompensate the subsidy’s deflationary effect and employment rises 
monotonically in s. 
If employment falls, welfare must fall as well. Less employed workers produce 
less output, and diverging prices between expanding and shrinking firms make it 
more difficult for consumers to satisfy their taste for variety. This happens in Case 
B of the first three scenarios. In the fourth scenario, however, aggregate 
employment rises monotonically in Case B. Moreover, consumers are able to 
substitute the various goods relatively well, such that variety is less important. 
Our simulations show that this suffices to raise welfare for a range of subsidy 
rates even in Case B. While the transition from Case A to Case B takes place at a 
subsidy rate of 1.2 percent, the welfare index C is maximized at a higher subsidy 
rate of 5.3 percent. 
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AMS has strong distributional effects. Even if unions cannot shift the subsidy 
fully into higher wages, they are able to lift their members’ net wages. Firms have 
to pay these higher wages for all their employees, but receive the subsidy only for 
extra workers. This lowers the share of profits in the functional income 
distribution in all four scenarios. Since total production might increase, however, 
this does not necessarily mean that absolute profits have to fall. In Case A, profits 
rise if 2<σ , stay constant if 2=σ , and fall if 2>σ . In Case B, profits are 
decreasing in s in all scenarios. 
6. The long run 
In the long run, firms may freely enter and exit the market. If, by developing a 
new variety and selling it on the market, a new firm could earn enough profits to 
cover its start-up costs F, it enters. If not, it stays out. Incumbent firms stay in the 
market as long as their short-run profits are positive because their start-up costs 
are sunk.14  
The treatment of new firms is crucial for the long-run efficacy of marginal 
employment subsidies. Since a new firm’s reference employment level is zero, all 
its workers count as extra jobs that, in principle, would be eligible for AMS. This 
procedure is problematic, however, because any incumbent firm would try to take 
advantage of it by setting up a new firm to which it would relocate all its business 
activities and its workforce. It could then enjoy full subsidization even without 
creating a single new job. If all incumbent firms converted to new firms, all 
workers in the economy would be subsidized. This would make AMS equivalent 
to a general subsidy and eliminate all positive employment effects. 
Alternatively, the government could exclude new firms that are founded after the 
reference date from subsidization. New firms would make less profit than 
                                                 
14 For a discussion of sunk cost see e.g. Martin (1993, 304) who also lays out why sunk cost are 
not just a short-run phenomenon, but remain relevant in the long run. 
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incumbent firms, which prevents the conversion of incumbent into new firms.15 
Keeping incumbent firms in the market is essential for a positive long-run 
employment effect because it is the asymmetry of the subsidy scheme that tames 
the trade unions. The long-run equilibrium then depends on whether new firms 
will enter.  
Incumbent firms’ profits fall in s if 2>σ  (see proof of Proposition 5.6 in the 
appendix). New firms always make less profit than incumbent firms because they 
are not subsidized. Hence, new firms strictly prefer not to enter the market. For 
2=σ , incumbent firms’ profits stay constant in s, such that they earn just enough 
to cover start-up costs. New firms make less profit and prefer to stay out. Only for 
2<σ , where incumbent firms’ profits are increasing in s, is it possible that new 
firms earn enough to cover their start-up costs. Therefore, there has to be a critical 
level ] [2,1∈σ  at which new firms are, in equilibrium, just indifferent between 
entering the market and staying out. Only if σ is less than this critical level will 
new firms enter. Otherwise, the long-run effects of AMS will be exactly the same 
as in the short run. This result is worth being stated as  
Proposition 5.6: An asymmetric marginal employment subsidy yields the same 
employment and welfare effects in the long run as in the short run if σ≥σ  with 
2<σ , in which case new firms prefer not to enter the market. 
Proof: See appendix. 
Only if 2<σ<σ , new firms earn enough profits to cover their start-up costs and 
enter the market. The resulting equilibrium can then be described by a system of 
equations similar to that of Case B because new entrants always behave like 
(unsubsidized) shrinking firms. In fact, equations (5.15) and (5.18)-(5.21) have to 
                                                 
15 A second alternative would be to grant higher marginal employment subsidies to incumbent 
firms until the average employment subsidy becomes the same for new and incumbent firms (see 
Knabe, Schöb and Weimann 2006b for details). 
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be fulfilled unchanged. The total number of firms in the market, m, is determined 
by the condition that new firms make just enough profits to cover their start-up 
cost: 
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The left-hand side of (5.22) is a new firm’s profit. The right-hand side is the level 
of start-up costs, which is given by a firm’s profit in the initial equilibrium with 
0=s , i.e. 10
−µ= WymF f . Equation (5.22) can be simplified to  
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Again, all m firms are divided into +m  expanding and −m  shrinking firms. As in 
the short run, in equilibrium unions are either indifferent between expanding and 
shrinking or strictly prefer expansion. The number of expanding firms is restricted 
to 0mm ≤
+  because only incumbent firms receive a subsidy and can pursue the 
expansion strategy. Similarly to (5.17), we can write this condition as 
 −+ Ω≥Ω  and 0mm ≤
+ , (5.24) 
where at least one of the two expressions has to hold with equality. Hence, the 
long-run equilibrium if new firms enter is given by the system of equations (5.15), 
(5.18)-(5.21), (5.23), and (5.24). The long-run employment and welfare effects 
can then be described as 
Proposition 5.7: If σ<σ , new firms enter. If all incumbent unions are indifferent 
between the expanding and shrinking strategies (as in the short-run Case B), AMS 
yield the same employment effect in the long run as in the short run. If all 
incumbent unions prefer the expanding strategy, long-run employment is less than 
short-run employment but larger than in the initial equilibrium. AMS always 
increase welfare in the long run. 
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Proof: See appendix. 
The first part of the proposition describes the situation where the entry of new 
firms raises the number of shrinking and expanding firms proportionally. In this 
case, the relative division of firms is unchanged, and employment is unaffected by 
the entry of new firms. In its second part, Proposition 5.7 refers to the case where 
the entry of new firms increases the share of shrinking firms in the economy. 
Since shrinking firms set higher prices than expanding firms, this releases 
inflationary pressure that reduces employment compared to the short run. This 
inflationary counter-effect, however, is not sufficient to outweigh the positive 
effects of AMS altogether. Hence, AMS will increase employment compared to 
the initial equilibrium even in the long-run. Since consumers love variety, an 
increase in the number of firms always increases welfare for a given level of 
aggregate production. We have shown that AMS always increase aggregate 
employment above its initial level, from which follows that AMS always increase 
welfare also in the long run. 
We conduct a numerical simulation to illustrate the difference between the short-
run and long-run effects of AMS (Figure 5.4). For σ≥σ , short-run and long-run 
effects coincide, so we can restrict our attention to the case of σ<σ . For an 
initial unemployment rate of 10 percent and 5.0=b , the critical value σ  is 
around 1.58. In Figure 5.4, we choose a very small value of 3.1=σ  to make the 
difference between the short run (solid line) and the long run (dashed line) visible. 
The left and middle figures show the results of Proposition 5.7. In Section 1 (for 
subsidy rates between 0 and 15.5 percent), new firms enter but unions in 
incumbent firms prefer to expand. In this case, the share of shrinking firms 
increases, and the resulting inflationary pressure reduces employment. Welfare 
increases more in the long run than in the short run because new firms enter and 
increase the variety of available goods. At 155.0=s , welfare increases from 0.9 
to 0.995 (increase by 10.5 percent) in the short run, but rises to 1.126 (increase by 
25.1 percent) in the long run because of an increase in firms (varieties) by 3.8 
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percent. In Section 2 (subsidy rates between 15.5 and 24 percent), new firms enter 
but incumbent unions remain indifferent between expanding and shrinking. As 
Proposition 5.7 shows, the entry of new firms does not affect aggregate 
employment compared to the short run. Welfare, however, increases due to the 
entry of new firms. In Section 3, new firms do not want to enter, and the long run 
equilibrium is the same as the short-run equilibrium.  
Figure 5.4 shows that the entry of new firms might harm aggregate employment, 
although the quantitative effect is rather small. The welfare of variety-loving 
consumers, however, increases substantially. 
 
 
Figure 5.4: The short run (solid line) and the long run (dashed line) 
7. Conclusion 
Asymmetric marginal employment subsidies that support extra jobs without 
punishing lay-offs are superior to both general employment subsidies and 
symmetric marginal employment subsidies. The driving force behind this result is 
the fact that the asymmetry of the subsidy scheme makes it less costly for firms to 
lay off a substantial fraction of their workforce when trade unions raise wages too 
aggressively. The credible threat of the firm to shrink tames the unions, causes 
wage moderation and raises aggregate employment and welfare. For moderate 
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subsidy rates, all unions prefer to restrain their wage claims and let their firms 
expand. In this case, raising the subsidy rate improves both employment and 
welfare. At high subsidy rates, labor market conditions improve so much that 
some unions start to enforce higher wages and let their firms shrink. This 
displacement of firms might have an ambiguous effect on employment but 
definitely lowers welfare as it distorts the households’ consumption decisions. 
This shows that asymmetric marginal wage subsidies are an effective means to 
fight unemployment and to increase welfare. Nevertheless, they should be applied 
with caution. 
We have discussed several features that prevent the exploitation of the subsidy 
scheme by incumbent firms. One practical problem remains. Even though 
incumbent firms may not simply convert themselves into new firms, they could 
outsource their workforce to another incumbent firm. In our model, the insourcing 
firm would then produce two varieties. Net employment would not change but the 
‘transferred’ workforce would be eligible for AMS. In the extreme case, all 
incumbent firms merge into one single firm and (almost) the complete workforce 
would be subsidized. AMS would degenerate to a general subsidy, and aggregate 
employment and welfare would return to their initial, non-subsidized levels. Such 
outsourcing activities, however, could be reduced by setting a threshold above 
which employment expansions in incumbent firms are not subsidized anymore. 
Such restrictions have already been implemented in real-life marginal subsidy 
programs. For example, the New Jobs Tax Credit in the United States restricted 
the maximum subsidy to the smaller of 25 percent of a firm’s total wage bill or 
100,000 US-$ per firm and year (Perloff and Wachter, 1979). Another option 
would be to restrict the subsidy to a certain number relative to the incumbent 
workforce. For example, one could introduce a ceiling at twice the reference 
employment level (see Knabe, Schöb and Weimann 2006a,b). Such restrictions 
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can prevent misuse of the subsidy and thereby preserve the asymmetry of the 
subsidy scheme. One should keep in mind, however, that even if these precautions 
fail, and firms manage to circumvent the marginal subsidy and get their entire 
workforce subsidized, the resulting long-run equilibrium would be the same as the 
one without any subsidy. AMS would then still be a welfare-enhancing policy due 
to its favorable short-run effects. 
Our analysis clearly shows that institutions, and their correct implementation in 
economic models, matter. The very fact that a small modification in the modeling 
of marginal subsidy schemes leads to substantially different results emphasizes 
the importance of institutional details for economic analysis, and in particular for 
the study of tax incidence. Besides contributing to the literature on the incidence 
of employment subsidies, this chapter therefore also fits into the growing 
literature that reintroduces institutions in economic theory. 
Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 5.1. If no firm wants to expand and receive the subsidy, and 
their unions set their wages accordingly, the resulting equilibrium is the initial 
equilibrium without any subsidy. The aggregate price setting equation PS is then 
given by 1)1( −µ+= fPW , and the wage setting equation is given 0yy = . Any 
single firm would strictly prefer shrinking if  
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By inserting 1)1( −µ+= fPW , the wage setting equation, and using the symmetry 
condition yC =  for the quantity index,16 the condition for a preference to shrink 
(5.A.1) simplifies to 
                                                 
16 If all firms are identical and set the same price, the quantity index in (5.4) simplifies to C = mCi 
= y. 
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 [ ] 01)1( 1 <−−−µ σ− ssf . (5.A.2) 
The left-hand-side of (5.A.2) is zero for 0=s . For all ] ]1,0∈s , however, it is 
increasing in s: 
 [ ][ ] [ ]1,0,01)1(1)1( 1 ∈∀≥−−=−−−µ
∂
∂ σ−σ− ssss
s
f , (5.A.3) 
i.e. (5.A.1) cannot hold. If all other firm-union-pairs shrink, any single firm would 
prefer to expand. There is no Nash equilibrium in which all firms strictly prefer to 
shrink.  
If all firms pursued an expansion strategy, and their unions expect them to do so, 
the resulting equilibrium is the same as with a SMS: the aggregate price setting 
equation (5.PS) and the aggregate wage setting equation (5.WS) apply. Any single 
firm will strictly prefer expansion if condition (5.17) holds as a strict inequality 
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As all other firms expand, we can substitute in the (5.PS) condition on both sides. 
By further inserting ( )[ ] 0)1)(1(1 yby uu =−µ+µ−= , derived from (5.WS), and 
using again the symmetry condition yC =  for the quantity index, the condition 
(5.A.4) for a single firm to expand simplifies to 
 [ ] 0)1()1( >−−−−µ σ sssf . (5.A.5) 
At 0=s , the left-hand side of (5.A.2) is zero. For all ] ]1,0∈s , condition (5.A.2) 
becomes smaller in s (using 1)1( −−σ=µ f ): 
 [ ][ ] [ ] [ ]1,0,01)1()1()1()1( 1 ∈∀≤−−µ+=−−−−µ
∂
∂
−σσ sssss
s
ff . (5.A.6) 
Condition (5.A.4) cannot hold. If all other firm-union-pairs expanded, an 
individual firm would prefer to shrink. There is no Nash equilibrium in which all 
firms strictly prefer to expand. ■ 
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Proof of Proposition 5.3. With 0=s , using L’Hôpital’s rule, we have for 
condition (5.16): 
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For marginal changes in s, we find 
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Let the numerator of (5.A.8) be denoted by A. Since we have 0
0
=
=s
A  and 
] [1,00)1)(1( 20 ∈∀>−−σσµ=∂∂ −σ sssysA f , equilibrium employment is 
increasing in s. ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 5.4. We discussed in the main text that, for a given level of 
y, C is maximized if all varieties are consumed at the same level. This is the case 
if all goods have the same prices. In this case, the quantity index simplifies to 
yC = . Since aggregate employment is restricted to [0,1], it is clear that we must 
also have 1≤C . Rewriting (5.15), inserting (5.7) and (5.14), yields 
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from which, for 1≤C , we have 
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Inserting in (5.17) with the explicit forms of +iP  and 
−
iP  yields 
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which implies 0lim
1
=
+
→
m
s
. Moreover, the second term on the right-hand-side of 
(5.A.11) must not be infinitely large. This requires that the term in round brackets 
must not be zero, i.e. 
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From (5.17), we know that 
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(5.A.12) then requires the right-hand-side of (5.A.13) to be finite. The left-hand-
side of (5.A.13) can only be finite if 
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By combining (5.18) and (5.20), we obtain 
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For 1→s , using (5.A.14), we obtain after some rearranging 
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 cannot constitute an equilibrium. By inserting 0=y  into the second 
bracketed term in (5.A.16), this condition reduces to 
( ) 0)1(1 ≤µ−=µ+− ++ yymbb uu . Substituting into the (5.WS) condition shows 
that this requires 00 ≤y , which is incompatible with a positive employment rate 
in the initial equilibrium. 
Other solutions of (5.A.16) can be found for yymy <<< ++,10 . These solutions 
cannot describe a general equilibrium for 1→s  either. Multiplying both sides of 
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Equation (5.A.19) is only fulfilled if 0lim
1
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C
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. This concludes the proof. ■ 
Proof of Proposition 5.5. A Case A-equilibrium exists if all unions prefer to 
expand after a marginal introduction of the subsidy. This requires (cf. condition 
(5.17)): 
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By inserting the equilibrium outcomes [ ]
P
Wyby
P
W
t
o ~
)1(
)1(
1
−+=
−
 and 
)1)(1(
1~
sP
W
f −µ+
= , (5.A.20) simplifies to 
 [ ] [ ] 0)1()1()()1()1)(1( >µ+−µ+−−−−
≡
σ−σφσ−φφ
4444444444 34444444444 21
A
uu sbybyb . (5.A.21) 
For 0=s , inserting (5.WS) into (5.A.21) gives 00 ==sA . Introducing AMS at 
the margin at 0=s  then yields 
 ( ) ( )( ) 0111
0
00
>






µ
µ+φ−µ+φ−σ−+σ=
∂
∂
=
== 44444 344444 21 u
u
u
ss
b
ds
dy
s
A , (5.A.22) 
Chapter 5: Promoting employment by taming the unions 
  125
which implies that (5.A.20) is always fulfilled, i.e. in the equilibrium arising from 
a marginal introduction of AMS, unions will always prefer expansion. ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 5.6. We start with Case A. We first show that new, 
unsubsidized firms always make less profit than incumbent firms. The profit of a 
new firm that does not receive any subsidy is given by (using 
)()1)(1( 1 PWtPW oui
−
−µ+=  and equation (5.9)): 
[ ]
σ−
σ−σ−σ−
σ−




+−µ+µ+µ=


 µ+µ=Π
1
11
~
)1()1()1(
)1(
P
Wbyb
m
C
P
W
m
C
P
W
P
uff
i
f
i
f
new
. (5.A. 23) 
An incumbent firm’s profit is given by 
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where 0m  is the initial number of firms. Inserting (5.A.7) and comparing (5.A.23) 
and (5.A.24) at 0mm =  then gives 
 [ ] 1)1()1( >+−µ+⇔Π>Π byb
PP u
newinc
. (5.A.25) 
Since [ ] 1)1()1( =+−µ+ bybu  at 0yy =  (where 0y  is defined by the WS 
condition), (5.A.25) is fulfilled for all 0 yy > : new firms always make less 
profits than incumbent firms. 
Next, we determine how an incumbent firm’s profit depends on s, given that no 
new firm has yet entered. Inserting (5.19) into (5.A.24), and applying 
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Differentiating with respect to s shows that 
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As the second derivative yields ( ) σ−−σ−σ−=Π )1)(2)(1(22 sdsPd inc , we have 
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Incumbent firms make zero profits if 0=s  so that they make (weakly) negative 
profits for 0>s  and 2≥σ . As new firms make less profits, they will not enter 
the market.  
For case B, we first show that new firms would always make negative profits if 
2≥σ . By inserting (5.A.7) into (5.A.24), we can rewrite the profit of an 
expanding incumbent firm as 
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We know that Case B is characterized by a consumption distortion, so that C is 
less than in Case A, ceteris paribus. (5.A.29) shows that 0>∂Π∂ Cinc , such that 
profits in Case B will be even less than they would have been if Case A had 
prevailed at the same s. Hence new firms never want to enter if 2≥σ . ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 5.7. We distinguish two cases. In the first case, unions are 
indifferent between expanding and shrinking. Equation (5.24) reads −+ Ω=Ω  and 
0mm ≤
+ . In this case, the system of equations is solved exactly like in the short 
run. Hence, equations (5.15) and (5.17)-(5.21) solve the equilibrium values of y , 
C , PW , mm /+ , PW~  and PW o . Equation (5.23) determines m, but has no 
influence on the other equilibrium outcomes. Thus, y and C retain their short-run 
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values. If C is constant, but m increases, it follows from (5.4) that welfare (∑i iV ) 
has to increase. 
In the second case, all incumbent unions prefer expansion, i.e. −+ Ω>Ω  and 
0mm =
+ . Rewriting (5.19) with the explicit forms of +iy  and 
−
iy  gives 
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For given short-run equilibrium values of y and C, an increase in m decreases the 
RHS of (5.A.30) because −+ < ii PP . C is restricted by yC ≤ , such that an 
increase in C cannot equilibrate (5.A.30). Since 0/ >− dydPi  (via y’s impact on 
the outside option), y has to fall to restore the equality. Hence, aggregate 
employment will be less in the short-run than in the long-run. 
To compare the long-run effect with the initial equilibrium, we combine (5.18) 
and (5.20), and insert 0mm =
+ , 0mmm −=
− , and the explicit forms of +iy  and 
−
iy , to obtain 
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We know from (5.A.14) and (5.A.10) that 0)~( >∂∂ sPW . Also,  
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with 
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Denoting the numerator of (5.A.33) by A, we obtain 0
0
=
=s
A  and 
] [1,00)1)(1( 2 ∈∀>−−σσ=∂∂ −σ ssssA . Hence, (5.A.32) is increasing in s. It 
follows that, for any equilibrium values of C and y, increasing s increases the 
Chapter 5: Promoting employment by taming the unions 
  128
right-hand side of (5.A.32), which requires an increase in )1()( tPW o −  to 
balance the equation. From (5.23), it follows that C has to increase. The entry of 
new firms raises m, which strengthens the necessary increase in C. At 0=s , we 
have 0yyC == , so that increasing s raises welfare and employment above their 
initial levels. ■ 
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